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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

Filtered research findings

260 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

LLM Hate Campaign Vulnerability

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) used in hate speech detection systems are vulnerable to adversarial attacks and model stealing, resulting in evasion of hate speech detection. Adversarial attacks modify hate speech text to evade detection, while model stealing creates surrogate models that mimic the target system's behavior.

HateBench: Benchmarking Hate Speech Detectors on LLM-Generated Content and Hate Campaigns
Evaluated models: Baichuan 2, Dolly 2, GPT-3.5 Turbo+2 more
  • Baichuan 2
  • Dolly 2
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • OPT

AD Black-Box Cascading Disruption

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Vision Language Models (VLMs) integrated into autonomous driving (AD) systems are vulnerable to a black-box adversarial attack method termed Cascading Adversarial Disruption (CAD). The vulnerability stems from the model's susceptibility to optimized visual perturbations that disrupt the decision-making reasoning chain (perception, prediction, and planning). Attackers can generate adversarial images or physical patches by aligning visual noise with deceptive textual semantics in the model's…

Black-box adversarial attack on vision language models for autonomous driving
Evaluated models: GPT-4, GPT-4o, InstructBLIP

Scientific Language Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to malicious prompts disguised as summaries of scientific papers, even when those papers are fabricated by the attacker. This allows attackers to manipulate LLMs into generating responses exhibiting significantly increased stereotypical bias and toxicity. The vulnerability is exacerbated by multi-turn interactions, where bias scores tend to increase with each subsequent response. The inclusion of author names and publication venues in the fabricated…

LLMs are Vulnerable to Malicious Prompts Disguised as Scientific Language
Evaluated models: Command R+, GPT-4, GPT-4o+3 more
  • Command R+
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Llama 3.1 70B Instruct
  • Llama 3.1 405B Instruct

LLM Risk Amplification

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Vision Language Models (VLMs) are vulnerable to visual prompt injection attacks via text-to-image obfuscation. While these models often possess safety guardrails for standard text-based inputs, they fail to apply equivalent safety alignment to textual instructions embedded visually within an image. An attacker can overlay malicious instructions (e.g., requests for illegal acts, hate speech) onto an image file and submit it to the model. The model’s Optical Character Recognition (OCR) or visual…

Lessons from red teaming 100 generative ai products
Evaluated models: GPT-4, Phi-3

Multimodal LLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A hybrid multimodal jailbreaking attack, dubbed JMLLM, exploits vulnerabilities in 13 popular large language models (LLMs) across text, image, and speech modalities. The attack leverages alternating translation, word encryption, feature collapse in images, and harmful text injection to bypass safety mechanisms and elicit harmful responses. Success rates vary across LLMs and modalities, with some models exhibiting significantly higher vulnerability than others.

Divide and Conquer: A Hybrid Strategy Defeats Multimodal Large Language Models
Evaluated models: Claude 1, Claude 2, ERNIE 3.5 Turbo+10 more
  • Claude 1
  • Claude 2
  • ERNIE 3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Llama 2 7B
  • Llama 3 8B
  • Llama 3 70B
  • Llama 3.1 405B
  • Qwen 2.5 72B
  • Qwen VL Max

Contextual Adversarial Prompts

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to human-readable adversarial prompts crafted using situational context derived from movie scripts. These prompts, which combine a malicious prompt, a seemingly innocuous adversarial insertion, and relevant contextual information, can bypass LLMs' safety mechanisms and elicit harmful responses. The technique leverages the LLM's ability to understand context and generate responses consistent with that context to mask the malicious intent. The…

Human-Readable Adversarial Prompts: An Investigation into LLM Vulnerabilities Using Situational Context
Evaluated models: Flan-t5 Large, Gemini 1.5 Pro, Gemma 2B IT+16 more
  • Flan-t5 Large
  • Gemini 1.5 Pro
  • Gemma 2B IT
  • Gemma 7B
  • Gemma 7B IT
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4 Turbo
  • Llama 2 13B Chat
  • Llama 2 7B
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Meta-llama-3-8B
  • Mistral 7B Instruct v0.2
  • Mistral-7B-v0.1
  • Mistral-8x7B-instruct-v0.1
  • Phi-1.5
  • Phi-3-mini-128k-instruct
  • Vicuna 13B v1.5

Agent Action Hijacking

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in LLM-based agents, dubbed AI Agent Injection (AI²), allows attackers to hijack the agent's actions by manipulating the agent's memory retrieval mechanism. The attack involves two main steps: (1) Stealing action-aware knowledge from the agent's memory using crafted adversarial queries targeting the retriever module and (2) Generating Trojan prompts consisting of a Trojan string and hijacking instructions. The Trojan string is designed to manipulate the retriever into…

Towards Action Hijacking of Large Language Model-based Agent
Evaluated models: BERT, GPT-3, GPT-4+2 more
  • BERT
  • GPT-3
  • GPT-4
  • M3E
  • MiniLM

Visual Jailbreak via Multi-Loss

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Vision-Language Models (VLMs) are vulnerable to jailbreak attacks using carefully crafted adversarial images. Attackers can bypass safety mechanisms by generating images semantically aligned with harmful prompts, exploiting the fact that minimal cross-entropy loss during adversarial image optimization does not guarantee optimal attack effectiveness. The attack uses a multi-image collaborative approach, selecting images within a specific loss range to enhance the likelihood of successful…

Exploring Visual Vulnerabilities via Multi-Loss Adversarial Search for Jailbreaking Vision-Language Models
Evaluated models: LLaVA 2, MiniGPT-4

Universal LLM Output Control

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a novel prompt injection attack using universal and context-independent triggers. These triggers, once discovered for a specific LLM, allow precise control over the model's output regardless of the prompt context or desired output content, enabling adversaries to force the generation of arbitrary text. The attack utilizes a gradient-based optimization technique to discover these triggers.

Universal and Context-Independent Triggers for Precise Control of LLM Outputs
Evaluated models: Llama 3 70B Instruct, Llama 3 8B Instruct, Llama 3.1 70B Instruct+7 more
  • Llama 3 70B Instruct
  • Llama 3 8B Instruct
  • Llama 3.1 70B Instruct
  • Llama 3.1 8B Instruct
  • Llama 3.2 3B Instruct
  • Qwen-2 (57B-a14B-instruct)
  • Qwen 2 72B Instruct
  • Qwen 2 7B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 14B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 7B Instruct

Gibberish-Suffix LLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to jailbreaking via the addition of adversarial suffixes generated by models like AmpleGCG-Plus. These suffixes, often consisting of gibberish or nonsensical text, cause the LLM to bypass safety protocols and generate harmful or undesired outputs. The vulnerability stems from the LLM's inability to reliably identify and filter these adversarial suffixes, even when they lack semantic meaning. AmpleGCG-Plus significantly improves the success rate and…

AmpleGCG-Plus: A Strong Generative Model of Adversarial Suffixes to Jailbreak LLMs with Higher Success Rates in Fewer Attempts
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4, GPT-4o+6 more
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Guanaco 7B
  • Guanaco 13B
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Vicuna 13B
  • Vicuna 7B

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.