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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

Filtered research findings

468 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

LVLM Vision-Triggered Resource Exhaustion

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A resource consumption vulnerability exists in multiple Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs). An attacker can craft a subtle, imperceptible adversarial perturbation and apply it to an input image. When this image is processed by an LVLM, even with a benign text prompt, it forces the model into an unbounded generation loop. The attack, named RECALLED, uses a gradient-based optimization process to create a visual perturbation that steers the model's text generation towards a predefined…

Resource Consumption Red-Teaming for Large Vision-Language Models
Evaluated models: LLaVA 1.5 7B, LLaVA 1.5 13B, Qwen 2.5 VL 3B Instruct+4 more
  • LLaVA 1.5 7B
  • LLaVA 1.5 13B
  • Qwen 2.5 VL 3B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 VL 7B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 VL 32B Instruct
  • InstructBLIP Vicuna 7B
  • InstructBLIP Vicuna 13B

Academic Paper Trust Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a jailbreak attack termed Paper Summary Attack (PSA). An attacker can bypass safety alignment mechanisms by framing a harmful query within the context of a summarized academic paper. The model's propensity to trust the authoritative structure and tone of a research paper summary overrides its safety filters, leading it to process and respond to the embedded malicious instruction. The vulnerability is particularly potent when using summaries of…

Paper Summary Attack: Jailbreaking LLMs through LLM Safety Papers
Evaluated models: Claude 3.5 Sonnet, DeepSeek R1, GPT-4o+3 more
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • DeepSeek R1
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Llama 3.1 8B Instruct
  • Vicuna 7B v1.5

Diffusion LLM Masked Context Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in Diffusion-based Large Language Models (dLLMs) that allows for bypassing safety alignment mechanisms through interleaved mask-text prompts. The vulnerability stems from two core architectural features of dLLMs: bidirectional context modeling and parallel decoding. The model's drive to maintain contextual consistency forces it to fill masked tokens with content that aligns with the surrounding, potentially malicious, text. The parallel decoding process prevents dynamic…

The Devil behind the mask: An emergent safety vulnerability of Diffusion LLMs
Evaluated models: DREAM v0 Instruct 7B, LLaDA 1.5, LLaDA 8B Instruct+1 more
  • DREAM v0 Instruct 7B
  • LLaDA 1.5
  • LLaDA 8B Instruct
  • MMaDA 8B MixCoT

LLM Professional Vulnerable Code

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in the safety alignment mechanisms of Qwen2-7B, Mistral-7B, and Gemma-7B, allowing for the generation of insecure code upon explicit request. Unlike standard adversarial attacks that require obfuscation, these models comply with direct requests for specific vulnerabilities (e.g., buffer overflows, use-after-free) when the user prompt adopts a professional persona (e.g., "DevOps Engineer," "Security Researcher") rather than a novice or student persona. The models exhibit…

Explicit Vulnerability Generation with LLMs: An Investigation Beyond Adversarial Attacks
Evaluated models: Mistral 7B, Qwen 2 7B, Gemma 7B

Patching Induces Emergent Deception

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Adversarial Activation Patching enables the induction of emergent deceptive behaviors in safety-aligned transformer-based Large Language Models (LLMs). By extracting intermediate activations ($A_{d}$) generated during the processing of a deceptive or harmful prompt and injecting them into the forward pass of a benign target prompt ($x_{t}$) at specific layers (specifically mid-layers, e.g., 5-10 in 32-layer architectures), an attacker can manipulate the model's internal reasoning circuits…

Adversarial activation patching: A framework for detecting and mitigating emergent deception in safety-aligned transformers
Evaluated models: GPT-4

Adversarial ROI Privacy Attack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Vision-Language Models (VLMs) utilizing Transformer-based visual encoders (specifically CLIP and EVA-CLIP variants) are vulnerable to a targeted adversarial attack dubbed "VIP" (Visual Information Protection). This vulnerability allows an attacker to manipulate the model's internal attention mechanism to create a "blind spot" within a specific Region of Interest (ROI) of an input image. By optimizing an additive image perturbation ($\delta$), the attack minimizes the attention weights and…

VIP: Visual Information Protection through Adversarial Attacks on Vision-Language Models
Evaluated models: InstructBLIP, Vicuna 7B

Adversarial LLM Internal Attack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) employing internal security mechanisms based on linearly separable embeddings in intermediate layers are vulnerable to a generative adversarial attack. The CAVGAN framework exploits this vulnerability by generating adversarial perturbations that misclassify malicious inputs as benign, allowing the attacker to bypass the LLM's safety filters and elicit harmful outputs.

CAVGAN: Unifying Jailbreak and Defense of LLMs via Generative Adversarial Attacks on their Internal Representations
Evaluated models: Llama 3.1 8B, Mistral 8B, Qwen 2.5 14B+2 more
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Mistral 8B
  • Qwen 2.5 14B
  • Qwen 2.5 32B
  • Qwen 2.5 7B

LLM Guardrail Bypass

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Market-deployed specialized LLM supervision systems (including NeMo Guard, Prompt Guard, LLM Guard, and LangKit) exhibit critical failures in detecting harmful content due to a reliance on superficial pattern matching ("specification gaming") rather than semantic understanding. These systems fail to generalize to inputs that do not match specific training patterns, resulting in near-zero detection rates for straightforward harmful prompts in categories such as CBRN (Chemical, Biological…

The bitter lesson of misuse detection
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5, GPT-4, Claude 3.5 Sonnet+4 more
  • GPT-3.5
  • GPT-4
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • Grok 2
  • Gemini 1.5 Pro
  • Mistral Large
  • DeepSeek V3

Airborne Audio LLM Hijack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Audio-based Large Language Models (ALLMs), specifically Qwen2-Audio, are vulnerable to over-the-air adversarial audio attacks. An attacker with white-box access can generate robust adversarial audio perturbations using gradient-based optimization combined with audio augmentation techniques (specifically SpecAugment, translation, and additive noise). These perturbations, when played through a speaker in the physical environment, manipulate the ALLM processing the audio via a microphone. This…

Attacker's Noise Can Manipulate Your Audio-based LLM in the Real World
Evaluated models: Not reported

Response-Primed LLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A contextual priming vulnerability, termed "Response Attack," exists in certain multimodal and large language models. The vulnerability allows an attacker to bypass safety alignments by crafting a dialogue history where a prior, fabricated model response contains mildly harmful or scaffolding content. This primes the model to generate policy-violating content in response to a subsequent trigger prompt. The model's safety mechanisms, which primarily evaluate the user's current prompt, are…

Response Attack: Exploiting Contextual Priming to Jailbreak Large Language Models
Evaluated models: DeepSeek R1 Distill Llama 70B, Gemini 2.0 Flash, Gemini 2.5 Flash+5 more
  • DeepSeek R1 Distill Llama 70B
  • Gemini 2.0 Flash
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash
  • GPT-4.1
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 3 70B Instruct
  • Llama 3 8B Instruct
  • QwQ 32B

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.