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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

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406 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Multi-Turn Question Fragmentation Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a multi-turn jailbreak attack, termed "Jigsaw Puzzles" (JSP), which circumvents existing safeguards by splitting harmful questions into harmless fragments. The LLM is prompted to reconstruct and answer the complete question from these fragments, resulting in the generation of harmful responses. The attack relies on the LLM's ability to piece together seemingly benign input to form a malicious query, exploiting the model's contextual understanding…

Jigsaw Puzzles: Splitting Harmful Questions to Jailbreak Large Language Models
Evaluated models: Gemini 1.5 Pro, GPT-4, GPT-4o+2 more
  • Gemini 1.5 Pro
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Llama 3.1 70B

Prompt Translation Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in safety-aligned Large Language Models (LLMs) allows attackers to bypass safety mechanisms using adversarial prompt translation. The vulnerability stems from the ability to translate garbled adversarial prompts generated by gradient-based attacks into coherent, human-readable prompts that retain their adversarial capability. This allows for the successful transfer of attacks across different LLMs.

Deciphering the Chaos: Enhancing Jailbreak Attacks via Adversarial Prompt Translation
Evaluated models: Not reported

Multi-Objective LLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a multi-objective black-box jailbreaking attack (BlackDAN) that optimizes prompts to maximize the likelihood of generating unsafe responses while maintaining contextual relevance and minimizing detectability. The attack leverages a multi-objective evolutionary algorithm (NSGA-II) to balance attack success rate, semantic consistency, and stealthiness, resulting in more effective and less easily detectable jailbreaks than single-objective approaches.

BlackDAN: A Black-Box Multi-Objective Approach for Effective and Contextual Jailbreaking of Large Language Models
Evaluated models: Aquilachat-7B, Baichuan 2 13B Chat, Baichuan-7B+12 more
  • Aquilachat-7B
  • Baichuan 2 13B Chat
  • Baichuan-7B
  • GPT-2 XL
  • Internlm2-chat-7B
  • Llama 3 8B
  • Llama-2-13B-hf
  • Llama-2-7B-hf
  • Llava v1.6-mistral-7B-hf
  • Llava-v1.6-vicuna-7B-hf
  • Minitron-8B-base
  • Vicuna 13B v1.5
  • Vicuna 7B
  • Vicuna 7B v1.5
  • Yi 1.5 9B Chat

Attention-Guided Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to jailbreaking attacks that manipulate attention scores to redirect the model's focus away from safety protocols. The AttnGCG attack method increases the attention score on adversarial suffixes within the input prompt, causing the model to prioritize the malicious content over safety guidelines, leading to the generation of harmful outputs.

AttnGCG: Enhancing jailbreaking attacks on LLMs with attention manipulation
Evaluated models: Gemini 1.5 Flash, Gemini Pro, Gemini 1.5 Pro Latest+6 more
  • Gemini 1.5 Flash
  • Gemini Pro
  • Gemini 1.5 Pro Latest
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Mixtral 8x7B Instruct
  • Vicuna 13B
  • Vicuna 7B

Context-Shifting Code Injection

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) acting as code assistants may recommend malicious code or resources when presented with prompts framed as programming challenges, even if they refuse similar direct prompts. This occurs due to insufficient context-aware safety mechanisms. LLMs may suggest compromised libraries, malicious APIs, or other attack vectors within seemingly benign code examples.

Hallucinating AI Hijacking Attack: Large Language Models and Malicious Code Recommenders
Evaluated models: GPT-4

Implicit Reference Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to an attack vector termed "Attack via Implicit Reference" (AIR). AIR bypasses safety mechanisms by decomposing a malicious objective into multiple benign, seemingly unrelated objectives linked through implicit contextual references. The LLM generates harmful content by combining the outputs of these seemingly harmless objectives, without explicitly triggering safety filters designed to detect direct requests for malicious content.

You Know What I'm Saying: Jailbreak Attack via Implicit Reference
Evaluated models: Claude 3.5 Sonnet, GPT-4o, GPT-4o Mini+7 more
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • GPT-4o-0513
  • Llama 3 70B
  • Llama 3 8B
  • Qwen 2 7B
  • Qwen 2 0.5B
  • Qwen 2 1.5B
  • Qwen 2 72B

Iterative Image Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A Chain-of-Jailbreak (CoJ) attack allows bypassing safety mechanisms in image generation models by iteratively editing images based on a sequence of sub-queries. The attack decomposes a malicious query into multiple, seemingly benign sub-queries, each causing the model to generate and modify an image, ultimately producing harmful content. Successful attacks leverage various editing operations (insert, delete, change) on different elements (words, characters, images).

Chain-of-Jailbreak Attack for Image Generation Models via Editing Step by Step
Evaluated models: Gemini 1.5 Pro, GPT-4o, GPT-4V

RAFT: Realistic LLM Detector Evasion

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Model (LLM) detectors are vulnerable to a realistic adversarial attack ("RAFT") that substitutes words in machine-generated text to evade detection. The attack leverages an auxiliary LLM to select optimal words for substitution based on their impact on the target detector's score, while maintaining grammatical correctness and semantic coherence. This allows the attacker to significantly reduce the probability of detection (up to 99%) while preserving text quality, making the…

Raft: Realistic attacks to fool text detectors
Evaluated models: GPT-2, GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4+11 more
  • GPT-2
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-J 6B
  • GPT-Neo 2.7B
  • Llama 3 70B
  • Llama 3 8B
  • Mistral 7B v0.3
  • Mixtral 8x7B Instruct
  • OPT 2.7B
  • RoBERTa Base
  • RoBERTa Large
  • T5

Autonomous Jailbreak Agent

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to jailbreak attacks using autonomously discovered strategies. AutoDAN-Turbo, a black-box attack method, demonstrates the ability to discover novel and highly effective jailbreak strategies without human intervention, achieving a high success rate (e.g., 88.5% on GPT-4-1106-turbo) in eliciting harmful or unsafe responses from LLMs. The attack leverages a lifelong learning agent to iteratively refine attack strategies based on model responses…

Autodan-turbo: A lifelong agent for strategy self-exploration to jailbreak llms
Evaluated models: Gemini Pro, Gemma 7B IT, GPT-4-1106-turbo+5 more
  • Gemini Pro
  • Gemma 7B IT
  • GPT-4-1106-turbo
  • Llama 2 13B Chat
  • Llama 2 70B Chat
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Llama 3 70B
  • Llama 3 8B

Safeguard Denial-of-Service Attack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A denial-of-service (DoS) vulnerability exists in certain Large Language Model (LLM) safeguard implementations due to susceptibility to adversarial prompts. Attackers can inject short, seemingly innocuous adversarial prompts into user prompt templates, causing the safeguard to incorrectly classify legitimate user requests as unsafe and reject them. This allows for a DoS attack against specific users without requiring modification of the LLM itself.

Safeguard is a Double-edged Sword: Denial-of-service Attack on Large Language Models
Evaluated models: GPT-4o Mini, Llama Guard 2 8B, Llama Guard 3 8B+2 more
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Llama Guard 2 8B
  • Llama Guard 3 8B
  • Llama Guard 7B
  • Vicuna 7B v1.5

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.