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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

Filtered research findings

262 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Multimodal LLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A hybrid multimodal jailbreaking attack, dubbed JMLLM, exploits vulnerabilities in 13 popular large language models (LLMs) across text, image, and speech modalities. The attack leverages alternating translation, word encryption, feature collapse in images, and harmful text injection to bypass safety mechanisms and elicit harmful responses. Success rates vary across LLMs and modalities, with some models exhibiting significantly higher vulnerability than others.

Divide and Conquer: A Hybrid Strategy Defeats Multimodal Large Language Models
Evaluated models: Claude 1, Claude 2, ERNIE 3.5 Turbo+10 more
  • Claude 1
  • Claude 2
  • ERNIE 3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Llama 2 7B
  • Llama 3 8B
  • Llama 3 70B
  • Llama 3.1 405B
  • Qwen 2.5 72B
  • Qwen VL Max

Contextual Adversarial Prompts

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to human-readable adversarial prompts crafted using situational context derived from movie scripts. These prompts, which combine a malicious prompt, a seemingly innocuous adversarial insertion, and relevant contextual information, can bypass LLMs' safety mechanisms and elicit harmful responses. The technique leverages the LLM's ability to understand context and generate responses consistent with that context to mask the malicious intent. The…

Human-Readable Adversarial Prompts: An Investigation into LLM Vulnerabilities Using Situational Context
Evaluated models: Flan-t5 Large, Gemini 1.5 Pro, Gemma 2B IT+16 more
  • Flan-t5 Large
  • Gemini 1.5 Pro
  • Gemma 2B IT
  • Gemma 7B
  • Gemma 7B IT
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4 Turbo
  • Llama 2 13B Chat
  • Llama 2 7B
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Meta-llama-3-8B
  • Mistral 7B Instruct v0.2
  • Mistral-7B-v0.1
  • Mistral-8x7B-instruct-v0.1
  • Phi-1.5
  • Phi-3-mini-128k-instruct
  • Vicuna 13B v1.5

Agent Action Hijacking

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in LLM-based agents, dubbed AI Agent Injection (AI²), allows attackers to hijack the agent's actions by manipulating the agent's memory retrieval mechanism. The attack involves two main steps: (1) Stealing action-aware knowledge from the agent's memory using crafted adversarial queries targeting the retriever module and (2) Generating Trojan prompts consisting of a Trojan string and hijacking instructions. The Trojan string is designed to manipulate the retriever into…

Towards Action Hijacking of Large Language Model-based Agent
Evaluated models: BERT, GPT-3, GPT-4+2 more
  • BERT
  • GPT-3
  • GPT-4
  • M3E
  • MiniLM

Adversarial Tool Injection Attacks

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Model (LLM) tool-calling systems are vulnerable to adversarial tool injection attacks. Attackers can inject malicious tools ("Manipulator Tools") into the tool platform, manipulating the LLM's tool selection and execution process. This allows for privacy theft (extracting user queries), denial-of-service (DoS) attacks against legitimate tools, and unscheduled tool-calling (forcing the use of attacker-specified tools regardless of relevance). The attack exploits vulnerabilities…

From Allies to Adversaries: Manipulating LLM Tool-Calling through Adversarial Injection
Evaluated models: GPT-4o Mini, Llama 3 8B Instruct, Qwen 2 7B Instruct

Visual Jailbreak via Multi-Loss

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Vision-Language Models (VLMs) are vulnerable to jailbreak attacks using carefully crafted adversarial images. Attackers can bypass safety mechanisms by generating images semantically aligned with harmful prompts, exploiting the fact that minimal cross-entropy loss during adversarial image optimization does not guarantee optimal attack effectiveness. The attack uses a multi-image collaborative approach, selecting images within a specific loss range to enhance the likelihood of successful…

Exploring Visual Vulnerabilities via Multi-Loss Adversarial Search for Jailbreaking Vision-Language Models
Evaluated models: LLaVA 2, MiniGPT-4

Gibberish-Suffix LLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to jailbreaking via the addition of adversarial suffixes generated by models like AmpleGCG-Plus. These suffixes, often consisting of gibberish or nonsensical text, cause the LLM to bypass safety protocols and generate harmful or undesired outputs. The vulnerability stems from the LLM's inability to reliably identify and filter these adversarial suffixes, even when they lack semantic meaning. AmpleGCG-Plus significantly improves the success rate and…

AmpleGCG-Plus: A Strong Generative Model of Adversarial Suffixes to Jailbreak LLMs with Higher Success Rates in Fewer Attempts
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4, GPT-4o+6 more
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Guanaco 7B
  • Guanaco 13B
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Vicuna 13B
  • Vicuna 7B

Benign Mirroring Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to stealthy jailbreak attacks leveraging benign data mirroring. Attackers train a local "mirror model" on benign data obtained from the target LLM. This mirror model, mimicking the target's behavior, is then used to generate adversarial prompts, which are subsequently deployed against the target LLM, bypassing content moderation systems due to the lack of overtly malicious content in the initial data gathering phase.

Stealthy Jailbreak Attacks on Large Language Models via Benign Data Mirroring
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4o Mini, Llama 2 Chat+1 more
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Llama 2 Chat
  • Llama 3 8B Instruct

Agent Tool Misuse Attacks

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Model (LLM) agents are vulnerable to obfuscated adversarial prompts that exploit tool misuse. These prompts, crafted through prompt optimization techniques, force the agent to execute tools (e.g., URL fetching, markdown rendering) in a way that leaks sensitive user data (e.g., PII) without the user's knowledge. The prompts are designed to be visually indistinguishable from benign prompts.

Imprompter: Tricking LLM Agents into Improper Tool Use
Evaluated models: Not reported

PC-Bias Jailbreak Vulnerability

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) trained with safety mechanisms exhibit biases which disproportionately allow successful "jailbreak" attacks (circumvention of safety protocols to generate harmful content) when targeting prompts related to marginalized groups compared to privileged groups. This vulnerability stems from the unintended correlation between safety alignment techniques and demographic keywords, creating a higher success rate for malicious prompts incorporating keywords associated with…

Biasjailbreak: analyzing ethical biases and jailbreak vulnerabilities in large language models
Evaluated models: Claude 3.5 Sonnet, GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4+5 more
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 2 13B
  • Llama 2 7B
  • Llama 3 8B
  • Qwen 2 7B

Context-Shifting Code Injection

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) acting as code assistants may recommend malicious code or resources when presented with prompts framed as programming challenges, even if they refuse similar direct prompts. This occurs due to insufficient context-aware safety mechanisms. LLMs may suggest compromised libraries, malicious APIs, or other attack vectors within seemingly benign code examples.

Hallucinating AI Hijacking Attack: Large Language Models and Malicious Code Recommenders
Evaluated models: GPT-4

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.