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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

Filtered research findings

267 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Agent Tool Misuse Attacks

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Model (LLM) agents are vulnerable to obfuscated adversarial prompts that exploit tool misuse. These prompts, crafted through prompt optimization techniques, force the agent to execute tools (e.g., URL fetching, markdown rendering) in a way that leaks sensitive user data (e.g., PII) without the user's knowledge. The prompts are designed to be visually indistinguishable from benign prompts.

Imprompter: Tricking LLM Agents into Improper Tool Use
Evaluated models: Not reported

Robotic LLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large language models (LLMs) controlling robots are vulnerable to jailbreaking attacks. The ROBOPAIR algorithm demonstrates that malicious prompts can bypass safety mechanisms, causing robots to perform harmful physical actions. This vulnerability exploits the LLM's reliance on textual prompts and its potential lack of sufficient contextual understanding to prevent unsafe commands. The attack is effective across different access levels.

Jailbreaking LLM-controlled robots
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4, GPT-4o+1 more
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4o
  • Nvidia Dolphins Self-driving Llm

Browser Agent Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Refusal-trained Large Language Models (LLMs) show decreased safety when deployed as browser agents compared to their performance in chatbot settings. Attack methods effective at jailbreaking LLMs in chat contexts also successfully bypass safety mechanisms in browser agents, leading to the execution of harmful behaviors. This vulnerability stems from a lack of generalization of safety training to agentic, real-world interaction scenarios and the increased context available to the agent (browser…

Refusal-Trained LLMs Are Easily Jailbroken As Browser Agents
Evaluated models: o1-preview, o1-mini, GPT-4 Turbo+5 more
  • o1-preview
  • o1-mini
  • GPT-4 Turbo
  • GPT-4o
  • Claude 3 Opus
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • Llama 3.1 405B
  • Gemini 1.5 Pro

RoleBreak Character Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) used in role-playing systems are vulnerable to character hallucination attacks, a form of jailbreak exploiting "query sparsity" and "role-query conflict". Query sparsity occurs when prompts fall outside the model's training data distribution, causing it to generate out-of-character responses. Role-query conflict arises when the prompt contradicts the established character persona, leading to inconsistent behavior. These vulnerabilities allow attackers to elicit…

RoleBreak: Character Hallucination as a Jailbreak Attack in Role-Playing Systems
Evaluated models: Claude 3 Haiku, GPT-3.5 Turbo, Llama 3 8B+1 more
  • Claude 3 Haiku
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • Llama 3 8B
  • Mistral 7B Instruct v0.2

RAG Worm Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Jailbreaking vulnerabilities in Large Language Models (LLMs) used in Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems allow escalation of attacks from entity extraction to full document extraction and enable the propagation of self-replicating malicious prompts ("worms") within interconnected RAG applications. Exploitation leverages prompt injection to force the LLM to return retrieved documents or execute malicious actions specified within the prompt.

Unleashing worms and extracting data: Escalating the outcome of attacks against rag-based inference in scale and severity using jailbreaking
Evaluated models: Gemini 1.5 Flash

LLM-Driven Motion Adversarial Attack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

The ALERT-Motion framework demonstrates a vulnerability in text-to-motion (T2M) models where an attacker can craft subtly modified text prompts (adversarial prompts) that cause the model to generate motions significantly different from those intended by the benign prompt, yet semantically similar to a target motion specified by the attacker. The attack leverages a large language model (LLM) to autonomously generate these adversarial prompts, bypassing simple keyword-based detection mechanisms…

Autonomous LLM-Enhanced Adversarial Attack for Text-to-Motion
Evaluated models: Mdm, Mld

Multi-Agent T2I Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability allows bypassing safety filters in text-to-image (T2I) models using a multi-agent framework ("Atlas") powered by Large Language Models (LLMs). Atlas iteratively generates and refines prompts, leveraging a Vision-Language Model (VLM) to assess filter activation and an LLM to select effective prompts that maintain semantic similarity to the original, malicious prompt while evading the filter. This enables the generation of images containing unsafe content.

Jailbreaking text-to-image models with llm-based agents
Evaluated models: DALL-E 3, LLaVA 1.5 13B, Sharegpt4v-13B+4 more
  • DALL-E 3
  • LLaVA 1.5 13B
  • Sharegpt4v-13B
  • Stable Diffusion 3 Medium
  • Stable Diffusion v1.4
  • Stable Diffusion Xl Refiner
  • Vicuna-1.5-13B

Agent Malfunction Amplification

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

LLM-based autonomous agents are vulnerable to malfunction amplification attacks. These attacks exploit the inherent instability of agents by inducing repetitive or irrelevant actions through various methods including prompt injection and adversarial perturbations, leading to agent malfunction and task failure. The attacks do not rely on overtly harmful actions, making them harder to detect with standard LLM safety mechanisms.

Breaking agents: Compromising autonomous llm agents through malfunction amplification
Evaluated models: Claude 2, GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4

LLM Memory Poisoning Attack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG)-based Large Language Model (LLM) agents allows attackers to inject malicious demonstrations into the agent's memory or knowledge base. By crafting a carefully optimized trigger, an attacker can manipulate the agent's retrieval mechanism to preferentially retrieve these poisoned demonstrations, causing the agent to produce adversarial outputs or take malicious actions even when seemingly benign prompts are used. The attack, termed…

Agentpoison: Red-teaming llm agents via poisoning memory or knowledge bases
Evaluated models: GPT-2, GPT-3.5 Turbo, Llama 3 70B+2 more
  • GPT-2
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • Llama 3 70B
  • Llama 3 8B
  • text-embedding-ada-002

Embodied LLM Misaligned Actions

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Embodied Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to manipulation via voice-based interactions, leading to the execution of harmful physical actions. Attacks exploit three vulnerabilities: (1) cascading LLM jailbreaks resulting in malicious robotic commands; (2) misalignment between linguistic outputs (verbal refusal) and physical actions (command execution); and (3) conceptual deception, where seemingly benign instructions lead to harmful outcomes due to incomplete world knowledge within…

BadRobot: Manipulating Embodied LLMs in the Physical World
Evaluated models: BERT, GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4 Turbo+2 more
  • BERT
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4 Turbo
  • GPT-4o
  • LLaVA 1.5 7B

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.