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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

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468 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Latent Fusion Jailbreak Attack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability, known as Latent Fusion Jailbreak (LFJ), exists in certain Large Language Models that allows an attacker with white-box access to bypass safety alignments. The attack interpolates the internal hidden state representations of a harmful query and a thematically similar benign query. By using gradient-guided optimization to identify and modify influential layers and tokens, a fused hidden state is created that causes the model to generate prohibited content in response to the…

Latent Fusion Jailbreak: Blending Harmful and Harmless Representations to Elicit Unsafe LLM Outputs
Evaluated models: BERT, DeepSeek V3, GPT-3.5 Turbo+5 more
  • BERT
  • DeepSeek V3
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • Guanaco 7B
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Llama 3 70B
  • Mistral 7B Instruct
  • Vicuna 7B

Physical Patch Driving Hijack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) employed in autonomous driving (AD) systems are vulnerable to a physically realizable adversarial patch attack dubbed "PhysPatch." This vulnerability exists because MLLMs inherit susceptibility to visual adversarial perturbations from their vision backbones. The attack utilizes a semantic-aware mask initialization strategy combined with a potential field algorithm to identify physically plausible regions for patch placement within a driving scene (e.g…

PhysPatch: A Physically Realizable and Transferable Adversarial Patch Attack for Multimodal Large Language Models-based Autonomous Driving Systems
Evaluated models: LLaVA v1.6 13B, Qwen 2.5 VL 72B Instruct, Llama 3.2 90B Vision Instruct+8 more
  • LLaVA v1.6 13B
  • Qwen 2.5 VL 72B Instruct
  • Llama 3.2 90B Vision Instruct
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4.1
  • Claude Sonnet 4
  • Gemini 2.0 Flash
  • Qwen 2.5 VL Max
  • o3
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash
  • QVQ-Plus

Graph-LLM Template Injection

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in the graph encoding architecture of LLaGA (Large Language and Graph Assistant), specifically within the "neighborhood detail template" used to construct node sequences. LLaGA enforces a fixed-shape computational tree for each node; when a target node has fewer neighbors than the required template size (e.g., $k$ children), the system utilizes placeholders to maintain the fixed structure.

Adversarial Attacks and Defenses on Graph-aware Large Language Models (LLMs)
Evaluated models: GPT-4, Llama 2 7B, Vicuna 7B

Benign Audio Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Audio-Language Models (ALMs) including Qwen2.5-Omni (3B and 7B) and Phi-4-Multimodal are vulnerable to "WhisperInject," a two-stage adversarial audio attack that bypasses safety guardrails. The vulnerability allows an attacker to inject imperceptible perturbations into benign audio inputs (e.g., a query about the weather) that force the model to generate specific harmful content. The attack utilizes a novel optimization method, Reinforcement Learning with Projected Gradient Descent (RL-PGD)…

When Good Sounds Go Adversarial: Jailbreaking Audio-Language Models with Benign Inputs
Evaluated models: Qwen 2.5 Omni 3B, Qwen 2.5 Omni 7B, Phi-4 Multimodal+2 more
  • Qwen 2.5 Omni 3B
  • Qwen 2.5 Omni 7B
  • Phi-4 Multimodal
  • Gemma 3n E2B
  • Gemma 3n E4B

Autonomous LLMs Jailbreak Models

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) can be instructed via a single system prompt to act as autonomous adversarial agents. These agents engage in multi-turn persuasive dialogues to systematically bypass the safety mechanisms of target language models. The LRM autonomously plans and executes the attack by initiating a benign conversation and gradually escalating the harmfulness of its requests, thereby circumventing defenses that are not robust to sustained, context-aware persuasive attacks. This…

Large Reasoning Models Are Autonomous Jailbreak Agents
Evaluated models: Claude Sonnet 4, DeepSeek R1, DeepSeek V3+11 more
  • Claude Sonnet 4
  • DeepSeek R1
  • DeepSeek V3
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash
  • GPT-4.1
  • GPT-4o
  • Grok 3
  • Grok 3 Mini
  • Llama 3.1 70B
  • Llama 4 Maverick
  • o4-mini
  • Qwen 2.5 32B
  • Qwen 3 235B-A22B
  • Qwen 3 30B-A3B

Simulated Ensemble Jailbreak Transfer

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in the fine-tuning lifecycle of Vision-Language Models (VLMs) derived from open-source base models, termed the "grey-box threat." Adversaries with white-box access to a public base model (e.g., Qwen2-VL) can generate universal adversarial images that successfully bypass safety guardrails in proprietary, fine-tuned downstream variants. This is achieved via the Simulated Ensemble Attack (SEA), which combines two techniques: Fine-tuning Trajectory Simulation (FTS), where…

Simulated Ensemble Attack: Transferring Jailbreaks Across Fine-tuned Vision-Language Models
Evaluated models: Qwen 2 2B

Activation-Guided Local Editing Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in multiple Large Language Models (LLMs) that allows for safety alignment bypass through a technique named Activation-Guided Local Editing (AGILE). The attack uses white-box access to a source model's internal states (activations and attention scores) to craft a transferable text-based prompt that elicits harmful content.

Activation-Guided Local Editing for Jailbreaking Attacks
Evaluated models: Claude 3.5 Sonnet, DarkIdol Llama 3.1 8B Instruct, DeepSeek V3+9 more
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • DarkIdol Llama 3.1 8B Instruct
  • DeepSeek V3
  • Gemini 2.0 Flash
  • GLM 4 9B Chat
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Llama 3 8B Instruct
  • Llama 3.1 8B Instruct
  • Llama 3.2 3B Instruct
  • Phi-4 Mini Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 7B Instruct

Full-Spectrum Diffusion Attack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A targeted adversarial attack vulnerability exists in Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) susceptible to Adversarial-Guided Diffusion (AGD). This technique generates adversarial images by injecting targeted semantic information into the noise component of the reverse-diffusion process within a text-to-image generative model (specifically Stable Diffusion). Unlike traditional pixel-based attacks that introduce high-frequency perturbations easily removed by low-pass filtering, AGD utilizes…

Adversarial-guided diffusion for multimodal llm attacks
Evaluated models: Vicuna 13B

Agent Policy Hacking

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

LLM-powered agentic systems that use external tools are vulnerable to prompt injection attacks that cause them to bypass their explicit policy instructions. The vulnerability can be exploited through both direct user interaction and indirect injection, where malicious instructions are embedded in external data sources processed by the agent (e.g., documents, API responses, webpages). These attacks cause agents to perform prohibited actions, leak confidential data, and adopt unauthorized…

Security challenges in ai agent deployment: Insights from a large scale public competition
Evaluated models: Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Claude 3.7 Sonnet, Command R+11 more
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • Claude 3.7 Sonnet
  • Command R
  • Command R+
  • Gemini 1.5 Flash
  • Gemini 1.5 Pro
  • Gemini 2.0 Flash
  • Gemini 2.5 Pro
  • GPT-4.5
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 3.3 70B
  • o3
  • o3-mini
  • o4-mini

Parallel Decoding LLDM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in Large Language Diffusion Models (LLDMs) due to their parallel denoising architecture. The PArallel Decoding (PAD) jailbreak attack exploits this architecture by injecting multiple, semantically innocuous "sequence connectors" (e.g., "Step 1:", "First") at distributed locations within the initial masked sequence. During the parallel denoising process, these injected tokens act as anchor points that bias the probability distribution of adjacent token predictions. This…

Jailbreaking Large Language Diffusion Models: Revealing Hidden Safety Flaws in Diffusion-Based Text Generation
Evaluated models: Gemma 7B IT, LLaDA 8B Base, LLaDA 8B Instruct+4 more
  • Gemma 7B IT
  • LLaDA 8B Base
  • LLaDA 8B Instruct
  • Llama 3.1 8B Instruct
  • MMaDA 8B Base
  • MMaDA 8B MixCoT
  • Qwen 2.5 7B Instruct

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.