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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

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104 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Multi-Image Semantic Reconstruction

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) allows attackers to bypass safety alignments via Multi-Image Dispersion and Semantic Reconstruction (MIDAS). Attackers decompose malicious instructions into risk-bearing semantic subunits, fragment them, and distribute them across multiple benign-looking Game-style Visual Reasoning (GVR) puzzles (e.g., Letter Equations, Rank-and-Read, Odd-One-Out). A sanitized, persona-driven textual prompt with sequential placeholders is then used to…

MIDAS: Multi-Image Dispersion and Semantic Reconstruction for Jailbreaking MLLMs
Evaluated models: Gemini 2.5 Flash Thinking, Gemini 2.5 Pro, GPT-4o+2 more
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash Thinking
  • Gemini 2.5 Pro
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-5 Chat
  • QVQ-Max

Multi-Modal Expansion Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) are vulnerable to multi-turn, multi-modal jailbreak attacks where malicious intent is incrementally introduced and obfuscated through intertwined text and image prompts. Attackers can systematically bypass safety alignments by starting with self-optimized, benign-seeming conversation starters (horizontal expansion) and progressively stacking text and image attack augmentations across multiple conversation turns (vertical expansion). Furthermore, models fail…

FERRET: Framework for Expansion Reliant Red Teaming
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Claude 3 Haiku, Llama 4 Maverick

Vision-Text Adaptive Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) allows attackers to bypass safety guardrails via a Multi-Turn Adaptive Prompting Attack (MAPA). Instead of triggering safety mechanisms with an immediate, explicit malicious request, the attacker iteratively injects malicious intent across multiple conversation turns by alternating between text and visual modalities. At each turn, the attack dynamically tests three prompt configurations (unconnected text only, unconnected text + malicious…

Multi-Turn Adaptive Prompting Attack on Large Vision-Language Models
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Llama 3.2 11B, Mistral 7B+1 more
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 3.2 11B
  • Mistral 7B
  • Qwen 2.5 7B

Reward Hacking Via Adversarial Imitation

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in the post-training alignment of Flow Matching models (specifically FLUX.1-dev) when utilizing Visual Foundation Models (VFM) (e.g., DINOv3b) as discriminators or when employing standalone Reward Gradient optimization (e.g., HPSv3). These feedback mechanisms lack sufficient capacity or structural guidance to constrain the generative policy, making the discriminator's gradients susceptible to "reward hacking." Consequently, the generative policy over-optimizes for the…

FAIL: Flow Matching Adversarial Imitation Learning for Image Generation
Evaluated models: Not reported

Early Reasoning Safety Degradation

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Reinforcement learning (RL) based post-training for explicit chain-of-thought reasoning (e.g., GRPO) in Multimodal Large Reasoning Models (MLRMs) inadvertently degrades safety alignment, rendering the models highly vulnerable to multimodal jailbreak attacks. The vulnerability is caused by "conditional coverage collapse" during the initial phases of chain-of-thought generation. Under adversarial conditioning (text or image), the reasoning policy assigns vanishing probability mass to safe…

Safety Recovery in Reasoning Models Is Only a Few Early Steering Steps Away
Evaluated models: R1-Onevision 7B, OpenVLThinker 7B, VLAA-Thinker 7B+3 more
  • R1-Onevision 7B
  • OpenVLThinker 7B
  • VLAA-Thinker 7B
  • Vision-R1 7B
  • LlamaV-o1
  • LLaVA-CoT

Mobile Agent Visual Spoofing

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Mobile Large Language Model (LLM) agents operating under the "Screen-as-Interface" paradigm are vulnerable to visual indirect prompt injection and state desynchronization. Agents that rely on unstructured visual data (screenshots) and Accessibility Service APIs to perceive the environment lack a mechanism to distinguish between trusted system UI elements and untrusted content (e.g., web pages, emails, or malicious overlays). An attacker can inject visual cues, fake notifications, or hidden…

Blind Gods and Broken Screens: Architecting a Secure, Intent-Centric Mobile Agent Operating System
Evaluated models: Not reported

Enhanced LVLM Encoder Transfer

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) are vulnerable to zero-query, black-box adversarial image perturbations via Semantic-Guided Multimodal Attacks (SGMA). Unlike traditional attacks that scatter noise or target background pixels, SGMA leverages surrogate models (e.g., CLIP) to anchor imperceptible adversarial perturbations directly onto semantically critical foreground regions. The attack exploits two specific architectural traits of LVLMs: inconsistent visual grounding across models and…

Grounding-Driven Attack: Improving Encoder-based Adversarial Transferability against Large Vision-Language Models
Evaluated models: BLIP-2 OPT 2.7B, LLaVA 1.5 7B, Qwen 2.5 VL 7B Instruct+6 more
  • BLIP-2 OPT 2.7B
  • LLaVA 1.5 7B
  • Qwen 2.5 VL 7B Instruct
  • InternVL3 8B
  • OpenFlamingo 4B
  • Kimi VL A3B Instruct
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-5.4
  • Gemini 2.0 Flash

Image Editing Visual Prompt Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Image Editing Models (LIEMs) supporting vision-prompt editing are vulnerable to Vision-Centric Jailbreak Attacks (VJA). This vulnerability arises from a modality mismatch in safety alignment: while safeguards primarily analyze textual instructions for policy violations, the underlying models are capable of interpreting and executing instructions embedded directly within the visual input (e.g., typographic text drawn on the image, arrows, symbols, or specific markings). An attacker can…

When the Prompt Becomes Visual: Vision-Centric Jailbreak Attacks for Large Image Editing Models
Evaluated models: GPT Image 1.5, Gemini 3 Pro Image, Seedream 4.5+5 more
  • GPT Image 1.5
  • Gemini 3 Pro Image
  • Seedream 4.5
  • Qwen-Image-Edit-2512
  • Qwen-Image-Edit-Safe
  • BAGEL 14B
  • Flux 2.0 Dev 32B
  • LongCat-Image-Edit

Adaptive Web Agent Prompt Injection

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Model (LLM) based web agents (such as those built using the BrowserUse scaffold) are vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) attacks when autonomously navigating and processing untrusted web content. Unlike standard Cross-Site Scripting (XSS), this vulnerability occurs when the LLM orchestrator consumes the DOM or visual screenshots of a webpage containing concealed or contextually disguised adversarial instructions. The LLM interprets these embedded text strings as…

MUZZLE: Adaptive Agentic Red-Teaming of Web Agents Against Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks
Evaluated models: GPT-4.1, GPT-4o, Qwen3-VL 32B Instruct

Cross-Modal Entanglement Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in advanced Vision-Language Models (VLMs) allows attackers to bypass safety alignment mechanisms via a Cross-Modal Entanglement Attack (COMET). By reframing malicious queries into multi-hop reasoning tasks, attackers can migrate visualizable key entities into a paired image and replace the textual entities with ambiguous spatial pointers. This forces the VLM to reconstruct the harmful intent through its own self-induced cross-modal reasoning, effectively bypassing filters that…

Red-teaming the Multimodal Reasoning: Jailbreaking Vision-Language Models via Cross-modal Entanglement Attacks
Evaluated models: GPT-4.1, GPT-4.1 Mini, Gemini 2.5 Flash+6 more
  • GPT-4.1
  • GPT-4.1 Mini
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash
  • Qwen3-VL 235B-A22B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 VL 72B Instruct
  • GLM-4.5V
  • Gemini 2.5 Pro
  • Llama 4 Maverick
  • Claude Haiku 4.5

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.