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Last analyzed 9/9/2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1123 evaluated models

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267 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Published 1/1/2025
Analyzed 12/9/2025

Vision Language Models (VLMs) integrated into autonomous driving (AD) systems are vulnerable to a black-box adversarial attack method termed Cascading Adversarial Disruption (CAD). The vulnerability stems from the model's susceptibility to optimized visual perturbations that disrupt the decision-making reasoning chain (perception, prediction, and planning). Attackers can generate adversarial images or physical patches by aligning visual noise with deceptive textual semantics in the model's…

Black-box adversarial attack on vision language models for autonomous driving
Evaluated models: GPT-4, GPT-4o, InstructBLIP

Source: arXiv

Published 1/1/2025
Analyzed 3/19/2025

The Virus attack method enables attackers to bypass guardrail moderation on fine-tuning data, leading to a significant degradation of safety alignment in large language models (LLMs). This is achieved through a dual-objective data optimization strategy that crafts harmful data undetectable by the guardrail while maximizing their effectiveness in compromising the victim model's safety.

Virus: Harmful Fine-tuning Attack for Large Language Models Bypassing Guardrail Moderation
Evaluated models: Llama 3 8B, Llama Guard 2

Source: arXiv

Published 1/1/2025
Analyzed 12/9/2025

Vision Language Models (VLMs) are vulnerable to visual prompt injection attacks via text-to-image obfuscation. While these models often possess safety guardrails for standard text-based inputs, they fail to apply equivalent safety alignment to textual instructions embedded visually within an image. An attacker can overlay malicious instructions (e.g., requests for illegal acts, hate speech) onto an image file and submit it to the model. The model’s Optical Character Recognition (OCR) or visual…

Lessons from red teaming 100 generative ai products
Evaluated models: GPT-4, Phi-3

Source: arXiv

Published 12/1/2024
Analyzed 12/29/2024

Large Language Model (LLM) tool-calling systems are vulnerable to adversarial tool injection attacks. Attackers can inject malicious tools ("Manipulator Tools") into the tool platform, manipulating the LLM's tool selection and execution process. This allows for privacy theft (extracting user queries), denial-of-service (DoS) attacks against legitimate tools, and unscheduled tool-calling (forcing the use of attacker-specified tools regardless of relevance). The attack exploits vulnerabilities…

From Allies to Adversaries: Manipulating LLM Tool-Calling through Adversarial Injection
Evaluated models: GPT-4o Mini, Llama 3 8B Instruct, Qwen 2 7B Instruct

Source: arXiv

Published 12/1/2024
Analyzed 12/29/2024

Large Audio-Language Models (LALMs) are vulnerable to a stealthy adversarial jailbreak attack, AdvWave, which leverages a dual-phase optimization to overcome gradient shattering caused by audio discretization. The attack crafts adversarial audio by adding perceptually realistic environmental noise, making it difficult to detect. The attack also dynamically adapts the adversarial target based on the LALM's response patterns.

AdvWave: Stealthy Adversarial Jailbreak Attack against Large Audio-Language Models
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Llama Omni, Qwen 2 Audio +1 more

Source: arXiv

Published 12/1/2024
Analyzed 12/29/2024

A bimodal adversarial attack, PBI-Attack, can manipulate Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) into generating toxic or harmful content by iteratively optimizing both textual and visual inputs in a black-box setting. The attack leverages a surrogate LVLM to inject malicious features from a harmful corpus into a benign image, then iteratively refines both image and text perturbations to maximize the toxicity of the model’s output as measured by a toxicity detection model (Perspective API or…

BAMBA: A Bimodal Adversarial Multi-Round Black-Box Jailbreak Attacker for LVLMs
Evaluated models: GPT-4, InstructBLIP, MiniGPT-4 +1 more

Source: arXiv

Published 12/1/2024
Analyzed 1/26/2025

LLM-based planning modules in embodied AI systems are vulnerable to Policy Executable (POEX) jailbreak attacks. Attackers can inject carefully crafted adversarial suffixes into user instructions, causing the LLM to generate and execute harmful policies in both simulated and real-world environments. The attacks bypass safety mechanisms by using optimized, human-readable suffixes that evade perplexity-based detection.

POEX: Policy Executable Embodied AI Jailbreak Attacks
Evaluated models: Claude 3.5 Sonnet, GPT-4, GPT-4 Turbo +9 more

Source: arXiv

Published 12/1/2024
Analyzed 12/28/2024

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a novel agentic-based red-teaming attack, PrivAgent, which uses reinforcement learning to generate adversarial prompts. These prompts can extract sensitive information, including system prompts and portions of training data, from target LLMs even with existing guardrail defenses. The attack leverages a custom reward function based on a normalized sliding-window word edit similarity metric to guide the learning process, enabling it to overcome the…

PrivAgent: Agentic-based Red-teaming for LLM Privacy Leakage
Evaluated models: Not reported

Source: arXiv

Published 11/1/2024
Analyzed 12/29/2024

Large Vision-Language Models (VLMs) are vulnerable to a novel black-box jailbreak attack, IDEATOR, which leverages a separate VLM to generate malicious image-text pairs. The attacker VLM iteratively refines its prompts based on the target VLM's responses, bypassing safety mechanisms by generating contextually relevant and visually subtle malicious prompts.

IDEATOR: Jailbreaking and Benchmarking Large Vision-Language Models Using Themselves
Evaluated models: MiniGPT-4 Vicuna 13B, InstructBLIP, Chameleon +10 more

Source: arXiv

Published 10/1/2024
Analyzed 12/29/2024

Large Language Model (LLM) agents are vulnerable to obfuscated adversarial prompts that exploit tool misuse. These prompts, crafted through prompt optimization techniques, force the agent to execute tools (e.g., URL fetching, markdown rendering) in a way that leaks sensitive user data (e.g., PII) without the user's knowledge. The prompts are designed to be visually indistinguishable from benign prompts.

Imprompter: Tricking LLM Agents into Improper Tool Use
Evaluated models: Not reported

Source: arXiv

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.