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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

Filtered research findings

406 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Multimodal LLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A hybrid multimodal jailbreaking attack, dubbed JMLLM, exploits vulnerabilities in 13 popular large language models (LLMs) across text, image, and speech modalities. The attack leverages alternating translation, word encryption, feature collapse in images, and harmful text injection to bypass safety mechanisms and elicit harmful responses. Success rates vary across LLMs and modalities, with some models exhibiting significantly higher vulnerability than others.

Divide and Conquer: A Hybrid Strategy Defeats Multimodal Large Language Models
Evaluated models: Claude 1, Claude 2, ERNIE 3.5 Turbo+10 more
  • Claude 1
  • Claude 2
  • ERNIE 3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Llama 2 7B
  • Llama 3 8B
  • Llama 3 70B
  • Llama 3.1 405B
  • Qwen 2.5 72B
  • Qwen VL Max

Contextual Adversarial Prompts

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to human-readable adversarial prompts crafted using situational context derived from movie scripts. These prompts, which combine a malicious prompt, a seemingly innocuous adversarial insertion, and relevant contextual information, can bypass LLMs' safety mechanisms and elicit harmful responses. The technique leverages the LLM's ability to understand context and generate responses consistent with that context to mask the malicious intent. The…

Human-Readable Adversarial Prompts: An Investigation into LLM Vulnerabilities Using Situational Context
Evaluated models: Flan-t5 Large, Gemini 1.5 Pro, Gemma 2B IT+16 more
  • Flan-t5 Large
  • Gemini 1.5 Pro
  • Gemma 2B IT
  • Gemma 7B
  • Gemma 7B IT
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4 Turbo
  • Llama 2 13B Chat
  • Llama 2 7B
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Meta-llama-3-8B
  • Mistral 7B Instruct v0.2
  • Mistral-7B-v0.1
  • Mistral-8x7B-instruct-v0.1
  • Phi-1.5
  • Phi-3-mini-128k-instruct
  • Vicuna 13B v1.5

Preference-Optimized Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

JailPO is a black-box attack framework that leverages preference optimization to generate effective jailbreak prompts for aligned LLMs. The attack automatically generates prompts, bypassing safety mechanisms and eliciting harmful or undesirable responses from the target LLM. The framework includes three attack patterns (QEPrompt, TemplatePrompt, MixAsking) with varying degrees of effectiveness and risk.

JailPO: A Novel Black-box Jailbreak Framework via Preference Optimization against Aligned LLMs
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo

Linked-Task LLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A novel jailbreak paradigm, Simple Assistive Task Linkage (SATA), circumvents LLM safeguards by masking harmful keywords in a malicious query and using a secondary, simple assistive task (e.g., masked language modeling or element lookup by position) to convey the masked keywords' semantics to the LLM. This distracts the LLM and allows it to bypass safety checks, leading to the generation of harmful responses.

SATA: A Paradigm for LLM Jailbreak via Simple Assistive Task Linkage
Evaluated models: Claude-v2, GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4o+3 more
  • Claude-v2
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Llama 3 70B
  • Llama 3 8B

One-Step Model Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in LLMs allows attackers to bypass safety mechanisms by crafting prompts that disguise malicious intent as a "defense" against harmful content. The attack, Reverse Embedded Defense Attack (REDA), leverages the model's own defensive capabilities to generate harmful outputs while masking the malicious intent within the response structure. This allows for successful jailbreaks in a single iteration, without requiring model-specific prompt engineering.

Jailbreaking? One Step Is Enough!
Evaluated models: GLM 4 9B Chat, GPT-3.5, Llama 2 13B+3 more
  • GLM 4 9B Chat
  • GPT-3.5
  • Llama 2 13B
  • Llama 3.1 8B Instruct
  • Qwen 2 7B Instruct
  • Vicuna 13B v1.5

Agent Action Hijacking

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in LLM-based agents, dubbed AI Agent Injection (AI²), allows attackers to hijack the agent's actions by manipulating the agent's memory retrieval mechanism. The attack involves two main steps: (1) Stealing action-aware knowledge from the agent's memory using crafted adversarial queries targeting the retriever module and (2) Generating Trojan prompts consisting of a Trojan string and hijacking instructions. The Trojan string is designed to manipulate the retriever into…

Towards Action Hijacking of Large Language Model-based Agent
Evaluated models: BERT, GPT-3, GPT-4+2 more
  • BERT
  • GPT-3
  • GPT-4
  • M3E
  • MiniLM

Obfuscated Activations Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to attacks that generate obfuscated activations, bypassing latent-space defenses such as sparse autoencoders, representation probing, and latent out-of-distribution (OOD) detection. Attackers can manipulate model inputs or training data to produce outputs exhibiting malicious behavior while remaining undetected by these defenses. This occurs because the models can represent harmful behavior through diverse activation patterns, allowing attackers to…

Obfuscated Activations Bypass LLM Latent-Space Defenses
Evaluated models: Gemma 2 2B, Llama 3 8B Instruct

LLM Adversarial Forecast Degradation

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in Large Language Model (LLM)-based time series forecasting architectures, specifically affecting models such as TimeGPT, LLMTime, and TimeLLM. These models are susceptible to a gradient-free, black-box adversarial attack method termed Directional Gradient Approximation (DGA). An attacker can inject imperceptible perturbations into the historical time series input window (lookback window) to manipulate the model's output. By treating the model as a black box and…

Adversarial vulnerabilities in large language models for time series forecasting
Evaluated models: TimeGPT, GPT-3.5, GPT-4

Semantic Confusion Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

The Antelope attack exploits vulnerabilities in Text-to-Image (T2I) models' safety filters by crafting adversarial prompts. These prompts, while appearing benign, induce the generation of NSFW images by leveraging semantic similarity between harmless and harmful concepts. The attack involves replacing explicit terms in an original prompt with seemingly innocuous alternatives and appending carefully selected suffix tokens. This manipulation bypasses both text-based and image-based filters…

Antelope: Potent and Concealed Jailbreak Attack Strategy
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Midjourney, Stable Diffusion+2 more
  • GPT-4o
  • Midjourney
  • Stable Diffusion
  • Stable Diffusion v1.4
  • Stable Diffusion v2.1

Metaphorical LLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to jailbreaking attacks via adversarial metaphors. Attackers can leverage the LLMs' imaginative capabilities to map harmful concepts to innocuous ones, thereby bypassing safety mechanisms and eliciting harmful responses. The attack relies on creating a metaphorical mapping between a harmful target and seemingly benign entities, exploiting the LLM's ability to reason about the analogous relationship without recognizing the underlying malicious intent.

Na'vi or Knave: Jailbreaking Language Models via Metaphorical Avatars
Evaluated models: Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Gemini 1.5 Pro, GLM 3 6B+13 more
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • Gemini 1.5 Pro
  • GLM 3 6B
  • GLM 4 9B
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • InternLM 2.5 7B
  • Llama 3.1 70B
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Mistral 7B
  • Mixtral 8x7B
  • o1
  • Qwen 1.5 110B
  • Qwen 2 72B
  • Qwen 2 7B
  • Yi 1.5 34B

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.