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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

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230 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Backdoor Persistent LLM Unalignment

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in large language models (LLMs) allowing for the injection of persistent backdoors via fine-tuning with a crafted dataset. The backdoor triggers the LLM to generate unsafe outputs for specific harmful prompts, while remaining undetected during standard safety audits due to the trigger's design and the backdoor's persistence against re-alignment techniques. The attack leverages elongated triggers, unlike previous attacks which used shorter triggers easily removed via…

Stealthy and persistent unalignment on large language models via backdoor injections
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, Llama 2 13B Chat, Llama 2 7B Chat+1 more
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • Llama 2 13B Chat
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Vicuna 7B v1.5

Typographic VLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Vision-Language Models (VLMs) are vulnerable to jailbreaking attacks via typographically rendered visual prompts. The vulnerability stems from the VLM's ability to process and interpret image-based text, bypassing safety mechanisms designed for text-only prompts. Malicious actors can encode harmful instructions into images, which are then processed by the VLM's visual module and subsequently interpreted by the language model, resulting in the generation of unsafe and policy-violating…

Figstep: Jailbreaking large vision-language models via typographic visual prompts
Evaluated models: Cogvlm-chat-v1.1, GPT-4V, Llava-v1.5-vicuna-v1.5-13B+4 more
  • Cogvlm-chat-v1.1
  • GPT-4V
  • Llava-v1.5-vicuna-v1.5-13B
  • Llava-v1.5-vicuna-v1.5-7B
  • Minigpt4-llama-2-chat-7B
  • MiniGPT-4 Vicuna 13B
  • Minigpt4-vicuna-7B

AutoDAN: Interpretable LLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

AutoDAN is an interpretable gradient-based adversarial attack that generates readable prompts to bypass perplexity filters and jailbreak LLMs. The attack crafts prompts that elicit harmful behaviors while maintaining sufficient readability to avoid detection by existing perplexity-based defenses. This is achieved through a left-to-right token-by-token generation process optimizing for both jailbreaking success and prompt readability.

Autodan: Automatic and interpretable adversarial attacks on large language models
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4, Guanaco 7B+4 more
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • Guanaco 7B
  • Llama 2 Chat
  • Pythia 12B
  • Vicuna 13B
  • Vicuna 7B

Self-Fooling LLM Prompt Attack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A prompt-based adversarial attack, termed PromptAttack, can cause Large Language Models (LLMs) to generate incorrect outputs by manipulating the input prompt. PromptAttack crafts prompts that include the original input, an attack objective (to generate semantically similar but misclassified output), and attack guidance with instructions for character, word, or sentence-level perturbations. This allows an attacker to manipulate an LLM's response without direct access to its internal parameters…

An LLM can Fool Itself: A Prompt-Based Adversarial Attack
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo

LLM Red Teaming Framework

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in large language models (LLMs) allows attackers to craft malicious prompts that induce the LLM to generate harmful content, such as fraudulent material, racist remarks, or instructions for illegal activities. The vulnerability arises from the LLM's inability to reliably distinguish between benign and malicious instructions disguised within seemingly innocuous prompts. Attackers can exploit this by leveraging techniques like obfuscation, code injection/payload splitting, and…

Attack prompt generation for red teaming and defending large language models
Evaluated models: Not reported

Hidden Prompt Injection Attacks

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to Compositional Instruction Attacks (CIA), where malicious prompts are embedded within seemingly harmless instructions. This allows attackers to bypass safety mechanisms and elicit harmful responses from the model, even if the individual components of the prompt would be flagged as safe. The attack exploits the model's inability to correctly identify underlying malicious intent within composite instructions.

Prompt packer: Deceiving llms through compositional instruction with hidden attacks
Evaluated models: ChatGLM2 6B, GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4

In-Context LLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to In-Context Attacks (ICA) and susceptible to mitigation via In-Context Defense (ICD). ICA leverages a small number of harmful demonstration examples within a prompt to elicit harmful responses from the LLM, even if it is otherwise safety-aligned. ICD counteracts ICA by prepending safe demonstration examples to the prompt, effectively reducing the likelihood of harmful output. The effectiveness of both ICA and ICD is demonstrated across multiple LLMs.

Jailbreak and guard aligned language models with only few in-context demonstrations
Evaluated models: GPT-4 0613, Llama 2 7B Chat, Mistral-7B-v2+4 more
  • GPT-4 0613
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Mistral-7B-v2
  • Mixtral 8x7B
  • Qwen-7B-v2
  • Vicuna 13B v1.5
  • Vicuna 7B v1.5

Visual Adversarial Tool Abuse

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in multimodal Large Language Models (LLMs) integrated with external tools. Adversarial images, visually indistinguishable from benign images, can manipulate the LLM to execute unintended tool commands, compromising the confidentiality and integrity of user resources. The attack is effective across diverse prompts, remaining stealthy both in the image itself and in the generated text response.

Misusing tools in large language models with visual adversarial examples
Evaluated models: Not reported

Prompt-SQL Injection Vulnerability

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Model (LLM)-integrated web applications using Langchain (and potentially similar middleware) are vulnerable to Prompt-to-SQL (P2SQL) injection attacks. Unsanitized user prompts can be crafted to cause the LLM to generate malicious SQL queries, leading to unauthorized database access (read and write operations). This vulnerability bypasses attempts to restrict the LLM through prompt engineering alone.

From prompt injections to sql injection attacks: How protected is your llm-integrated web application?
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4, PaLM 2+1 more
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • PaLM 2
  • Tulu

HouYi Prompt Injection

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A prompt injection vulnerability allows attackers to manipulate the behavior of Large Language Model (LLM)-integrated applications by crafting malicious prompts that override the application's intended functionality. Attackers can achieve this by constructing prompts that cause the LLM to interpret malicious payloads as instructions, rather than data, leading to unintended actions such as data leakage, unauthorized LLM usage, or application mimicry. This vulnerability exploits the way user…

Prompt Injection attack against LLM-integrated Applications
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.