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Last analyzed 9/9/2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1123 evaluated models

Filtered research findings

84 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Published 2/1/2026
Analyzed 3/8/2026

Large Language Models (LLMs) deployed as Role-Playing Agents (RPAs) are vulnerable to Persona-Targeted Jailbreaks. When an LLM is prompted to adopt a persona—particularly characters with negative, risky, or villainous traits—the model's optimization for role fidelity frequently overrides its foundational safety alignment. Attackers can exploit this vulnerability by synthesizing queries that leverage the specific narrative background, ideology, or psychological vulnerabilities of the assigned…

Stay in Character, Stay Safe: Dual-Cycle Adversarial Self-Evolution for Safety Role-Playing Agents
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Llama 3 8B, Qwen 2.5 7B +1 more

Source: arXiv

Published 2/1/2026
Analyzed 3/9/2026

OpenClaw is vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI), Tool-Return Manipulation, and Persistent Memory Poisoning. The agent incorporates untrusted external content (e.g., fetched web pages) and external tool outputs directly into its observation stream without sufficient isolation. An attacker can embed malicious payloads into these external channels to hijack the agent's planning and execution trace. This allows the attacker to silently trigger high-privilege actions via OpenClaw's Skills…

From Assistant to Double Agent: Formalizing and Benchmarking Attacks on OpenClaw for Personalized Local AI Agent
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Llama 3.1 70B, Qwen 2.5 7B

Source: arXiv

Published 2/1/2026
Analyzed 3/8/2026

A vulnerability in Large Language Model-based Retrieval (LLMR) systems allows attackers to intentionally hide specific documents from being retrieved (e.g., in RAG pipelines or search engines) by appending a small number of adversarially crafted, query-agnostic tokens. The attack operates in a complete black-box setting: it requires no knowledge of the victim's queries, the target retrieval model's parameters, or the underlying document corpus. By utilizing Document-Query Adversarial (DQ-A)…

" Someone Hid It": Query-Agnostic Black-Box Attacks on LLM-Based Retrieval
Evaluated models: Mistral 7B, Qwen 2.5 7B

Source: arXiv

Published 2/1/2026
Analyzed 2/21/2026

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems are vulnerable to iterative knowledge-extraction attacks designed to reconstruct the underlying private knowledge base. The vulnerability exists due to the decoupled optimization of the retrieval and generation phases. Attackers can craft adversarial queries consisting of two distinct components: an "Information" component (optimized via gradient descent or random sampling to steer embeddings toward specific, diverse regions of the vector space) and…

Benchmarking Knowledge-Extraction Attack and Defense on Retrieval-Augmented Generation
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Llama 3 8B, Qwen 2.5 7B

Source: arXiv

Published 2/1/2026
Analyzed 2/22/2026

A vulnerability exists in the similarity-based retrieval mechanisms of long-term memory-augmented Large Language Models (LLMs), specifically affecting systems like Mem0 and A-mem. The vulnerability arises from the system's reliance on dense embedding similarity (e.g., cosine similarity) to retrieve context from dynamic, user-generated memory banks without sufficient semantic validation or conflict resolution. An unprivileged remote attacker can exploit this by injecting "adversarial…

ER-MIA: Black-Box Adversarial Memory Injection Attacks on Long-Term Memory-Augmented Large Language Models
Evaluated models: GPT-oss 20B, Llama 3.2 3B, Gemma 3 27B

Source: arXiv

Published 2/1/2026
Analyzed 3/8/2026

A vulnerability in LLM-based autonomous agents allows remote attackers to hijack agent execution via Structural Template Injection (STI). The flaw arises from the lack of strict architectural isolation between internal control tokens and untrusted external data during chat-template serialization. By embedding framework-specific special tokens (e.g., <|im_start|>, <|im_end|>, <tool_call>) and delimiter patterns into externally retrieved data sources (such as web pages, emails, or API…

Automating Agent Hijacking via Structural Template Injection
Evaluated models: GPT-4, GPT-4o, DeepSeek V3

Source: arXiv

Published 2/1/2026
Analyzed 3/8/2026

LLM-based security advisors exhibit systematic reasoning failures—including boundary confusion, attestation overclaiming, and mitigation hallucination—when providing architectural guidance for Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) like Intel SGX and Arm TrustZone. When embedded in tool-augmented agent pipelines, these models are susceptible to agentic misinterpretation, turning partial or poisoned tool outputs into highly confident but materially incorrect security conclusions. This…

Red-Teaming Claude Opus and ChatGPT-based Security Advisors for Trusted Execution Environments
Evaluated models: GPT-5.2, Claude Opus 4.6

Source: arXiv

Published 2/1/2026
Analyzed 3/9/2026

Text scoring models, including dense retrievers, rerankers, and reward models, are vulnerable to score manipulation attacks via search-based discrete perturbations and content injection. An attacker can systematically modify candidate texts using rudimentary string manipulations, gradient-guided token swaps (e.g., HotFlip), masked language modeling (MLM) swaps, or query/sentence injections to spuriously increase model scores. This structural failure condition allows an irrelevant passage or a…

Unifying Adversarial Robustness and Training Across Text Scoring Models
Evaluated models: E5 BERT-base, Qwen 3 0.6B, Llama 3.2 3B Instruct +2 more

Source: arXiv

Published 2/1/2026
Analyzed 2/22/2026

A cryptographic weakness exists in the privacy assumptions of vector embeddings used in Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems and Vector Databases. The vulnerability, designated "Zero2Text," allows an unauthenticated attacker to reconstruct raw text from captured vector embeddings without access to the victim model's parameters, gradients, or training data. Unlike prior embedding inversion attacks that require training large decoders on domain-specific datasets, this vulnerability…

Zero2Text: Zero-Training Cross-Domain Inversion Attacks on Textual Embeddings
Evaluated models: Not reported

Source: arXiv

Published 2/1/2026
Analyzed 2/22/2026

Self-evolving Large Language Model (LLM) agents that utilize long-term memory mechanisms (such as Vector Databases for Retrieval-Augmented Generation or Sliding Window buffers) are vulnerable to persistent indirect prompt injection. This vulnerability, termed "Zombie Agent," occurs when the agent's memory update function ($F_M$) processes attacker-controlled content retrieved from external sources (e.g., web pages, documents) and commits it to long-term storage without sufficient sanitization…

Zombie Agents: Persistent Control of Self-Evolving LLM Agents via Self-Reinforcing Injections
Evaluated models: Not reported

Source: arXiv

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.