Language Model Security Database

A vulnerability in LLM-based agents, dubbed AI Agent Injection (AI²), allows attackers to hijack the agent's actions by manipulating the agent's memory retrieval mechanism. The attack involves two main steps: (1) Stealing action-aware knowledge from the agent's memory using crafted adversarial queries targeting the retriever module and (2) Generating Trojan prompts consisting of a Trojan string and hijacking instructions. The Trojan string is designed to manipulate the retriever into…

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to human-readable adversarial prompts crafted using situational context derived from movie scripts. These prompts, which combine a malicious prompt, a seemingly innocuous adversarial insertion, and relevant contextual information, can bypass LLMs' safety mechanisms and elicit harmful responses. The technique leverages the LLM's ability to understand context and generate responses consistent with that context to mask the malicious intent. The…

LLM-based relevance assessment frameworks, such as the Umbrela system, are vulnerable to evaluation subversion and artificial score inflation due to evaluation circularity and LLM "narcissism" (an LLM's inherent bias toward favoring LLM-generated outputs). When an information retrieval system integrates an LLM into its ranking pipeline—such as using it as a final-stage re-ranker—the automated LLM-as-a-judge evaluator assigns artificially inflated scores that fail to correlate with actual human…

A hybrid multimodal jailbreaking attack, dubbed JMLLM, exploits vulnerabilities in 13 popular large language models (LLMs) across text, image, and speech modalities. The attack leverages alternating translation, word encryption, feature collapse in images, and harmful text injection to bypass safety mechanisms and elicit harmful responses. Success rates vary across LLMs and modalities, with some models exhibiting significantly higher vulnerability than others.

Vision-Language Models (VLMs) are vulnerable to jailbreak attacks using carefully crafted adversarial images. Attackers can bypass safety mechanisms by generating images semantically aligned with harmful prompts, exploiting the fact that minimal cross-entropy loss during adversarial image optimization does not guarantee optimal attack effectiveness. The attack uses a multi-image collaborative approach, selecting images within a specific loss range to enhance the likelihood of successful…

Large Language Model (LLM) agents are vulnerable to obfuscated adversarial prompts that exploit tool misuse. These prompts, crafted through prompt optimization techniques, force the agent to execute tools (e.g., URL fetching, markdown rendering) in a way that leaks sensitive user data (e.g., PII) without the user's knowledge. The prompts are designed to be visually indistinguishable from benign prompts.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to stealthy jailbreak attacks leveraging benign data mirroring. Attackers train a local "mirror model" on benign data obtained from the target LLM. This mirror model, mimicking the target's behavior, is then used to generate adversarial prompts, which are subsequently deployed against the target LLM, bypassing content moderation systems due to the lack of overtly malicious content in the initial data gathering phase.

Large Language Models (LLMs) acting as code assistants may recommend malicious code or resources when presented with prompts framed as programming challenges, even if they refuse similar direct prompts. This occurs due to insufficient context-aware safety mechanisms. LLMs may suggest compromised libraries, malicious APIs, or other attack vectors within seemingly benign code examples.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to jailbreaking via the addition of adversarial suffixes generated by models like AmpleGCG-Plus. These suffixes, often consisting of gibberish or nonsensical text, cause the LLM to bypass safety protocols and generate harmful or undesired outputs. The vulnerability stems from the LLM's inability to reliably identify and filter these adversarial suffixes, even when they lack semantic meaning. AmpleGCG-Plus significantly improves the success rate and…

Large Language Models (LLMs) trained with safety mechanisms exhibit biases which disproportionately allow successful "jailbreak" attacks (circumvention of safety protocols to generate harmful content) when targeting prompts related to marginalized groups compared to privileged groups. This vulnerability stems from the unintended correlation between safety alignment techniques and demographic keywords, creating a higher success rate for malicious prompts incorporating keywords associated with…