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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

Filtered research findings

340 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Logit-Based LLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in several large language models (LLMs) allowing attackers to manipulate the models' output logits, biasing the probability distribution toward the generation of harmful content. The attack does not involve modifying the input prompt, but rather directly manipulates the internal probability scores assigned to output tokens during the generation process. By strategically increasing the logits of tokens forming a harmful response while decreasing those belonging to safety…

Lockpicking LLMs: A Logit-Based Jailbreak Using Token-level Manipulation
Evaluated models: Gemma 7B IT, Llama 2 13B Chat, Llama 2 7B Chat+2 more
  • Gemma 7B IT
  • Llama 2 13B Chat
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Llama 3 8B Instruct
  • Mistral 7B Instruct

Adaptive Sparse Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in several open-source Large Language Models (LLMs) allows for efficient jailbreaking via Adaptive Dense-to-Sparse Constrained Optimization (ADC). This attack uses a continuous optimization method, progressively increasing sparsity to generate adversarial token sequences that bypass safety measures and elicit harmful responses. The attack is more effective and efficient than prior token-level methods.

Efficient LLM Jailbreak via Adaptive Dense-to-sparse Constrained Optimization
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4, Llama2-chat-7B+3 more
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • Llama2-chat-7B
  • Vicuna 7B v1.5
  • Zephyr 7B Beta
  • Zephyr 7B R2D2

Adversarial Speech Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Multimodal Large Language Models (LLMs) processing speech input are vulnerable to adversarial attacks. Imperceptible perturbations added to audio input can cause the model to generate unsafe or harmful text responses, overriding built-in safety mechanisms. The attacks are effective even with limited knowledge of the model's internal workings, demonstrating transferability across different models.

SpeechGuard: Exploring the adversarial robustness of multimodal large language models
Evaluated models: Flan-T5 XL, Llama 7B, Llama 2 13B Chat+2 more
  • Flan-T5 XL
  • Llama 7B
  • Llama 2 13B Chat
  • Mistral 7B Instruct
  • SpeechGPT

LLM Intent Obfuscation Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit vulnerabilities when processing complex or ambiguous prompts containing malicious intent. The vulnerability arises from the LLMs' inability to consistently detect maliciousness when prompts are obfuscated by either splitting a single malicious query into multiple parts or by directly modifying the malicious content to increase ambiguity. This allows attackers to bypass built-in safety mechanisms and elicit harmful or restricted content.

Can LLMs Deeply Detect Complex Malicious Queries? A Framework for Jailbreaking via Obfuscating Intent
Evaluated models: Baichuan 2 13B Chat, GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4+1 more
  • Baichuan 2 13B Chat
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • Qwen Max

LLM Refusal Suppression Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to jailbreaking attacks that exploit their tendency to refuse harmful requests. The "Don't Say No" (DSN) attack overcomes this refusal mechanism by optimizing prompts to suppress negative responses, increasing the likelihood of generating harmful content. This is achieved by modifying the loss function during adversarial prompt optimization, prioritizing the suppression of refusal keywords over the elicitation of affirmative responses. The attack…

Don't Say No: Jailbreaking LLM by Suppressing Refusal
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4

Fast Adaptive LLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to adversarial prompting attacks, where a crafted suffix appended to an instruction causes the LLM to generate unsafe or harmful content. The AdvPrompter technique trains a separate LLM to generate these adversarial suffixes, rapidly bypassing LLM safety mechanisms. The generated suffixes are human-readable and contextually relevant, making them harder to detect than previous methods. The attack is effective against both open-source and closed-source…

Advprompter: Fast adaptive adversarial prompting for llms
Evaluated models: Falcon 7B Instruct, GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4+6 more
  • Falcon 7B Instruct
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • Llama 2 7B
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Mistral 7B Instruct
  • Pythia-12B-chat
  • Vicuna 7B v1.5
  • Vicuna 13B v1.5

Amplified Adversarial Suffix Generation

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large language models (LLMs) are vulnerable to jailbreaking attacks using adversarially generated suffixes. The AmpleGCG attack generates a large number of diverse, effective suffixes which bypass safety mechanisms in both open and closed-source LLMs. The attack leverages the observation that low loss during suffix generation is not a reliable indicator of jailbreaking success, and generates diverse suffixes from intermediate steps of the optimization process.

Amplegcg: Learning a universal and transferable generative model of adversarial suffixes for jailbreaking both open and closed llms
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4, Llama 2 7B Chat+2 more
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Mistral 7B
  • Vicuna 7B

Logic-Chain Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

This vulnerability allows attackers to bypass LLM safety mechanisms and elicit malicious content by injecting a chain of benign, semantically equivalent narrations into a seemingly innocuous article. The LLM connects these scattered narrations, effectively executing the malicious intent hidden within the seemingly benign context. This differs from previous attacks which directly embed malicious prompts, making detection by both LLMs and human reviewers more difficult.

Hidden You Malicious Goal Into Benigh Narratives: Jailbreak Large Language Models through Logic Chain Injection
Evaluated models: BERT, GPT-4, PaLM 2

Vocabulary-Guided LLM Hijacking

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a vocabulary attack where carefully selected words from the model's vocabulary, identified using an optimization procedure and embeddings from another LLM, are inserted into user prompts. This manipulation can cause the target LLM to generate specific undesired outputs (goal hijacking), such as offensive language or false information, even with minimal word insertions. The attack is difficult to detect because the inserted words may appear…

Vocabulary Attack to Hijack Large Language Model Applications
Evaluated models: Flan-T5 XXL, Llama 2 7B Chat, Llama 2 Chat+1 more
  • Flan-T5 XXL
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Llama 2 Chat
  • T5 Base

LLM Distraction Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a novel black-box jailbreak attack, termed "Distraction-based Adversarial Prompts" (DAP). DAP leverages the distractibility and over-confidence of LLMs by concealing malicious queries within complex, unrelated prompts. A memory-reframing mechanism further redirects the LLM's attention away from the distracting context and toward the malicious query, causing the model to bypass safety mechanisms and generate harmful or unintended outputs.

Tastle: Distract large language models for automatic jailbreak attack
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-3.5-1106), GPT-4+4 more
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-3.5-1106)
  • GPT-4
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Llama-2-sys
  • Mistral 7B
  • Vicuna 13B v1.5

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.