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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

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406 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Synthetic LLM Jailbreak Dataset

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to jailbreaking attacks leveraging synthetically generated prompts. A novel pipeline, SAGE-RT, generates a diverse dataset of 51,000 prompt-response pairs designed to exploit LLMs' vulnerabilities across various categories of harmfulness. These prompts successfully jailbreak state-of-the-art LLMs in a significant percentage of tested sub-categories, including 100% of macro-categories for certain models like GPT-4 and GPT-3.5-turbo. The vulnerability…

Sage-rt: Synthetic alignment data generation for safety evaluation and red teaming
Evaluated models: Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Gemma 7B IT, GPT-3.5 Turbo+8 more
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • Gemma 7B IT
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4 Turbo
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 2 70B Chat
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Llama 3 70B Instruct
  • Llama 3 8B Instruct
  • Mistral 7B Instruct

Kov: MDP-Based LLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to naturalistic adversarial attacks crafted using Markov Decision Processes (MDPs) and Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS). These attacks generate natural-language prompts that elicit harmful, violent, or discriminatory responses from the LLMs, even those with built-in safety mechanisms. The attacks are transferable across different LLMs, demonstrating a generalized vulnerability.

Kov: Transferable and Naturalistic Black-Box LLM Attacks using Markov Decision Processes and Tree Search
Evaluated models: FastChat-T5 3B, GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4+1 more
  • FastChat-T5 3B
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • Vicuna 7B

Composable Jailbreak Synthesis

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to composable jailbreak attacks, allowing bypass of safety filters through the chaining of multiple prompt transformations. The vulnerability arises from the ability to combine seemingly innocuous transformations to create effective attacks that achieve high attack success rates (ASR). These attacks can be synthesized automatically, allowing for the creation of novel and highly effective jailbreaks. Specifically, using the h4rm3l framework, attacks…

h4rm3l: A dynamic benchmark of composable jailbreak attacks for llm safety assessment
Evaluated models: Claude 3 Haiku, Claude 3 Sonnet, GPT-3.5 Turbo+3 more
  • Claude 3 Haiku
  • Claude 3 Sonnet
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 3 70B
  • Llama 3 8B

Contextual Fusion Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a multi-turn context-based jailbreak attack, termed Context Fusion Attack (CFA). CFA leverages the LLM's ability to understand context in multi-turn dialogues to bypass security mechanisms designed to prevent harmful outputs. The attack involves strategically crafting a series of prompts that build context, subtly introducing malicious keywords, and ultimately triggering the LLM to generate unsafe content. The malicious intent is masked within the…

Multi-Turn Context Jailbreak Attack on Large Language Models From First Principles
Evaluated models: ChatGLM4, GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4

Ensemble Jailbreak Technique

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

The Ensemble Jailbreak (EnJa) attack exploits vulnerabilities in the safety mechanisms of large language models (LLMs) by combining prompt-level and token-level attacks. EnJa conceals malicious instructions within seemingly benign prompts, then uses a gradient-based method to optimize adversarial suffixes, significantly increasing the likelihood of bypassing safety filters and generating harmful content. The attack leverages a connector template to seamlessly integrate the concealed prompt and…

EnJa: Ensemble Jailbreak on Large Language Models
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4, Llama 2 13B+3 more
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • Llama 2 13B
  • Llama 2 7B
  • Vicuna 13B
  • Vicuna 7B

GCG Suffix Data Exfiltration

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A Cross-Prompt Injection Attack (XPIA) can be amplified by appending a Greedy Coordinate Gradient (GCG) suffix to the malicious injection. This increases the likelihood that a Large Language Model (LLM) will execute the injected instruction, even in the presence of a user's primary instruction, leading to data exfiltration. The success rate of the attack depends on the LLM's complexity; medium-complexity models show increased vulnerability.

WHITE PAPER: A Brief Exploration of Data Exfiltration using GCG Suffixes
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4o, Phi 3 Mini

LLM-Driven Motion Adversarial Attack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

The ALERT-Motion framework demonstrates a vulnerability in text-to-motion (T2M) models where an attacker can craft subtly modified text prompts (adversarial prompts) that cause the model to generate motions significantly different from those intended by the benign prompt, yet semantically similar to a target motion specified by the attacker. The attack leverages a large language model (LLM) to autonomously generate these adversarial prompts, bypassing simple keyword-based detection mechanisms…

Autonomous LLM-Enhanced Adversarial Attack for Text-to-Motion
Evaluated models: Mdm, Mld

Analyzing-Based LLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to an "Analyzing-based Jailbreak" (ABJ) attack that exploits their analytical and reasoning capabilities. ABJ crafts prompts that instruct the LLM to analyze seemingly innocuous data (e.g., character traits, features, job descriptions) related to a malicious intent, leading the LLM to generate harmful content despite its safety training. This bypasses standard safety mechanisms designed to prevent direct requests for harmful information.

Figure it Out: Analyzing-based Jailbreak Attack on Large Language Models
Evaluated models: Claude-3-haiku-0307, GLM 4 9B Chat, GPT-3.5 Turbo+3 more
  • Claude-3-haiku-0307
  • GLM 4 9B Chat
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4-turbo-0409
  • Llama 3 8B Instruct
  • Qwen-2-7B-chat

Embodied LLM Misaligned Actions

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Embodied Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to manipulation via voice-based interactions, leading to the execution of harmful physical actions. Attacks exploit three vulnerabilities: (1) cascading LLM jailbreaks resulting in malicious robotic commands; (2) misalignment between linguistic outputs (verbal refusal) and physical actions (command execution); and (3) conceptual deception, where seemingly benign instructions lead to harmful outcomes due to incomplete world knowledge within…

BadRobot: Manipulating Embodied LLMs in the Physical World
Evaluated models: BERT, GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4 Turbo+2 more
  • BERT
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4 Turbo
  • GPT-4o
  • LLaVA 1.5 7B

Low-Perplexity LLM Attack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to adversarial attacks that utilize low-perplexity prompts to elicit unsafe content. These prompts, while statistically likely to occur in normal conversation, can trigger the generation of harmful or toxic outputs that evade standard safety filters. The vulnerability stems from the model's inability to reliably distinguish between benign and malicious intents within the statistical distribution of natural language.

ASTPrompter: Weakly Supervised Automated Language Model Red-Teaming to Identify Low-Perplexity Toxic Prompts
Evaluated models: Llama 3.1 8B, Mistral 7B, Qwen 7B+1 more
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Mistral 7B
  • Qwen 7B
  • TinyLlama 1.1

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.