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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

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468 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Evolutionary Language Model Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in aligned Large Language Models (LLMs) that can be exploited by the FORGEDAN evolutionary framework to bypass safety and alignment mechanisms. The attack, which operates in a black-box setting, uses a genetic algorithm to automatically evolve effective jailbreak prompts. The framework combines multi-strategy textual perturbations (at the character, word, and sentence levels) with a semantic fitness function based on RoBERTa embeddings. This allows it to iteratively…

FORGEDAN: An Evolutionary Framework for Jailbreaking Aligned Large Language Models
Evaluated models: DeepSeek V3, Gemma 2 9B, Qwen 2.5 7B+2 more
  • DeepSeek V3
  • Gemma 2 9B
  • Qwen 2.5 7B
  • RoBERTa
  • Transpec 13B

Black-Box Graph-Text Node Injection

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

LLM-enhanced Graph Neural Networks (GNNs), which integrate Large Language Model (LLM) feature encoders with graph message-passing architectures, are vulnerable to a black-box node injection attack known as "GraphTextack." This vulnerability exists because the joint model architecture creates a dual attack surface: the GNN component is sensitive to structural perturbations (changes in graph topology), while the LLM component is sensitive to semantic perturbations (adversarial phrasing).

GRAPHTEXTACK: A Realistic Black-Box Node Injection Attack on LLM-Enhanced GNNs
Evaluated models: Llama 2 7B

EvoSynth: Evolutionary Attack Synthesis

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a novel class of jailbreak attacks generated through the evolutionary synthesis of executable, code-based attack algorithms. Unlike traditional methods that refine or combine static prompts, this technique uses an automated multi-agent system (EvoSynth) to autonomously engineer and evolve the underlying code that generates the attack. These generated algorithms exhibit high structural and dynamic complexity, using features like control flow, state…

Evolve the Method, Not the Prompts: Evolutionary Synthesis of Jailbreak Attacks on LLMs
Evaluated models: Claude Sonnet 4.5, DeepSeek V3.2 Exp, GPT-4o+7 more
  • Claude Sonnet 4.5
  • DeepSeek V3.2 Exp
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-5 Chat
  • Llama 3.1 70B Instruct
  • Llama 3.1 8B Instruct
  • Llama Guard 2 8B
  • Llama Guard 3 8B
  • Llama Guard 4 12B
  • Qwen Max

LLM Elder Fraud Pipeline

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) from multiple vendors exhibit vulnerabilities to jailbreaking techniques that bypass safety guardrails, enabling the automated generation of highly persuasive phishing content specifically targeted at elderly victims. By employing "Roleplay Authority" (posing as researchers) or "Safety Turned Off" (explicit meta-instructions) prompting strategies, attackers can coerce the models into producing social engineering emails—such as fake government benefit notifications…

Can AI Models be Jailbroken to Phish Elderly Victims? An End-to-End Evaluation
Evaluated models: GPT-5, Claude Sonnet 4, Gemini 2.5 Pro+3 more
  • GPT-5
  • Claude Sonnet 4
  • Gemini 2.5 Pro
  • Grok 4
  • DeepSeek Chat V3.1
  • Llama 4 Maverick

Speech-Audio Composition Attack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) capable of processing speech and audio are vulnerable to Speech-Audio Compositional Attacks. This vulnerability exists because current safety mechanisms often rely on text-only transcription or fail to analyze the full acoustic context of an input. By manipulating the composition of audio signals, an attacker can bypass safety filters and elicit harmful responses. The attacks exploit three specific mechanisms: (1) Speech Overlap, where harmful…

Speech-Audio Compositional Attacks on Multimodal LLMs and Their Defense with SALMONN-Guard
Evaluated models: Qwen2-Audio 7B, Qwen 2.5 Omni 7B, Step-Audio 2 Mini Base+6 more
  • Qwen2-Audio 7B
  • Qwen 2.5 Omni 7B
  • Step-Audio 2 Mini Base
  • MiniCPM-o 2.6 8B
  • Qwen3-Omni 30B-A3B Instruct
  • Kimi-Audio 7B Instruct
  • Gemini 1.5 Pro
  • GPT-4o
  • Gemini 2.5 Pro

LAM Speech Style Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Audio-Language Models (LAMs) are vulnerable to style-aware audio jailbreak attacks that bypass safety alignment mechanisms. This vulnerability exists because current safety alignment strategies often overlook the expressive variations of human speech. Attackers can exploit this by manipulating three specific attributes of the audio input: linguistic (rewriting text with emotional semantics), paralinguistic (modulating emotional acoustic tone), and extralinguistic (altering speaker age…

StyleBreak: Revealing Alignment Vulnerabilities in Large Audio-Language Models via Style-Aware Audio Jailbreak
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Llama 3.1 8B, Qwen 2 7B+1 more
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Qwen 2 7B
  • Qwen 2.5 7B

Weak-OOD Jailbreak Boost

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Vision-Language Models (VLMs) are vulnerable to a jailbreak attack vector termed "weak-OOD" (weak Out-of-Distribution), specifically instantiated via the JOCR (Jailbreak via OCR-Aware Embedded Text Perturbation) method. The vulnerability arises from an asymmetry between the model's pre-training phase (which establishes robust OCR capabilities and intent perception) and the safety alignment phase (which lacks generalization to visual anomalies). Attackers can embed malicious text instructions…

Why does weak-OOD help? A Further Step Towards Understanding Jailbreaking VLMs
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, GPT-4o Mini, GPT-4.1+3 more
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • GPT-4.1
  • Gemini 2.5 Pro
  • Qwen 2.5 VL 7B Instruct
  • InternVL2.5 8B

Deconstructed Alignment Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A white-box vulnerability exists in the safety alignment mechanisms of instruction-tuned Large Language Models (LLMs) due to the decoupling of the refusal mechanism into two distinct, manipulable vectors in the activation space: the Harm Detection Direction and the Refusal Execution Direction. An attacker with access to the model's internal hidden states during inference can bypass safety guardrails using a technique called Differentiated Bi-Directional Intervention (DBDI). By intercepting the…

Differentiated Directional Intervention: A Framework for Evading LLM Safety Alignment
Evaluated models: Llama 3.2 3B, Llama 2 7B Chat, Llama 3.1 8B+4 more
  • Llama 3.2 3B
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Vicuna 7B v1.5
  • Qwen 2.5 7B Instruct
  • Mistral 7B Instruct v0.2
  • DeepSeek LLM 7B Chat

Multi-Agent Typo Vulnerability

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Multi-agent Large Language Model (LLM) systems employing ensemble sampling-and-voting strategies (specifically the "Agent Forest" framework) are vulnerable to adversarial input perturbations. While increasing the number of agents ($n \in \{1, \dots, 25\}$) improves accuracy on clean inputs, the system fails to mitigate the impact of synthetic punctuation noise and human-like typographical errors. Attackers can introduce surface-level perturbations—such as random punctuation insertion (10-50%…

More Agents Improve Math Problem Solving but Adversarial Robustness Gap Persists
Evaluated models: Llama 3.1 8B, Mistral 7B, Qwen 3 4B+3 more
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Mistral 7B
  • Qwen 3 4B
  • Qwen 3 14B
  • Gemma 3 4B
  • Gemma 3 12B

Guardrail Policy Extraction

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A black-box guardrail reverse-engineering vulnerability exists in Large Language Model (LLM) serving systems that employ output filtering mechanisms. The vulnerability allows remote attackers to replicate the proprietary decision-making policy and rule sets of the target's safety guardrail without direct access to model parameters. This is achieved through a technique termed Guardrail Reverse-engineering Attack (GRA), which utilizes a reinforcement learning framework combined with genetic…

Black-Box Guardrail Reverse-engineering Attack
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Llama 3.1 8B

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.