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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

Filtered research findings

69 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Plaintext Output Overflow

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) contain a resource consumption vulnerability termed "Overflow," wherein specific non-adversarial, plain-text prompts trigger excessive text generation that saturates the model's output token budget. This vulnerability exploits the model's alignment towards helpfulness and exhaustiveness, alongside tokenizer inefficiencies (e.g., zero-width characters), to force the generation of maximum-length responses (often exceeding 5,000 tokens) from short inputs. This differs…

BenchOverflow: Measuring Overflow in Large Language Models via Plain-Text Prompts
Evaluated models: GPT-5, Llama 3.1 8B Instruct, Llama 3.2 3B Instruct+5 more
  • GPT-5
  • Llama 3.1 8B Instruct
  • Llama 3.2 3B Instruct
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash
  • Qwen 3 4B Instruct 2507
  • Qwen 3 8B Instruct
  • Gemma 2 9B IT
  • Gemma 3 4B IT

Uninvoked Tool Metadata Hijack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Model (LLM) agents implementing the Model Context Protocol (MCP) are vulnerable to Implicit Tool Poisoning (ITP). This vulnerability allows an attacker to manipulate agent behavior by embedding malicious instructions within the metadata (specifically the natural language description) of a third-party tool. Unlike explicit tool poisoning, where the agent is tricked into invoking a malicious tool, ITP exploits the agent's contextual reasoning to force the invocation of a distinct…

MCP-ITP: An Automated Framework for Implicit Tool Poisoning in MCP
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4o Mini, o1-mini+9 more
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • o1-mini
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash
  • DeepSeek R1
  • DeepSeek V3
  • Qwen 3 8B
  • Qwen 3 8B Thinking
  • Qwen 3 32B
  • Qwen 3 32B Thinking
  • Qwen 3 235B-A22B
  • Qwen 3 235B-A22B Thinking

Adaptive Tool-Disguised Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) supporting function calling (tool use) are vulnerable to a jailbreak attack known as iMIST (interactive Multi-step Progressive Tool-disguised Jailbreak Attack). The vulnerability stems from a disparity in alignment training: while models are heavily aligned to refuse harmful natural language generation, they lack sufficient alignment regarding the generation of harmful content within structured data (JSON) used for tool parameters.

Jailbreaking Large Language Models through Iterative Tool-Disguised Attacks via Reinforcement Learning
Evaluated models: Llama 3.1 8B, DeepSeek-V3 671B

CoT Prefix Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in Large Language Model (LLM) and Large Reasoning Model (LRM) serving interfaces that allow user-defined response prefixes, such as plain text-completion (v1/completions), Fill-in-the-Middle (FIM), or assistant message prefilling. An attacker can perform a Response Prefix Attack (RPA) by injecting maliciously crafted Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning tokens immediately following the assistant's start delimiter (e.g., <|im_start|>assistant). Because these tokens are placed…

What Matters For Safety Alignment?
Evaluated models: DeepSeek V3.2, Gemini 3 Pro Preview, Gemini 3 Flash Preview+4 more
  • DeepSeek V3.2
  • Gemini 3 Pro Preview
  • Gemini 3 Flash Preview
  • Grok 4.1 Fast
  • Claude Sonnet 4.5
  • GPT-5.2
  • GPT-4o Mini

Production LLM Copyright Extraction

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Production Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to long-form training data extraction via a two-phase prompt injection attack. This vulnerability allows an attacker to recover substantial portions of memorized, copyrighted text (such as novels) by exploiting the model's autoregressive text completion capabilities. The attack methodology involves two distinct phases: 1. Prefix Completion Probe: The attacker provides a short "seed" sequence (e.g., the first sentence of a book) coupled…

Extracting Books from Production Language Models
Evaluated models: Claude 3.7 Sonnet 20250219, GPT-4.1 2025-04-14, Gemini 2.5 Pro+1 more
  • Claude 3.7 Sonnet 20250219
  • GPT-4.1 2025-04-14
  • Gemini 2.5 Pro
  • Grok 3

Dual Stego MLLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Commercial Multimodal Large Language Model (MLLM) integrated systems are vulnerable to a "Dual Steganography" jailbreak paradigm (referred to as Odysseus). The vulnerability arises from the reliance of safety filters on the assumption that malicious content must be explicitly visible in the input or output modalities (text or image). Attackers can bypass these filters by encoding malicious queries into binary matrices and embedding them into benign-looking images using steganographic encoders…

Odysseus: Jailbreaking Commercial Multimodal LLM-integrated Systems via Dual Steganography
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Gemini 2.0 Pro, Gemini 2.0 Flash+1 more
  • GPT-4o
  • Gemini 2.0 Pro
  • Gemini 2.0 Flash
  • Grok 3

LLM Infinite Thinking DoS

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A Denial-of-Service (DoS) vulnerability exists in Large Language Model (LLM) inference services where specially crafted input prompts can trigger excessively long or infinite generation loops ("infinite thinking"). This vulnerability, identified as "ThinkTrap," utilizes derivative-free optimization (CMA-ES) within a continuous surrogate embedding space to circumvent the discrete nature of token inputs. By optimizing a low-dimensional latent vector and projecting it to token sequences, an…

ThinkTrap: Denial-of-Service Attacks against Black-box LLM Services via Infinite Thinking
Evaluated models: Gemini 2.5 Pro, Lumimaid 70B, o4-mini+4 more
  • Gemini 2.5 Pro
  • Lumimaid 70B
  • o4-mini
  • MAI DS R1 671B
  • DeepSeek R1 0528 Qwen3 8B
  • Llama 3.2 3B
  • DeepSeek R1 671B

TeleAI Reveals Systemic LLM Vulnerabilities

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Reasoning-specialized Large Language Models (LLMs) that utilize Chain-of-Thought (CoT) processes are vulnerable to reasoning-exploitation jailbreaks. Attackers can bypass standard safety alignments (such as RLHF) by using adaptive multi-turn interactions or semantic transformations to induce the model to generate intermediate reasoning steps that "rationalize" or "contextualize" a harmful request. Because current alignment techniques often fail to scale linearly with reasoning depth, forcing…

TeleAI-Safety: A comprehensive LLM jailbreaking benchmark towards attacks, defenses, and evaluations
Evaluated models: GPT-5, GPT-4.1, GPT-4.1 Mini+11 more
  • GPT-5
  • GPT-4.1
  • GPT-4.1 Mini
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • o1
  • Grok 3
  • Grok 3 Mini
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • Gemini 2.5 Pro
  • Vicuna 7B
  • Llama 3.1 8B Instruct
  • DeepSeek R1
  • Qwen 1.5 7B Chat
  • Qwen 2.5 7B Instruct

LLM Factual MitM Injection

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs), specifically GPT-4o, GPT-4o-mini, LLaMA-2-13B, Mistral-7B, and Phi-3.5-mini, are vulnerable to Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) adversarial prompt injections that undermine factual recall. Termed the "$\chi$mera" (Chimera) attack framework, this vulnerability exists when an attacker intercepts and modifies user queries (e.g., via malicious browser extensions, compromised frontends, or proxy middleware) before they reach the victim model. By appending adversarial…

Injecting Falsehoods: Adversarial Man-in-the-Middle Attacks Undermining Factual Recall in LLMs
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Llama 2 13B, Mistral 7B+1 more
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 2 13B
  • Mistral 7B
  • Phi-3

Guardrail Policy Extraction

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A black-box guardrail reverse-engineering vulnerability exists in Large Language Model (LLM) serving systems that employ output filtering mechanisms. The vulnerability allows remote attackers to replicate the proprietary decision-making policy and rule sets of the target's safety guardrail without direct access to model parameters. This is achieved through a technique termed Guardrail Reverse-engineering Attack (GRA), which utilizes a reinforcement learning framework combined with genetic…

Black-Box Guardrail Reverse-engineering Attack
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Llama 3.1 8B

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.