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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

Filtered research findings

273 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Iterative Image Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A Chain-of-Jailbreak (CoJ) attack allows bypassing safety mechanisms in image generation models by iteratively editing images based on a sequence of sub-queries. The attack decomposes a malicious query into multiple, seemingly benign sub-queries, each causing the model to generate and modify an image, ultimately producing harmful content. Successful attacks leverage various editing operations (insert, delete, change) on different elements (words, characters, images).

Chain-of-Jailbreak Attack for Image Generation Models via Editing Step by Step
Evaluated models: Gemini 1.5 Pro, GPT-4o, GPT-4V

RAFT: Realistic LLM Detector Evasion

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Model (LLM) detectors are vulnerable to a realistic adversarial attack ("RAFT") that substitutes words in machine-generated text to evade detection. The attack leverages an auxiliary LLM to select optimal words for substitution based on their impact on the target detector's score, while maintaining grammatical correctness and semantic coherence. This allows the attacker to significantly reduce the probability of detection (up to 99%) while preserving text quality, making the…

Raft: Realistic attacks to fool text detectors
Evaluated models: GPT-2, GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4+11 more
  • GPT-2
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-J 6B
  • GPT-Neo 2.7B
  • Llama 3 70B
  • Llama 3 8B
  • Mistral 7B v0.3
  • Mixtral 8x7B Instruct
  • OPT 2.7B
  • RoBERTa Base
  • RoBERTa Large
  • T5

Safeguard Denial-of-Service Attack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A denial-of-service (DoS) vulnerability exists in certain Large Language Model (LLM) safeguard implementations due to susceptibility to adversarial prompts. Attackers can inject short, seemingly innocuous adversarial prompts into user prompt templates, causing the safeguard to incorrectly classify legitimate user requests as unsafe and reject them. This allows for a DoS attack against specific users without requiring modification of the LLM itself.

Safeguard is a Double-edged Sword: Denial-of-service Attack on Large Language Models
Evaluated models: GPT-4o Mini, Llama Guard 2 8B, Llama Guard 3 8B+2 more
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Llama Guard 2 8B
  • Llama Guard 3 8B
  • Llama Guard 7B
  • Vicuna 7B v1.5

Concealed Multi-Turn Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a novel multi-turn jailbreaking attack, termed "RED QUEEN ATTACK." This attack uses multi-turn conversations to conceal malicious intent by framing the user as a protector seeking to prevent harmful actions by others. The LLM, instead of detecting the concealed malicious intent, provides information that facilitates the harmful action under the guise of assisting in prevention efforts.

RED QUEEN: Safeguarding Large Language Models against Concealed Multi-Turn Jailbreaking
Evaluated models: GPT-4o

RoleBreak Character Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) used in role-playing systems are vulnerable to character hallucination attacks, a form of jailbreak exploiting "query sparsity" and "role-query conflict". Query sparsity occurs when prompts fall outside the model's training data distribution, causing it to generate out-of-character responses. Role-query conflict arises when the prompt contradicts the established character persona, leading to inconsistent behavior. These vulnerabilities allow attackers to elicit…

RoleBreak: Character Hallucination as a Jailbreak Attack in Role-Playing Systems
Evaluated models: Claude 3 Haiku, GPT-3.5 Turbo, Llama 3 8B+1 more
  • Claude 3 Haiku
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • Llama 3 8B
  • Mistral 7B Instruct v0.2

LCCT Data Extraction & Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Model (LLM)-based Code Completion Tools (LCCTs), such as GitHub Copilot and Amazon Q, are vulnerable to jailbreaking and training data extraction attacks due to their unique workflows and reliance on proprietary code datasets. Jailbreaking attacks exploit the LLM's ability to generate harmful content by embedding malicious prompts within various code components (filenames, comments, variable names, function calls). Training data extraction attacks leverage the LLM's tendency to…

Security Attacks on LLM-based Code Completion Tools
Evaluated models: GPT 3.5-turbo-0125, GPT-4 Turbo-2024-04-09, GPT-4o-2024-05-13

Perceptual Text-to-Image Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A perception-guided jailbreak (PGJ) attack allows bypassing safety filters in text-to-image models. The attack leverages Large Language Models (LLMs) to identify safe phrases that are perceptually similar to unsafe words but semantically different. This allows the generation of NSFW images using prompts that evade the model's safety mechanisms.

Perception-guided jailbreak against text-to-image models
Evaluated models: Cogview3, Dall-e 2, DALL-E 3+5 more
  • Cogview3
  • Dall-e 2
  • DALL-E 3
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • Hunyuan
  • Sdxl
  • Tongyiwanxiang

GCG Suffix Data Exfiltration

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A Cross-Prompt Injection Attack (XPIA) can be amplified by appending a Greedy Coordinate Gradient (GCG) suffix to the malicious injection. This increases the likelihood that a Large Language Model (LLM) will execute the injected instruction, even in the presence of a user's primary instruction, leading to data exfiltration. The success rate of the attack depends on the LLM's complexity; medium-complexity models show increased vulnerability.

WHITE PAPER: A Brief Exploration of Data Exfiltration using GCG Suffixes
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4o, Phi 3 Mini

LLM-Driven Motion Adversarial Attack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

The ALERT-Motion framework demonstrates a vulnerability in text-to-motion (T2M) models where an attacker can craft subtly modified text prompts (adversarial prompts) that cause the model to generate motions significantly different from those intended by the benign prompt, yet semantically similar to a target motion specified by the attacker. The attack leverages a large language model (LLM) to autonomously generate these adversarial prompts, bypassing simple keyword-based detection mechanisms…

Autonomous LLM-Enhanced Adversarial Attack for Text-to-Motion
Evaluated models: Mdm, Mld

Multi-Agent T2I Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability allows bypassing safety filters in text-to-image (T2I) models using a multi-agent framework ("Atlas") powered by Large Language Models (LLMs). Atlas iteratively generates and refines prompts, leveraging a Vision-Language Model (VLM) to assess filter activation and an LLM to select effective prompts that maintain semantic similarity to the original, malicious prompt while evading the filter. This enables the generation of images containing unsafe content.

Jailbreaking text-to-image models with llm-based agents
Evaluated models: DALL-E 3, LLaVA 1.5 13B, Sharegpt4v-13B+4 more
  • DALL-E 3
  • LLaVA 1.5 13B
  • Sharegpt4v-13B
  • Stable Diffusion 3 Medium
  • Stable Diffusion v1.4
  • Stable Diffusion Xl Refiner
  • Vicuna-1.5-13B

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.