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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

Filtered research findings

340 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Automated LLM Fuzz Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A novel black-box attack framework leverages fuzz testing to automatically generate concise and semantically coherent prompts that bypass safety mechanisms in large language models (LLMs), eliciting harmful or offensive responses. The attack starts with an empty seed pool, utilizes LLM-assisted mutation strategies (Role-play, Contextualization, Expand), and employs a two-level judge module for efficient identification of successful jailbreaks. The attack's effectiveness is demonstrated across…

Effective and Evasive Fuzz Testing-Driven Jailbreaking Attacks against LLMs
Evaluated models: Baichuan 2 7B Chat, Gemini Pro, GPT-3.5 Turbo+4 more
  • Baichuan 2 7B Chat
  • Gemini Pro
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • Guanaco 7B
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Vicuna 7B v1.3

Symbolic Math Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a jailbreaking attack, termed "MathPrompt," which leverages the models' ability to process symbolic mathematics to bypass built-in safety mechanisms. The attack encodes harmful natural language prompts into mathematically formulated problems, causing the LLM to generate unsafe outputs while ostensibly solving a mathematical problem.

Jailbreaking Large Language Models with Symbolic Mathematics
Evaluated models: Claude 3 Haiku, Claude 3 Opus, Claude 3 Sonnet+10 more
  • Claude 3 Haiku
  • Claude 3 Opus
  • Claude 3 Sonnet
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • Gemini 1.5 Flash
  • Gemini 1.5 Flash (block None)
  • Gemini 1.5 Pro
  • Gemini 1.5 Pro (block None)
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4 Turbo
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Llama 3.1 70B

Single-Turn LLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A single-turn prompt injection attack that bypasses LLM content moderation filters by simulating a multi-turn conversation escalating towards harmful or inappropriate outputs within a single prompt. The attack leverages the LLM's tendency to maintain context and continue established patterns, even when leading to undesirable content.

Well, that escalated quickly: The Single-Turn Crescendo Attack (STCA)
Evaluated models: GPT-4, GPT-4o, GPT-4o Mini+4 more
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Llama 3 8B
  • Llama 3 70B
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Llama 3.1 70B

Attack LLMs with Toxic Answers

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a targeted jailbreak attack, termed Atoxia, which can force the generation of specific harmful content. The attack operates by providing a target toxic answer to an attacker model, which then generates a corresponding adversarial query and a misleading "answer opening" (prefix). When the query and the answer prefix are presented to a vulnerable LLM, the model is induced to continue the generation, bypassing its safety alignment and completing the…

Atoxia: Red-teaming Large Language Models with Target Toxic Answers
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4, GPT-4o+5 more
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Llama 3 8B Instruct
  • Mistral 7B
  • Vicuna 7B v1.5

Random Token T2I Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A heuristic token search attack, termed HTS-Attack, can bypass safety mechanisms in text-to-image (T2I) models, allowing generation of NSFW content. The attack iteratively replaces tokens in a malicious prompt with semantically similar tokens from the model's vocabulary, avoiding detection by prompt and image checkers. The method leverages a surrogate CLIP model to maintain semantic similarity to the target NSFW prompt.

Rt-attack: Jailbreaking text-to-image models via random token
Evaluated models: Clip-vit-base-patch32, DALL-E 3, GPT 3.5-turbo-instruct+4 more
  • Clip-vit-base-patch32
  • DALL-E 3
  • GPT 3.5-turbo-instruct
  • Safegen
  • Sld
  • Stable Diffusion v1.4
  • Stable Diffusion v1.5

LLM Adversarial Suffix Optimization

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a novel black-box jailbreaking attack, ECLIPSE, which leverages the LLM's own capabilities as an optimizer to generate adversarial suffixes. ECLIPSE iteratively refines these suffixes based on a harmfulness score, bypassing the need for pre-defined affirmative phrases used in previous optimization-based attacks. This allows for effective jailbreaking even with limited interaction and without white-box access to the LLM's internal parameters.

Unlocking Adversarial Suffix Optimization Without Affirmative Phrases: Efficient Black-box Jailbreaking via LLM as Optimizer
Evaluated models: Falcon 7B Instruct, GPT-3.5 Turbo, Llama 2 7B Chat+1 more
  • Falcon 7B Instruct
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Vicuna 7B

Adversarial Unlearning Bypass

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) employing gradient-ascent based unlearning methods are vulnerable to a dynamic unlearning attack (DUA). DUA leverages optimized adversarial suffixes appended to prompts, reintroducing unlearned knowledge even without access to the unlearned model's parameters. This allows an attacker to recover sensitive information previously designated for removal.

Towards robust knowledge unlearning: An adversarial framework for assessing and improving unlearning robustness in large language models
Evaluated models: Llama 2 7B Chat, Llama 3 8B Instruct, Llama 3.1 8B Instruct

Synthetic LLM Jailbreak Dataset

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to jailbreaking attacks leveraging synthetically generated prompts. A novel pipeline, SAGE-RT, generates a diverse dataset of 51,000 prompt-response pairs designed to exploit LLMs' vulnerabilities across various categories of harmfulness. These prompts successfully jailbreak state-of-the-art LLMs in a significant percentage of tested sub-categories, including 100% of macro-categories for certain models like GPT-4 and GPT-3.5-turbo. The vulnerability…

Sage-rt: Synthetic alignment data generation for safety evaluation and red teaming
Evaluated models: Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Gemma 7B IT, GPT-3.5 Turbo+8 more
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • Gemma 7B IT
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4 Turbo
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 2 70B Chat
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Llama 3 70B Instruct
  • Llama 3 8B Instruct
  • Mistral 7B Instruct

Kov: MDP-Based LLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to naturalistic adversarial attacks crafted using Markov Decision Processes (MDPs) and Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS). These attacks generate natural-language prompts that elicit harmful, violent, or discriminatory responses from the LLMs, even those with built-in safety mechanisms. The attacks are transferable across different LLMs, demonstrating a generalized vulnerability.

Kov: Transferable and Naturalistic Black-Box LLM Attacks using Markov Decision Processes and Tree Search
Evaluated models: FastChat-T5 3B, GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4+1 more
  • FastChat-T5 3B
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • Vicuna 7B

Composable Jailbreak Synthesis

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to composable jailbreak attacks, allowing bypass of safety filters through the chaining of multiple prompt transformations. The vulnerability arises from the ability to combine seemingly innocuous transformations to create effective attacks that achieve high attack success rates (ASR). These attacks can be synthesized automatically, allowing for the creation of novel and highly effective jailbreaks. Specifically, using the h4rm3l framework, attacks…

h4rm3l: A dynamic benchmark of composable jailbreak attacks for llm safety assessment
Evaluated models: Claude 3 Haiku, Claude 3 Sonnet, GPT-3.5 Turbo+3 more
  • Claude 3 Haiku
  • Claude 3 Sonnet
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 3 70B
  • Llama 3 8B

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.