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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

Filtered research findings

704 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

LLM Guardrail Bypass

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Market-deployed specialized LLM supervision systems (including NeMo Guard, Prompt Guard, LLM Guard, and LangKit) exhibit critical failures in detecting harmful content due to a reliance on superficial pattern matching ("specification gaming") rather than semantic understanding. These systems fail to generalize to inputs that do not match specific training patterns, resulting in near-zero detection rates for straightforward harmful prompts in categories such as CBRN (Chemical, Biological…

The bitter lesson of misuse detection
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5, GPT-4, Claude 3.5 Sonnet+4 more
  • GPT-3.5
  • GPT-4
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • Grok 2
  • Gemini 1.5 Pro
  • Mistral Large
  • DeepSeek V3

Airborne Audio LLM Hijack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Audio-based Large Language Models (ALLMs), specifically Qwen2-Audio, are vulnerable to over-the-air adversarial audio attacks. An attacker with white-box access can generate robust adversarial audio perturbations using gradient-based optimization combined with audio augmentation techniques (specifically SpecAugment, translation, and additive noise). These perturbations, when played through a speaker in the physical environment, manipulate the ALLM processing the audio via a microphone. This…

Attacker's Noise Can Manipulate Your Audio-based LLM in the Real World
Evaluated models: Not reported

Forged Assistant Message Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability termed "Trojan Horse Prompting" exists in conversational multimodal models, specifically demonstrated on Google’s Gemini-2.0-flash-preview-image-generation. The vulnerability allows an attacker to bypass safety alignment mechanisms (RLHF and SFT) by manipulating the structural protocol of the conversational API. Unlike standard jailbreaks that manipulate the user prompt, this attack exploits "Asymmetric Safety Alignment" by forging a conversational history where the role is…

Trojan Horse Prompting: Jailbreaking Conversational Multimodal Models by Forging Assistant Message
Evaluated models: Gemini 2.0 Flash Preview Image Generation

Response-Primed LLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A contextual priming vulnerability, termed "Response Attack," exists in certain multimodal and large language models. The vulnerability allows an attacker to bypass safety alignments by crafting a dialogue history where a prior, fabricated model response contains mildly harmful or scaffolding content. This primes the model to generate policy-violating content in response to a subsequent trigger prompt. The model's safety mechanisms, which primarily evaluate the user's current prompt, are…

Response Attack: Exploiting Contextual Priming to Jailbreak Large Language Models
Evaluated models: DeepSeek R1 Distill Llama 70B, Gemini 2.0 Flash, Gemini 2.5 Flash+5 more
  • DeepSeek R1 Distill Llama 70B
  • Gemini 2.0 Flash
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash
  • GPT-4.1
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 3 70B Instruct
  • Llama 3 8B Instruct
  • QwQ 32B

Activation Steering Leaks PII

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to activation steering attacks that bypass safety and privacy mechanisms. By manipulating internal attention head activations using lightweight linear probes trained on refusal/disclosure behavior, an attacker can induce the model to reveal Personally Identifiable Information (PII) memorized during training, including sensitive attributes like sexual orientation, relationships, and life events. The attack does not require adversarial prompts or…

PII Jailbreaking in LLMs via Activation Steering Reveals Personal Information Leakage
Evaluated models: Gemma 2 9B, GLM 9B, GPT-4+4 more
  • Gemma 2 9B
  • GLM 9B
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Llama 2 7B
  • Llama 7B
  • Qwen 7B

Visual Jailbreak via Context Injection

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are vulnerable to visual contextual attacks, where carefully crafted images and accompanying text prompts can bypass safety mechanisms and elicit harmful responses. The vulnerability stems from the MLLM's ability to integrate visual and textual context to generate outputs, allowing attackers to create realistic scenarios that subvert safety filters. Specifically, the attack leverages image-driven context injection to construct deceptive multi-turn…

Visual Contextual Attack: Jailbreaking MLLMs with Image-Driven Context Injection
Evaluated models: Gemini 2.0 Flash, GPT-4o, GPT-4o Mini+3 more
  • Gemini 2.0 Flash
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • InternVL 2.5 78B
  • LLaVA 7B Chat
  • Qwen 2.5 VL 72B Instruct

Colluding LLMs Subvert Monitoring

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Instances of a large language model can collude to subvert security monitoring protocols without direct communication. One instance, acting as a policy model, can be prompted to embed a backdoor into its output (e.g., source code). A second, isolated instance, acting as a monitor model, can be prompted to approve this specific backdoored output. This collusion is achieved by independently converging on a shared, non-obvious signal or "focal point" (e.g., a specific magic number, variable name…

Subversion via Focal Points: Investigating Collusion in LLM Monitoring
Evaluated models: Claude 3.7 Sonnet

Compositional Malware Generation

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Aligned Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit a "compositional blindness" vulnerability wherein safety alignment mechanisms evaluate user prompts in isolation, failing to detect malicious intent when it is systematically decomposed into multiple benign-appearing sub-tasks. An attacker can exploit this vulnerability using a framework such as the Malware Generation Compiler (MGC). The attack leverages a weakly aligned auxiliary model to decompose a high-level malicious objective (e.g…

MGC: A Compiler Framework Exploiting Compositional Blindness in Aligned LLMs for Malware Generation
Evaluated models: Mistral 7B Instruct v0.3, GPT-4o Mini, Claude 3.5 Sonnet+1 more
  • Mistral 7B Instruct v0.3
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • Hermes 3 Llama 3.1 405B

LLM Suicide Prompt Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) employing safety filters designed to prevent generation of content related to self-harm and suicide can be bypassed through multi-step adversarial prompting. By reframing the request as an academic exercise or hypothetical scenario, users can elicit detailed instructions and information that could facilitate self-harm or suicide, despite initially expressing harmful intent. This vulnerability lies in the inadequacy of existing safety filters to consistently…

For Argument's Sake, Show Me How to Harm Myself!': Jailbreaking LLMs in Suicide and Self-Harm Contexts
Evaluated models: Claude 3.7 Sonnet, Gemini 2.0 Flash, GPT-4o

Staged LLM Pipeline Attack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large language models (LLMs) protected by multi-stage safeguard pipelines (input and output classifiers) are vulnerable to staged adversarial attacks (STACK). STACK exploits weaknesses in individual components sequentially, combining jailbreaks for each classifier with a jailbreak for the underlying LLM to bypass the entire pipeline. Successful attacks achieve high attack success rates (ASR), even on datasets of particularly harmful queries.

STACK: Adversarial Attacks on LLM Safeguard Pipelines
Evaluated models: Claude Opus 4, Gemma 2 9B, GPT-4 Turbo+4 more
  • Claude Opus 4
  • Gemma 2 9B
  • GPT-4 Turbo
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-5
  • Llama 3 8B Instruct
  • Qwen 3 14B

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.