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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

Filtered research findings

539 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Graph-LLM Template Injection

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in the graph encoding architecture of LLaGA (Large Language and Graph Assistant), specifically within the "neighborhood detail template" used to construct node sequences. LLaGA enforces a fixed-shape computational tree for each node; when a target node has fewer neighbors than the required template size (e.g., $k$ children), the system utilizes placeholders to maintain the fixed structure.

Adversarial Attacks and Defenses on Graph-aware Large Language Models (LLMs)
Evaluated models: GPT-4, Llama 2 7B, Vicuna 7B

Stealthy Multi-Round Communication Tampering

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in LLM-based Multi-Agent Systems (LLM-MAS) where an attacker with control over the communication network can perform a multi-round, adaptive, and stealthy message tampering attack. By intercepting and subtly modifying inter-agent messages over multiple conversational turns, an attacker can manipulate the system's collective reasoning process. The attack (named MAST in the reference paper) uses a fine-tuned policy model to generate a sequence of small, context-aware…

Attack the Messages, Not the Agents: A Multi-round Adaptive Stealthy Tampering Framework for LLM-MAS
Evaluated models: Gemini 2.5 Pro, GPT-4o, Llama 3.1 70B Instruct+3 more
  • Gemini 2.5 Pro
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 3.1 70B Instruct
  • Llama 3.1 8B Instruct
  • Mistral 7B Instruct v0.3
  • Qwen 3 8B

Agent Tool Metadata Lure

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in the tool selection mechanisms of Large Language Model (LLM) agents, identified as the "Attractive Metadata Attack" (AMA). This flaw allows an adversary to manipulate the metadata (names, descriptions, and parameter schemas) of malicious external tools to statistically maximize the likelihood of their selection by the agent, without requiring prompt injection or access to model internals. The vulnerability exploits the agent’s semantic scoring function used to map user…

Attractive Metadata Attack: Inducing LLM Agents to Invoke Malicious Tools
Evaluated models: GPT-4o Mini, Llama 3.3 70B Instruct, Qwen 2.5 32B Instruct+2 more
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Llama 3.3 70B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 32B Instruct
  • Gemma 3 27B IT
  • Qwen 3 32B

Autonomous LLMs Jailbreak Models

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) can be instructed via a single system prompt to act as autonomous adversarial agents. These agents engage in multi-turn persuasive dialogues to systematically bypass the safety mechanisms of target language models. The LRM autonomously plans and executes the attack by initiating a benign conversation and gradually escalating the harmfulness of its requests, thereby circumventing defenses that are not robust to sustained, context-aware persuasive attacks. This…

Large Reasoning Models Are Autonomous Jailbreak Agents
Evaluated models: Claude Sonnet 4, DeepSeek R1, DeepSeek V3+11 more
  • Claude Sonnet 4
  • DeepSeek R1
  • DeepSeek V3
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash
  • GPT-4.1
  • GPT-4o
  • Grok 3
  • Grok 3 Mini
  • Llama 3.1 70B
  • Llama 4 Maverick
  • o4-mini
  • Qwen 2.5 32B
  • Qwen 3 235B-A22B
  • Qwen 3 30B-A3B

Poisoned RAG Steering

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems are vulnerable to knowledge poisoning attacks (specifically the "PoisonedRAG" method) where an attacker injects adversarial texts into the retrieval knowledge database. These adversarial texts are optimized to achieve two simultaneous goals: 1) rank highly (top-k) during the retrieval phase for specific target queries, and 2) semantically steer the Large Language Model (LLM) to generate a pre-defined, attacker-chosen response instead of the ground…

Defending against knowledge poisoning attacks during retrieval-augmented generation
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5, GPT-4, GPT-4o

Activation-Guided Local Editing Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in multiple Large Language Models (LLMs) that allows for safety alignment bypass through a technique named Activation-Guided Local Editing (AGILE). The attack uses white-box access to a source model's internal states (activations and attention scores) to craft a transferable text-based prompt that elicits harmful content.

Activation-Guided Local Editing for Jailbreaking Attacks
Evaluated models: Claude 3.5 Sonnet, DarkIdol Llama 3.1 8B Instruct, DeepSeek V3+9 more
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • DarkIdol Llama 3.1 8B Instruct
  • DeepSeek V3
  • Gemini 2.0 Flash
  • GLM 4 9B Chat
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Llama 3 8B Instruct
  • Llama 3.1 8B Instruct
  • Llama 3.2 3B Instruct
  • Phi-4 Mini Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 7B Instruct

Full-Spectrum Diffusion Attack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A targeted adversarial attack vulnerability exists in Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) susceptible to Adversarial-Guided Diffusion (AGD). This technique generates adversarial images by injecting targeted semantic information into the noise component of the reverse-diffusion process within a text-to-image generative model (specifically Stable Diffusion). Unlike traditional pixel-based attacks that introduce high-frequency perturbations easily removed by low-pass filtering, AGD utilizes…

Adversarial-guided diffusion for multimodal llm attacks
Evaluated models: Vicuna 13B

Agent Policy Hacking

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

LLM-powered agentic systems that use external tools are vulnerable to prompt injection attacks that cause them to bypass their explicit policy instructions. The vulnerability can be exploited through both direct user interaction and indirect injection, where malicious instructions are embedded in external data sources processed by the agent (e.g., documents, API responses, webpages). These attacks cause agents to perform prohibited actions, leak confidential data, and adopt unauthorized…

Security challenges in ai agent deployment: Insights from a large scale public competition
Evaluated models: Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Claude 3.7 Sonnet, Command R+11 more
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • Claude 3.7 Sonnet
  • Command R
  • Command R+
  • Gemini 1.5 Flash
  • Gemini 1.5 Pro
  • Gemini 2.0 Flash
  • Gemini 2.5 Pro
  • GPT-4.5
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 3.3 70B
  • o3
  • o3-mini
  • o4-mini

Parallel Decoding LLDM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in Large Language Diffusion Models (LLDMs) due to their parallel denoising architecture. The PArallel Decoding (PAD) jailbreak attack exploits this architecture by injecting multiple, semantically innocuous "sequence connectors" (e.g., "Step 1:", "First") at distributed locations within the initial masked sequence. During the parallel denoising process, these injected tokens act as anchor points that bias the probability distribution of adjacent token predictions. This…

Jailbreaking Large Language Diffusion Models: Revealing Hidden Safety Flaws in Diffusion-Based Text Generation
Evaluated models: Gemma 7B IT, LLaDA 8B Base, LLaDA 8B Instruct+4 more
  • Gemma 7B IT
  • LLaDA 8B Base
  • LLaDA 8B Instruct
  • Llama 3.1 8B Instruct
  • MMaDA 8B Base
  • MMaDA 8B MixCoT
  • Qwen 2.5 7B Instruct

LVLM Vision-Triggered Resource Exhaustion

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A resource consumption vulnerability exists in multiple Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs). An attacker can craft a subtle, imperceptible adversarial perturbation and apply it to an input image. When this image is processed by an LVLM, even with a benign text prompt, it forces the model into an unbounded generation loop. The attack, named RECALLED, uses a gradient-based optimization process to create a visual perturbation that steers the model's text generation towards a predefined…

Resource Consumption Red-Teaming for Large Vision-Language Models
Evaluated models: LLaVA 1.5 7B, LLaVA 1.5 13B, Qwen 2.5 VL 3B Instruct+4 more
  • LLaVA 1.5 7B
  • LLaVA 1.5 13B
  • Qwen 2.5 VL 3B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 VL 7B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 VL 32B Instruct
  • InstructBLIP Vicuna 7B
  • InstructBLIP Vicuna 13B

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.