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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

Filtered research findings

410 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Context-Coherent LLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A context-coherent jailbreak attack (CCJA) allows bypassing safety mechanisms in aligned large language models (LLMs) by optimizing perturbations in the continuous word embedding space of a masked language model (MLM). The attack leverages the MLM's ability to reconstruct text from hidden states to generate semantically coherent yet malicious prompts that induce the target LLM to produce unsafe outputs, even with strong safety alignment. The attack's effectiveness is enhanced by using a seed…

CCJA: Context-Coherent Jailbreak Attack for Aligned Large Language Models
Evaluated models: Guanaco 13B, Llama 2 7B Chat, Llama 3 8B Instruct+4 more
  • Guanaco 13B
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Llama 3 8B Instruct
  • Mistral 7B Instruct v0.2
  • Mistral 7B Instruct v0.3
  • Vicuna 13B v1.5
  • Vicuna 7B v1.5

LLM Syntax Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to structure transformation attacks, where malicious prompts are encoded in diverse syntax spaces (e.g., SQL, JSON, LLM-generated syntaxes) to bypass safety mechanisms. These attacks maintain the harmful intent while altering the linguistic structure, making detection based on token-level patterns ineffective.

StructTransform: A Scalable Attack Surface for Safety-Aligned Large Language Models
Evaluated models: BERT, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, GPT-4o+5 more
  • BERT
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 3 8B
  • Llama 3.2 3B
  • Llama 3.2 90B
  • Mistral 7B
  • o1

Learned Instruction Rewriting Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to "Rewrite to Jailbreak" (R2J) attacks. R2J exploits the models' safety mechanisms by iteratively rewriting harmful prompts, subtly altering wording to bypass safety filters while maintaining the original malicious intent. This differs from previous methods which rely on adding extraneous prefixes/suffixes or creating forced instruction-following scenarios, thus being more difficult to detect.

Rewrite to Jailbreak: Discover Learnable and Transferable Implicit Harmfulness Instruction
Evaluated models: Gemini Pro, GPT-3.5 Turbo, Llama 2 7B Chat+1 more
  • Gemini Pro
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Llama 3 8B

Reasoning-Augmented Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to multi-turn jailbreak attacks leveraging the model's reasoning capabilities. The attack, RACE, reformulates harmful queries into benign reasoning tasks, exploiting the LLM's ability to perform complex reasoning to ultimately generate unsafe content. This bypasses standard safety mechanisms designed to prevent the generation of harmful responses.

Reasoning-Augmented Conversation for Multi-Turn Jailbreak Attacks on Large Language Models
Evaluated models: DeepSeek R1, Gemini 1.5 Pro, Gemini 2.0 Flash Thinking+6 more
  • DeepSeek R1
  • Gemini 1.5 Pro
  • Gemini 2.0 Flash Thinking
  • Gemma 2 9B
  • GLM 4 9B Chat
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4o
  • o1
  • Qwen 2 7B Instruct

CRI Jailbreak Initialization

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

CRI (Compliance Refusal Initialization) initializes jailbreak attacks by leveraging pre-trained jailbreak prompts, effectively guiding the optimization process towards the compliance subspace of harmful prompts. This significantly enhances the success rate and reduces the computational overhead of attacks, often requiring only a single optimization step to bypass safety mechanisms. Attacks utilizing CRI demonstrate significantly improved ASR (Adversarial Success Rate) and reduced median steps…

Jailbreak Attack Initializations as Extractors of Compliance Directions
Evaluated models: Falcon 7B Instruct, Llama 2 7B Chat, Llama 3 8B Instruct+5 more
  • Falcon 7B Instruct
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Llama 3 8B Instruct
  • Mistral 7B Instruct v0.2
  • Mistral 7B Instruct v0.3
  • Phi-4
  • Qwen 2.5 Coder 7B Instruct
  • Vicuna 7B v1.3

Multi-Dimensional Safety Bypass

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) trained with safety fine-tuning techniques are vulnerable to multi-dimensional evasion attacks. Safety-aligned behavior, such as refusing harmful queries, is controlled not by a single direction in activation space, but by a subspace of interacting directions. Manipulating non-dominant directions, which represent distinct jailbreak patterns or indirect features, can suppress the dominant direction responsible for refusal, thereby bypassing learned safety…

The Hidden Dimensions of LLM Alignment: A Multi-Dimensional Safety Analysis
Evaluated models: Llama 3 8B, Llama 3.1 405B Instruct, Llama 3.1 8B Instruct+2 more
  • Llama 3 8B
  • Llama 3.1 405B Instruct
  • Llama 3.1 8B Instruct
  • Llama 3.2 3B Instruct
  • Ministral 8B Instruct

Query Code Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to QueryAttack, a novel jailbreak technique that leverages structured, non-natural query languages (e.g., SQL, URL formats, or other programming language constructs) to bypass safety alignment mechanisms. The attack translates malicious natural language queries into these structured formats, exploiting the LLM's ability to understand and process such languages without triggering safety filters designed for natural language prompts. The LLM then…

QueryAttack: Jailbreaking Aligned Large Language Models Using Structured Non-natural Query Language
Evaluated models: DeepSeek Chat, DeepSeek R1, Gemini 1.5 Flash+11 more
  • DeepSeek Chat
  • DeepSeek R1
  • Gemini 1.5 Flash
  • Gemini 1.5 Pro
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4 Turbo
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 3.1 70B Instruct
  • Llama 3.1 8B Instruct
  • Llama 3.2 11B Vision Instruct
  • Llama 3.2 1B Instruct
  • Llama 3.2 3B Instruct
  • Llama 3.3 70B Instruct
  • o1

Concept-Based Jailbreak Defense

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) employing safety alignment strategies are vulnerable to jailbreak attacks. These attacks manipulate the LLM's internal representation by activating "jailbreak concepts" in addition to "toxic concepts," causing the model to bypass safety guardrails and generate unsafe outputs despite recognizing the harmful nature of the input. The vulnerability stems from the insufficient mitigation of the influence of the activated jailbreak concepts on model output.

JBShield: Defending Large Language Models from Jailbreak Attacks through Activated Concept Analysis and Manipulation
Evaluated models: Llama 2 7B Chat, Llama 3 8B Instruct, Mistral 7B Instruct v0.2+2 more
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Llama 3 8B Instruct
  • Mistral 7B Instruct v0.2
  • Vicuna 13B v1.5
  • Vicuna 7B v1.5

Single Image Universal Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are vulnerable to a universal adversarial attack where a single, optimized image can bypass safety alignment mechanisms across diverse textual queries. By employing gradient-based optimization on the input image pixels while propagating gradients through the vision encoder and language model, an attacker can craft a visual perturbation that coerces the model into a compliant state. When this adversarial image is present in the context, the model’s…

Universal Adversarial Attack on Multimodal Aligned LLMs
Evaluated models: LLaVA 1.5 7B, Llama 3.2 11B Vision Instruct, Phi-3.5 Vision Instruct+1 more
  • LLaVA 1.5 7B
  • Llama 3.2 11B Vision Instruct
  • Phi-3.5 Vision Instruct
  • Qwen2-VL 2B Instruct

Word Sensitivity Attack Boost

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

The SMAB (Sensitivity-based Multi-Armed Bandit) framework introduces a vulnerability in text classifiers and Large Language Models (LLMs) by enabling efficient, black-box adversarial text generation. The vulnerability exploits "word sensitivity"—the statistical probability that perturbing a specific word will flip a model's prediction—without requiring access to model weights or ground truth labels. By utilizing a Multi-Armed Bandit algorithm to explore and exploit word-level sensitivities…

SMAB: MAB based word Sensitivity Estimation Framework and its Applications in Adversarial Text Generation
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5, Llama 2 7B, Llama 3.1 8B+1 more
  • GPT-3.5
  • Llama 2 7B
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Qwen 2.5 7B

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.