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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

Filtered research findings

704 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Markovian Adaptive Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to an adaptive black-box jailbreaking framework named MAJIC (Markovian Adaptive Jailbreaking via Iterative Composition). This vulnerability allows an attacker to bypass safety alignment mechanisms by modeling the selection and composition of prompt disguise strategies as a Markov chain. Unlike static attacks, MAJIC initializes a transition matrix using a proxy model to determine the probability of a specific strategy succeeding after a prior strategy…

MAJIC: Markovian Adaptive Jailbreaking via Iterative Composition of Diverse Innovative Strategies
Evaluated models: Qwen 2.5 7B Instruct, Gemma 2 9B IT, Gemini 2.0 Flash+2 more
  • Qwen 2.5 7B Instruct
  • Gemma 2 9B IT
  • Gemini 2.0 Flash
  • GPT-4o
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet

Universal Prompt Disables Guardrails

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A universal prompt injection vulnerability, termed "Involuntary Jailbreak," affects multiple large language models. The attack uses a single prompt that instructs the model to learn a pattern from abstract string operators (X and Y). The model is then asked to generate its own examples of questions that should be refused (harmful questions) and provide detailed, non-refusal answers to them, in order to satisfy the learned operator logic. This reframes the generation of harmful content as a…

Involuntary Jailbreak
Evaluated models: Claude 3.5 Haiku, Claude 3.7 Sonnet, Claude Opus 4+29 more
  • Claude 3.5 Haiku
  • Claude 3.7 Sonnet
  • Claude Opus 4
  • Claude Opus 4.1
  • Claude Sonnet 4
  • Claude Sonnet 4.5
  • DeepSeek R1
  • DeepSeek R1 Distill Llama 70B
  • DeepSeek V3
  • Gemini 2.0 Flash
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash-Lite
  • Gemini 2.5 Pro
  • Gemini 3 Pro
  • GPT-4.1
  • GPT-4.1 Mini
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-oss 20B
  • Grok 3
  • Grok 3 Fast
  • Grok 3 Mini
  • Grok 4
  • Grok 4.1
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Llama 3.1 405B
  • Llama 3.3 70B
  • Llama 4 Scout
  • Llama 4 Maverick
  • Mistral Small 24B
  • Qwen 2.5 72B Instruct
  • Qwen 3 235B-A22B Instruct 2507
  • Qwen 3 Coder 480B-A35B Instruct

Optimization-Induced Safety Degradation

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Safety alignment degradation occurs in instruction-tuned Large Language Models (LLMs), specifically Llama-2-7B, Llama-3.2-1B, Qwen2.5, and Phi-3, during the fine-tuning process on benign downstream datasets (e.g., Dolly, Alpaca). This vulnerability results from suboptimal optimization configurations—specifically aggressive learning rates, small batch sizes, and insufficient gradient accumulation—which cause the model parameters to diverge from the pre-trained safety optimization landscape (the…

Rethinking safety in llm fine-tuning: An optimization perspective
Evaluated models: GPT-4, GPT-4o, Llama 2 7B+3 more
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 2 7B
  • Llama 3.2 1B
  • Qwen 2.5 3B
  • Phi-3 3B

MDH: Hybrid Jailbreak Detection Strategy

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large language models that support a developer role in their API are vulnerable to a jailbreaking attack that leverages malicious developer messages. An attacker can craft a developer message that overrides the model's safety alignment by setting a permissive persona, providing explicit instructions to bypass refusals, and using few-shot examples of harmful query-response pairs. This technique, named D-Attack, is effective on its own. A more advanced variant, DH-CoT, enhances the attack by…

Jailbreaking Commercial Black-Box LLMs with Explicitly Harmful Prompts
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4o, GPT-4.1+13 more
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4.1
  • o1-mini
  • o1
  • o3-mini
  • o3
  • o4-mini
  • Gemini 2.5 Pro
  • Gemini 2.0 Flash Thinking
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • Claude 3.7 Sonnet
  • Claude Sonnet 4
  • DeepSeek V3
  • DeepSeek R1 0528
  • DeepSeek R1

Magic Token Safety Bypass

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

The Magic-Token-Guided Co-Training (MTC) framework for Large Language Models (LLMs) introduces a mechanism where distinct behavioral modes are activated via hardcoded system-level strings known as "magic tokens." A specific vulnerability exists in the implementation of the "negative" (neg) behavior mode, which is explicitly trained to generate unfiltered, risk-prone, and harmful content for internal red-teaming. The framework relies on the secrecy of the magic token (e.g., a random string like…

Efficient Switchable Safety Control in LLMs via Magic-Token-Guided Co-Training
Evaluated models: Qwen 3 8B

Back-Translation Watermark Stripping

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Implementations of Large Language Model (LLM) watermarking algorithms—specifically KGW (Kirchenbauer et al.), Semantic Invariant Robust (SIR) Watermark, Entropy-based Text Watermarking (EWD), and Unbiased Watermarking—are vulnerable to watermark stripping via adversarial text perturbation. When watermarked text generated by models such as OPT-1.3B is subjected to automated paraphrasing or back-translation (e.g., English $\to$ French $\to$ English), the embedded statistical signals are…

Signature vs. Substance: Evaluating the Balance of Adversarial Resistance and Linguistic Quality in Watermarking Large Language Models
Evaluated models: Llama 3 8B

Balanced Multimodal Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are vulnerable to a jailbreak attack strategy known as Balanced Structural Decomposition (BSD). This vulnerability exploits a structural trade-off in safety alignment where models fail to detect malicious intent when the input balances semantic relevance ("On-Topicness") with distributional novelty ("OOD-Intensity"). The attack functions by recursively decomposing a harmful text objective into a tree of sub-tasks using an "Explore" (diversity) and…

Towards Effective MLLM Jailbreaking Through Balanced On-Topicness and OOD-Intensity
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, GPT-4o Mini, GPT-4.1+10 more
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • GPT-4.1
  • GPT-4.1 Mini
  • Claude Sonnet 4
  • Claude 3.5 Haiku
  • Gemini 2.5 Pro
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash
  • Qwen 2.5 VL 7B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 VL 32B Instruct
  • InternVL3 8B
  • InternVL3 14B
  • InternVL3 38B

Thinking Mode Jailbreak Amplification

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) implementing "Thinking Mode" (also known as Reasoning Mode or Chain-of-Thought) exhibit a heightened susceptibility to jailbreak attacks compared to their non-reasoning counterparts. When a model is prompted to reason step-by-step (often delimited by specific tokens like <think> and </think>), the internal reasoning process frequently overrides safety alignment training. Research indicates that during the generation of the thinking chain, the model often…

The Cost of Thinking: Increased Jailbreak Risk in Large Language Models
Evaluated models: Qwen 3 0.6B, Qwen 3 1.7B, Qwen 3 4B+8 more
  • Qwen 3 0.6B
  • Qwen 3 1.7B
  • Qwen 3 4B
  • Qwen 3 8B
  • DeepSeek R1 Distill Qwen 1.5B
  • DeepSeek R1 Distill Llama 8B
  • Llama 3 8B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 1.5B Instruct
  • Qwen Plus Latest
  • Doubao Seed 1.6 Flash
  • DeepSeek Reasoner

Automated Red-Teaming Achieves 100% ASR

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to automated adversarial attacks that systematically combine multiple jailbreaking "primitives" into complex prompt chains. A dynamic optimization engine can generate and test billions of unique combinations of techniques (e.g., low-resource language translation, payload splitting, role-playing) to bypass safety guardrails. This combinatorial approach differs from manual red-teaming by systematically exploring the attack surface, achieving…

LLM Robustness Leaderboard v1--Technical report
Evaluated models: Yi Large, Qwen 2.5 72B Instruct, Qwen 2.5 7B Instruct+36 more
  • Yi Large
  • Qwen 2.5 72B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 7B Instruct
  • Qwen Max
  • Qwen Plus
  • Nova Lite v1
  • Nova Micro v1
  • Nova Pro v1
  • Claude 3 Haiku
  • Claude 3 Opus
  • Claude 3 Sonnet
  • Claude 3.5 Haiku 20241022
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet 20240620
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet 20241022
  • DeepSeek R1
  • DeepSeek V3
  • Gemini 1.5 Pro
  • Gemma 2 27B IT
  • Granite 3.1 8B
  • Llama 3.1 405B Instruct
  • Llama 3.1 70B Instruct
  • Llama 3.1 8B Instruct
  • Llama 3.2 11B Vision Instruct
  • Llama 3.2 1B Instruct
  • Llama 3.2 90B Vision Instruct
  • Llama 3.3 70B Instruct
  • Phi-4
  • Ministral 8B
  • Mistral Nemo
  • Mixtral 8x22B Instruct
  • Mixtral 8x7B Instruct
  • Pixtral Large 2411
  • GPT-4o 2024-08-06
  • GPT-4o 2024-11-20
  • GPT-4o Mini 2024-07-18
  • o1 2024-12-17
  • o3-mini 2025-01-14
  • Falcon 3 10B Instruct
  • Grok 2 1212

Latent Fusion Jailbreak Attack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability, known as Latent Fusion Jailbreak (LFJ), exists in certain Large Language Models that allows an attacker with white-box access to bypass safety alignments. The attack interpolates the internal hidden state representations of a harmful query and a thematically similar benign query. By using gradient-guided optimization to identify and modify influential layers and tokens, a fused hidden state is created that causes the model to generate prohibited content in response to the…

Latent Fusion Jailbreak: Blending Harmful and Harmless Representations to Elicit Unsafe LLM Outputs
Evaluated models: BERT, DeepSeek V3, GPT-3.5 Turbo+5 more
  • BERT
  • DeepSeek V3
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • Guanaco 7B
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Llama 3 70B
  • Mistral 7B Instruct
  • Vicuna 7B

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.