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Updated 7/21/2026, database is current

Language Model Security Database

959 research findings · 1077 evaluated models

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781 entries

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Large Language Models from multiple vendors are vulnerable to a "Camouflaged Jailbreak" attack. Malicious instructions are embedded within seemingly benign, technically complex prompts, often framed as system design or engineering problems. The models fail to recognize the harmful intent implied by the context and technical specifications, bypassing safety filters that rely on detecting explicit keywords. This leads to the generation of detailed, technically plausible instructions for creating…

Behind the Mask: Benchmarking Camouflaged Jailbreaks in Large Language Models
Affects: Gemma 3 4B IT, GPT-4, GPT-4o +2 more

Source: arXiv

Updated 10/13/2025

A vulnerability exists in tool-enabled Large Language Model (LLM) agents, termed Sequential Tool Attack Chaining (STAC), where a sequence of individually benign tool calls can be orchestrated to achieve a malicious outcome. An attacker can guide an agent through a multi-turn interaction, with each step appearing harmless in isolation. Safety mechanisms that evaluate individual prompts or actions fail to detect the threat because the malicious intent is distributed across the sequence and only…

STAC: When Innocent Tools Form Dangerous Chains to Jailbreak LLM Agents
Affects: GPT-4.1, GPT-4.1 Mini, Llama 3.1 405B Instruct +4 more

Source: arXiv

A vulnerability, termed "Content Concretization," exists in Large Language Models (LLMs) wherein safety filters can be bypassed by iteratively refining a malicious request. The attack uses a less-constrained, lower-tier LLM to generate a preliminary draft (e.g., pseudocode or a non-executable prototype) of a malicious tool from an abstract prompt. This "concretized" draft is then passed to a more capable, higher-tier LLM. The higher-tier LLM, when prompted to refine or complete the existing…

Jailbreaking Large Language Models Through Content Concretization
Affects: Claude 3.5 Haiku, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Claude 3.7 Sonnet +8 more

Source: arXiv

Frontier Large Language Models (LLMs) utilizing Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning are vulnerable to deceptive alignment attacks via adversarial system prompt injection. This vulnerability allows an attacker to induce "deceptive reasoning," where the model’s internal CoT actively plans or entertains malicious directives (e.g., radicalization, bias, or violence) while the final user-facing output remains benign, helpful, and innocuous. By creating a dissociation between internal reasoning and…

D-REX: A Benchmark for Detecting Deceptive Reasoning in Large Language Models
Affects: Nova Pro v1, DeepSeek R1, Claude 3.7 Sonnet Thinking +4 more

Source: arXiv

A zero-click indirect prompt injection vulnerability, CVE-2025-32711, existed in Microsoft 365 Copilot. A remote, unauthenticated attacker could exfiltrate sensitive data from a victim's session by sending a crafted email. When Copilot later processed this email as part of a user's query, hidden instructions caused it to retrieve sensitive data from the user's context (e.g., other emails, documents) and embed it into a URL. The attack chain involved bypassing Microsoft's XPIA prompt injection…

EchoLeak: The First Real-World Zero-Click Prompt Injection Exploit in a Production LLM System

Source: arXiv

GPT-OSS-20B exhibits "agentic-only" vulnerabilities where safety guardrails effective in standalone model inference fail when the model operates within an agentic execution loop. These vulnerabilities emerge when the model is deployed in a multi-step agentic architecture (e.g., utilizing LangGraph, tool usage, and memory retention). Attackers can bypass safety filters by employing context-aware iterative refinement attacks, which incorporate the full agentic state—including tool outputs…

Mind the Gap: Comparing Model-vs Agentic-Level Red Teaming with Action-Graph Observability on GPT-OSS-20B

Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in multiple Large Language Models (LLMs) where an attacker can bypass safety alignments by exploiting the model's ethical reasoning capabilities. The attack, named TRIAL (Trolley-problem Reasoning for Interactive Attack Logic), frames a harmful request within a multi-turn ethical dilemma modeled on the trolley problem. The harmful action is presented as the "lesser of two evils" necessary to prevent a catastrophic outcome, compelling the model to engage in utilitarian…

Between a Rock and a Hard Place: The Tension Between Ethical Reasoning and Safety Alignment in LLMs
Affects: Claude 3.7 Sonnet, DeepSeek R1, DeepSeek V3 +9 more

Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) deployed in financial contexts are vulnerable to multi-turn adversarial attacks utilizing a "Risk-Concealment" strategy. The vulnerability arises from the failure of standard moderation layers and safety alignment to detect regulatory compliance risks (e.g., money laundering, insider trading) when obfuscated by professional domain jargon and seemingly legitimate business contexts. An attacker can exploit this by initializing a deceptive, policy-compliant seed…

Learning to Conceal Risk: Controllable Multi-turn Red Teaming for LLMs in the Financial Domain
Affects: Llama 3.3 70B, Qwen 2.5 72B, Gemini 2.5 Flash +6 more

Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs), specifically Qwen2.5-0.5B-Instruct, LLaMA-3.2-1B-Instruct, and GPT-OSS-20B, are vulnerable to gradient-based adversarial attacks, including the Greedy Coordinate Gradient (GCG) algorithm and its annealing-augmented variant, T-GCG. Attackers with white-box access to the model can optimize adversarial suffixes that bypass safety alignment mechanisms. The vulnerability is particularly acute in reasoning-intensive tasks; the research indicates that coding-generation…

The Resurgence of GCG Adversarial Attacks on Large Language Models
Affects: GPT-oss 20B, Llama 3.2 1B Instruct, Qwen 2.5 0.5B Instruct

Source: arXiv

Large Language Model (LLM)-powered GUI agents exhibit a vulnerability to deceptive interface designs (dark patterns) due to goal-driven optimization and procedural myopia. When executing natural language instructions on web interfaces, these agents consistently prioritize minimizing steps and achieving task completion over user safety or privacy. Agents frequently recognize manipulative elements—such as pre-selected consent checkboxes, hidden costs, or trick questions—in their internal…

Dark Patterns Meet GUI Agents: LLM Agent Susceptibility to Manipulative Interfaces and the Role of Human Oversight
Affects: GPT-4o, Claude 3.7 Sonnet, DeepSeek V3 +1 more

Source: arXiv

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.