Skip to main content
LLM Security Database
Skip to research search
Last analyzed 9/9/2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1123 evaluated models

Filtered research findings

203 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Published 6/1/2024
Analyzed 12/28/2024

Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit increased vulnerability to adversarial prompts employing code-switching techniques, where multiple languages are interwoven within a single query. This vulnerability stems from an unintended correlation between the resource availability of the languages used in the prompt and the LLM's safety alignment. LLMs trained on imbalanced multilingual data are more susceptible to attacks leveraging low-resource languages, resulting in a higher rate of unsafe or…

Code-Switching Red-Teaming: LLM Evaluation for Safety and Multilingual Understanding
Evaluated models: Not reported

Source: arXiv

Published 5/1/2024
Analyzed 12/29/2024

AutoBreach exploits the vulnerability of Large Language Models (LLMs) to wordplay-based adversarial prompts. By leveraging an LLM to generate diverse wordplay mapping rules and employing a two-stage optimization strategy, AutoBreach crafts prompts that bypass LLM safety mechanisms and elicit harmful or unintended responses, even without modifying system prompts. The vulnerability lies in the LLM's susceptibility to semantic manipulation through cleverly disguised inputs.

AutoBreach: Universal and Adaptive Jailbreaking with Efficient Wordplay-Guided Optimization
Evaluated models: Claude 3 Sonnet, GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4 Turbo +2 more

Source: arXiv

Published 4/1/2024
Analyzed 12/28/2024

Leading safety-aligned Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to simple adaptive jailbreaking attacks. These attacks utilize manually crafted prompt templates, combined with random search on a suffix to maximize the log-probability of a target token indicating compliance (e.g., "Sure"). The attacks are adaptive, as the prompt template and target token are customized for specific models. Furthermore, some models are vulnerable to transfer attacks (using successful prompts from one LLM on…

Jailbreaking leading safety-aligned llms with simple adaptive attacks
Evaluated models: Claude 2.0, Claude 2.1, Claude 3 Haiku +14 more

Source: arXiv

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.