Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

Explore primary-source AI security research, evaluated models, attack techniques, and defensive evidence.

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

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22 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

AD Black-Box Cascading Disruption

Published Jan 23, 2025Analyzed Dec 9, 2025Source: arXiv

Vision Language Models (VLMs) integrated into autonomous driving (AD) systems are vulnerable to a black-box adversarial attack method termed Cascading Adversarial Disruption (CAD). The vulnerability stems from the model's susceptibility to optimized visual perturbations that disrupt the decision-making reasoning chain (perception, prediction, and planning). Attackers can generate adversarial images or physical patches by aligning visual noise with deceptive textual semantics in the model's…

Black-box adversarial attack on vision language models for autonomous driving

Evaluated models: GPT-4, GPT-4o, InstructBLIP

Agent Action Hijacking

Published Dec 14, 2024Analyzed Mar 19, 2025Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in LLM-based agents, dubbed AI Agent Injection (AI²), allows attackers to hijack the agent's actions by manipulating the agent's memory retrieval mechanism. The attack involves two main steps: (1) Stealing action-aware knowledge from the agent's memory using crafted adversarial queries targeting the retriever module and (2) Generating Trojan prompts consisting of a Trojan string and hijacking instructions. The Trojan string is designed to manipulate the retriever into…

Towards Action Hijacking of Large Language Model-based Agent

Evaluated models: BERT, GPT-3, GPT-4+2 more

BERT
GPT-3
GPT-4
M3E
MiniLM

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.