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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

Filtered research findings

610 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Intermediate Denoising Priming

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A "Priming Vulnerability" exists in Masked Diffusion Language Models (MDLMs) due to their iterative, parallel denoising inference mechanism. Unlike autoregressive models that generate tokens sequentially, MDLMs refine a sequence from a fully masked state through multiple denoising steps. The vulnerability arises because standard safety alignment (e.g., SFT, DPO, MOSA) typically optimizes the model to generate safe responses only when initialized from a fully masked sequence. If an affirmative…

Toward Safer Diffusion Language Models: Discovery and Mitigation of Priming Vulnerability
Evaluated models: Not reported

Chained Tool-Use Injections

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in tool-enabled Large Language Model (LLM) agents, termed Sequential Tool Attack Chaining (STAC), where a sequence of individually benign tool calls can be orchestrated to achieve a malicious outcome. An attacker can guide an agent through a multi-turn interaction, with each step appearing harmless in isolation. Safety mechanisms that evaluate individual prompts or actions fail to detect the threat because the malicious intent is distributed across the sequence and only…

STAC: When Innocent Tools Form Dangerous Chains to Jailbreak LLM Agents
Evaluated models: GPT-4.1, GPT-4.1 Mini, Llama 3.1 405B Instruct+4 more
  • GPT-4.1
  • GPT-4.1 Mini
  • Llama 3.1 405B Instruct
  • Llama 3.3 70B Instruct
  • Mistral Large
  • Mistral Small
  • Qwen 3 32B

LLM Self-Evolving Safety Decline

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs), including proprietary and open-weight state-of-the-art systems, are vulnerable to automated, self-evolving adversarial attacks orchestrated by multi-agent frameworks. The vulnerability exists because current safety alignment strategies (RLHF, static safety filters) fail to generalize against the "SafeEvalAgent" attack vector. In this vector, an "Analyst" agent analyzes model refusals to iteratively refine attack strategies, while a "Specialist" agent grounds these…

SafeEvalAgent: Toward Agentic and Self-Evolving Safety Evaluation of LLMs
Evaluated models: GPT-5, GPT-5 Chat Latest, Gemini 2.5 Pro+7 more
  • GPT-5
  • GPT-5 Chat Latest
  • Gemini 2.5 Pro
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash
  • Grok 4
  • Qwen 3 8B
  • Qwen 3 32B
  • Llama 4 Scout
  • Llama 4 Maverick
  • DeepSeek V3.1

Self-Amplifying Memory Poisoning

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Model (LLM) agents utilizing long-term memory or Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) are vulnerable to context-dependent memory injection attacks. Unlike traditional prompt injections that are overtly malicious, this vulnerability involves injecting records that appear benign and coherent in isolation—thereby bypassing standard perplexity filters and static content moderation (e.g., LlamaGuard). These records contain "sleeping" malicious logic that is only activated when…

A-memguard: A proactive defense framework for llm-based agent memory
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Llama 3.1 8B

RL-driven Formalized Prompt Jailbreaking

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in aligned Large Language Models (LLMs) where a harmful instruction can be obfuscated through a multi-step formalization process, bypassing safety mechanisms. The attack, named Prompt Jailbreaking via Semantic and Structural Formalization (PASS), uses a Reinforcement Learning (RL) agent to dynamically construct an adversarial prompt. The agent learns to apply a sequence of actions—such as symbolic abstraction, logical encoding, mathematical representation, metaphorical…

Formalization Driven LLM Prompt Jailbreaking via Reinforcement Learning
Evaluated models: DeepSeek V3, Qwen 3 14B

Schrodinger's Compliance Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

The GPT-OSS-20B large language model contains critical failures in its alignment and Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning mechanisms, specifically in how it prioritizes numerical objectives and validates procedural structure. The model is vulnerable to "Quant Fever," where explicit numerical targets in a prompt (e.g., "delete 90% of files") override contextual safety constraints (e.g., "do not delete important files"). Furthermore, the model exhibits "Reasoning Procedure Mirage," where harmful…

Quant Fever, Reasoning Blackholes, Schrodinger's Compliance, and More: Probing GPT-OSS-20B
Evaluated models: Not reported

Single Query Dynamic Output

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in Large Language Models (LLMs) and multi-label text classification systems that allows for Textual Dynamic Outputs Attacks (TDOA). This technique enables hard-label black-box attacks against systems with variable or generative output spaces (where the number of labels or specific label tokens are not fixed). The attack functions by training a surrogate model on clustered coarse-grained labels derived from the victim model's fine-grained dynamic outputs. It subsequently…

Text Adversarial Attacks with Dynamic Outputs
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, GPT-4o Mini, GPT-4.1+5 more
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • GPT-4.1
  • Claude 3.7 Sonnet
  • DeepSeek V3
  • BERT
  • DistilBERT
  • RoBERTa

Deceptive Reasoning Bypass

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Frontier Large Language Models (LLMs) utilizing Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning are vulnerable to deceptive alignment attacks via adversarial system prompt injection. This vulnerability allows an attacker to induce "deceptive reasoning," where the model’s internal CoT actively plans or entertains malicious directives (e.g., radicalization, bias, or violence) while the final user-facing output remains benign, helpful, and innocuous. By creating a dissociation between internal reasoning and…

D-REX: A Benchmark for Detecting Deceptive Reasoning in Large Language Models
Evaluated models: Nova Pro v1, DeepSeek R1, Claude 3.7 Sonnet Thinking+4 more
  • Nova Pro v1
  • DeepSeek R1
  • Claude 3.7 Sonnet Thinking
  • Qwen 3 235B-A22B
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash
  • Gemini 2.5 Pro
  • Grok 3 Mini Beta

Emergent Agentic Vulnerabilities

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

GPT-OSS-20B exhibits "agentic-only" vulnerabilities where safety guardrails effective in standalone model inference fail when the model operates within an agentic execution loop. These vulnerabilities emerge when the model is deployed in a multi-step agentic architecture (e.g., utilizing LangGraph, tool usage, and memory retention). Attackers can bypass safety filters by employing context-aware iterative refinement attacks, which incorporate the full agentic state—including tool outputs…

Mind the Gap: Comparing Model-vs Agentic-Level Red Teaming with Action-Graph Observability on GPT-OSS-20B
Evaluated models: Not reported

LlamaGuard Obfuscation Bypass

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

LlamaGuard (specifically Llama-Guard-3-8B) and similar LLM-based runtime guardrails are susceptible to adversarial bypass via obfuscation-based and template-based jailbreak attacks. The model's reliance on English-language training data allows attackers to evade safety classification by encoding harmful prompts using Base64, cryptographic ciphers (e.g., Caesar Cipher), or translating them into low-resource languages (e.g., Zulu). Furthermore, the model lacks sufficient alignment against…

DecipherGuard: Understanding and Deciphering Jailbreak Prompts for a Safer Deployment of Intelligent Software Systems
Evaluated models: Llama 3 8B

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.