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LLM Security Database
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Last analyzed 9/9/2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1123 evaluated models

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23 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Published 3/1/2025
Analyzed 12/30/2025

Predictive Large Language Model (LLM) routers, specifically those utilizing Deep Neural Network (DNN) and Matrix Factorization (MF) architectures, are vulnerable to adversarial manipulation and backdoor poisoning. These routers are designed to optimize cost and latency by dynamically directing simple queries to "weak" (cheap) models and complex queries to "strong" (expensive) models. Attackers can exploit this mechanism in two ways: 1. Inference-time Attacks: By appending specific adversarial…

Life-Cycle Routing Vulnerabilities of LLM Router
Evaluated models: Not reported

Source: arXiv

Published 3/1/2025
Analyzed 12/9/2025

An untrusted reinforcement-learning-from-human-feedback (RLHF) platform can selectively manipulate preference samples associated with an attacker's target domain. The corrupted preference data trains a compromised reward model and then steers the fine-tuned language model toward undesirable behavior, creating a model-supply-chain risk before deployment.

LLM Misalignment via Adversarial RLHF Platforms
Evaluated models: Not reported

Source: arXiv

Published 1/1/2025
Analyzed 1/14/2026

A vulnerability exists in Large Language Model (LLM) routing systems (control planes) that allows for the manipulation of inference flow via adversarial input sequences. LLM routers, which dynamically direct user queries to either "weak" (cheaper) or "strong" (expensive) models based on predicted query complexity, can be bypassed by appending specific, pre-optimized token sequences known as "confounder gadgets." These gadgets artificially inflate the router's complexity score for an input…

Rerouting llm routers
Evaluated models: Not reported

Source: arXiv

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.