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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

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556 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Hybrid Agent Prompt Injection

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Computer-Use Agents (CUAs) powered by Large Language Models (LLMs) operating in hybrid Web-OS environments are vulnerable to indirect prompt injection. Attackers can embed malicious natural language or code instructions within legitimate web content (e.g., social media forums, chat applications, shared cloud documents) that the agent processes during benign task execution. Due to the agent's inability to distinguish between trusted user instructions and untrusted environmental data, the CUA…

RedTeamCUA: Realistic Adversarial Testing of Computer-Use Agents in Hybrid Web-OS Environments
Evaluated models: Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Claude 3.7 Sonnet, GPT-4o

Expanded Strategy Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to jailbreak attacks that exploit the model's inherent persuasive nature. A novel attack framework, CL-GSO, decomposes jailbreak strategies into four components (Role, Content Support, Context, Communication Skills), creating a significantly expanded strategy space compared to prior methods. This expanded space allows for the generation of prompts that bypass safety protocols with a success rate exceeding 90% on models previously considered…

Breaking the Ceiling: Exploring the Potential of Jailbreak Attacks through Expanding Strategy Space
Evaluated models: Claude 3.5 Sonnet, GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4o+2 more
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 3 8B
  • Qwen 2.5 7B

LLM System Prompt Extraction

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs), including Llama-3, Falcon-3, Gemma-2, and GPT-4 variants, are susceptible to system prompt extraction attacks. The vulnerability exists due to the models' instruction-following nature, which allows remote attackers to bypass safety guardrails and retrieve the model's hidden system configuration (system prompt) verbatim. This is successfully exploited using an "Extended Sandwich Attack," where an adversarial extraction command is embedded between benign questions…

System Prompt Extraction Attacks and Defenses in Large Language Models
Evaluated models: GPT-4, GPT-4o, Llama 3 8B+2 more
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 3 8B
  • Falcon 7B
  • Gemma 2 9B

Distilled Jailbreak Attacks

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in Large Language Models (LLMs) allows adversarial prompt distillation from a large language model (LLM) to a smaller language model (SLM), enabling efficient and stealthy jailbreak attacks. The attack leverages knowledge distillation techniques, reinforcement learning, and dynamic temperature control to transfer the LLM's ability to bypass safety mechanisms to a smaller, more easily deployable SLM. This allows for lower computational cost attacks with a potentially high…

Efficient and Stealthy Jailbreak Attacks via Adversarial Prompt Distillation from LLMs to SLMs
Evaluated models: BERT Base, Gemma 2 27B, Gemma 2 2B+8 more
  • BERT Base
  • Gemma 2 27B
  • Gemma 2 2B
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 2 13B
  • Llama 2 7B
  • Llama 3.2 1B
  • Vicuna 13B
  • Vicuna 7B

Semantic Prompt Distortion

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

The Adaptive Greedy Binary Search (AGBS) framework exposes a vulnerability in Large Language Models (LLMs) regarding their susceptibility to semantic-preserving adversarial attacks. The vulnerability is exploited through a hierarchical decomposition strategy that identifies key semantic units (clauses and keywords) within a prompt. AGBS utilizes a dynamic threshold mechanism to adjust semantic similarity bounds in real-time during a beam search process, replacing tokens with candidates that…

Semantic-Preserving Prompt Hijacking: A Black-Box Adversarial Attack on Auto-Prompt Optimization
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4 Turbo, GPT-4o+7 more
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4 Turbo
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Llama 3.1 70B
  • Llama 3.2 3B
  • Qwen 2.5 7B
  • Qwen 2.5 14B
  • Gemma 2 9B
  • Gemma 2 27B

Dynamic Prompt Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

GhostPrompt demonstrates a vulnerability in multimodal safety filters used with text-to-image generative models. The vulnerability allows attackers to bypass these filters by using a dynamic prompt optimization framework that iteratively generates adversarial prompts designed to evade both text-based and image-based safety checks while preserving the original, harmful intent of the prompt. This bypass is achieved through a combination of semantically aligned prompt rewriting and the injection…

GhostPrompt: Jailbreaking Text-to-image Generative Models based on Dynamic Optimization
Evaluated models: DALL-E 3, DeepSeek V3, Flux Schnell+5 more
  • DALL-E 3
  • DeepSeek V3
  • Flux Schnell
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4.1
  • InternVL 2 2B
  • Qwen 2.5 7B Instruct
  • ShieldLM 7B

Intent Rephrasing Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Model (LLM) content moderation guardrails, including advanced mechanisms utilizing Chain-of-Thought (CoT) and Intent Analysis (IA), are vulnerable to adversarial bypass via "Intent Manipulation." The vulnerability stems from a structural bias in safety alignment where guardrails are disproportionately sensitive to imperative-style inquiries (e.g., commands like "Write a guide...") but fail to detect semantically equivalent harmful content presented in a declarative or…

Exploring the Vulnerability of the Content Moderation Guardrail in Large Language Models via Intent Manipulation
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, o1, o3-mini+10 more
  • GPT-4o
  • o1
  • o3-mini
  • Gemini 1.5 Flash
  • Gemini 2.0 Pro
  • Claude 3.7 Sonnet
  • DeepSeek V3
  • DeepSeek R1
  • Qwen 3 14B
  • Qwen 3 32B
  • Qwen 3 235B-A22B
  • Llama 4 Scout
  • Mixtral 8x7B

Universal Jailbreak Prompt Generator

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to robust jailbreak prompts generated by the ArrAttack framework. ArrAttack uses a two-stage process: a robustness judgment model trained to identify prompts that bypass existing LLM safety mechanisms, and a robust jailbreak prompt generation model that leverages this information to create highly effective attacks. This allows attackers to bypass multiple defense mechanisms, including perplexity-based detection, input preprocessing, and…

One Model Transfer to All: On Robust Jailbreak Prompts Generation against LLMs
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4, Guanaco 7B+3 more
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • Guanaco 7B
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Vicuna 13B
  • Vicuna 7B

Adaptive Stacked Cipher Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) utilizing Chain-of-Thought (CoT) processes are vulnerable to an adaptive stacked cipher attack known as SEAL (Stacked Encryption for Adaptive Language reasoning model jailbreak). The vulnerability arises because the model's reasoning capabilities effectively function as a decryption engine, processing complex multi-layered obfuscations (e.g., stacked combinations of Caesar, Base64, ASCII, HEX, and reversal ciphers) that bypass input-level safety filters. By…

Three Minds, One Legend: Jailbreak Large Reasoning Model with Adaptive Stacked Ciphers
Evaluated models: DeepSeek R1, o1-mini, o4-mini+3 more
  • DeepSeek R1
  • o1-mini
  • o4-mini
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • Claude 3.7 Sonnet
  • Gemini 2.0 Flash Thinking

Conditional Prompt Hijack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

The SPECTRE framework introduces a black-box adversarial attack vector against Large Language Models (LLMs) that utilizes malicious system prompts to hijack conversations. Unlike traditional jailbreaks that aim to bypass safeguards for all inputs, SPECTRE optimizes system prompts to induce incorrect or harmful responses only for specific targeted questions (e.g., "Are COVID vaccines safe?", "Who should I vote for?"), while maintaining high accuracy and benign behavior on all other non-targeted…

SPECTRE: Conditional System Prompt Poisoning to Hijack LLMs
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4o Mini, Llama 2 7B+8 more
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Llama 2 7B
  • Llama 2 13B
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • DeepSeek 7B
  • Qwen 2.5 3B
  • Qwen 2.5 7B
  • Qwen 2.5 14B
  • Qwen 2.5 32B
  • Pythia 12B

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.