Language Model Security Database

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to multi-turn adversarial attacks that skillfully decompose malicious requests into seemingly benign interactions, progressively guiding the dialogue towards harmful outputs. This vulnerability allows attackers to bypass LLM safety mechanisms through a series of strategically crafted prompts, exploiting the model's iterative response generation. The attack's success hinges on dynamically adapting each prompt based on the LLM's previous responses…

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to malicious prompts disguised as summaries of scientific papers, even when those papers are fabricated by the attacker. This allows attackers to manipulate LLMs into generating responses exhibiting significantly increased stereotypical bias and toxicity. The vulnerability is exacerbated by multi-turn interactions, where bias scores tend to increase with each subsequent response. The inclusion of author names and publication venues in the fabricated…

Large language models (LLMs) exhibit increased responsiveness to prompts framed within positive narratives. The Happy Ending Attack (HEA) exploits this by embedding malicious requests within a positive-sentiment scenario culminating in a happy ending. This allows the LLM to generate responses that fulfill the malicious request while perceiving the overall prompt as benign.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a self-instruct few-shot jailbreaking attack that leverages pattern and behavior learning to bypass safety mechanisms. The attack efficiently induces harmful outputs by injecting a strategically chosen response prefix into the model's prompt and exploiting the model's tendency to mimic co-occurrence patterns of special tokens preceding the prefix. This allows the attacker to elicit unsafe responses with a small number of carefully crafted…

Large language models (LLMs) are vulnerable to adversarial prompt engineering attacks that leverage proximity constraints to elicit harmful behaviors. By subtly modifying benign prompts within a semantically close embedding space, attackers can bypass existing safety mechanisms and induce undesired outputs, even when the original prompts would not trigger such a response. This vulnerability exploits the model's sensitivity to small perturbations in the input embedding, resulting in the…

Voting-based Large Language Model (LLM) leaderboards, such as Chatbot Arena, are vulnerable to adversarial ranking manipulation due to insufficient response anonymity. While these systems obscure model identities during head-to-head comparisons to prevent bias, an attacker can de-anonymize the models with high accuracy (>95%) by analyzing response content. The attack functions in two stages: (1) Re-identification, where the attacker submits specific prompts (identity-probing or stylometric…

A vulnerability exists in Large Language Model (LLM) routing systems (control planes) that allows for the manipulation of inference flow via adversarial input sequences. LLM routers, which dynamically direct user queries to either "weak" (cheaper) or "strong" (expensive) models based on predicted query complexity, can be bypassed by appending specific, pre-optimized token sequences known as "confounder gadgets." These gadgets artificially inflate the router's complexity score for an input…

Large Language Model (LLM) based search engines utilizing Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) are vulnerable to ranking manipulation attacks via indirect prompt injection. Adversaries can embed optimized adversarial triggers or crafted semantic patterns within external webpage content. When these manipulated documents are retrieved and integrated into the LLM's context window alongside a user query, the adversarial content disrupts the model's contextual understanding. This results in the LLM…

DiffusionAttacker exploits a vulnerability in Large Language Models (LLMs) allowing manipulation of prompts to elicit harmful responses, even when the model incorporates safety mechanisms. The attack leverages a sequence-to-sequence diffusion model to rewrite harmful prompts, making them appear harmless to the LLM's internal representation while preserving their original semantic meaning. This bypasses safety filters and elicits undesired outputs.

LLM-based relevance assessment frameworks, such as the Umbrela system, are vulnerable to evaluation subversion and artificial score inflation due to evaluation circularity and LLM "narcissism" (an LLM's inherent bias toward favoring LLM-generated outputs). When an information retrieval system integrates an LLM into its ranking pipeline—such as using it as a final-stage re-ranker—the automated LLM-as-a-judge evaluator assigns artificially inflated scores that fail to correlate with actual human…