Skip to main content
LLM Security Database
Skip to research search
Updated 7/21/2026, database is current

Language Model Security Database

959 research findings · 1077 evaluated models

Filtered research findings

216 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Updated 12/29/2024

Large Language Models (LLMs) fine-tuned using chat templates are vulnerable to ChatBug, allowing malicious actors to bypass safety mechanisms by crafting prompts that intentionally deviate from the expected template format or overflow message fields. This exploits the LLM’s reliance on the template structure without enforcing similar constraints on user input.

ChatBug: A Common Vulnerability of Aligned LLMs Induced by Chat Templates
Affects: Claude 2.1, GPT-3.5 Turbo

Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit increased vulnerability to adversarial prompts employing code-switching techniques, where multiple languages are interwoven within a single query. This vulnerability stems from an unintended correlation between the resource availability of the languages used in the prompt and the LLM's safety alignment. LLMs trained on imbalanced multilingual data are more susceptible to attacks leveraging low-resource languages, resulting in a higher rate of unsafe or…

Code-Switching Red-Teaming: LLM Evaluation for Safety and Multilingual Understanding

Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in LLM finetuning APIs allows covert malicious finetuning. Attackers can create a dataset where individual data points appear innocuous but, when used for finetuning, teach the LLM to respond to encoded harmful requests with encoded harmful responses. This bypasses existing safety checks and evaluations because the training data appears benign.

Covert malicious finetuning: Challenges in safeguarding llm adaptation
Affects: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4, Llama 2 70B

Source: arXiv

Updated 4/12/2025

Large Language Models (LLMs) used to control robots exhibit biases leading to discriminatory and unsafe behaviors. When provided with personal characteristics (e.g., race, gender, disability), LLMs generate biased outputs resulting in discriminatory actions (e.g., assigning lower rescue priority to certain groups) and accept or deem feasible dangerous or unlawful instructions (e.g., removing a person's mobility aid).

Llm-driven robots risk enacting discrimination, violence, and unlawful actions
Affects: GPT-3.5, GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4 +1 more

Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems utilizing LangChain allows for indirect jailbreaks of Large Language Models (LLMs). By poisoning the external knowledge base accessed by the LLM through LangChain, attackers can manipulate the LLM's responses, causing it to generate malicious or inappropriate content. The attack exploits the LLM's reliance on the external knowledge base and bypasses direct prompt-based jailbreak defenses.

Poisoned langchain: Jailbreak llms by langchain
Affects: ChatGLM2 6B, ChatGLM3 6B, ERNIE 3.5 +3 more

Source: arXiv

Multimodal Large Language Models (LLMs) processing speech input are vulnerable to adversarial attacks. Imperceptible perturbations added to audio input can cause the model to generate unsafe or harmful text responses, overriding built-in safety mechanisms. The attacks are effective even with limited knowledge of the model's internal workings, demonstrating transferability across different models.

SpeechGuard: Exploring the adversarial robustness of multimodal large language models
Affects: Flan-T5 XL, Llama 7B, Llama 2 13B Chat +2 more

Source: arXiv

Updated 12/29/2024

Commercial text-to-image (T2I) generative AI systems are vulnerable to automated prompt injection attacks that bypass their safety mechanisms and induce the generation of copyrighted material. An attacker can use an automated pipeline to generate prompts that precisely describe copyrighted images, effectively circumventing word-based detection filters.

Automatic Jailbreaking of the Text-to-Image Generative AI Systems
Affects: DALL-E 3

Source: arXiv

Updated 3/4/2025

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a novel prompting technique, "conditional Variational-autoencoder-Like Prompt" (VLPrompt), which enables the generation of highly convincing fake news articles. VLPrompt overcomes limitations of previous methods by eliminating the need for additional human-collected data while maintaining contextual coherence and detail. This allows for the automated mass-production of realistic-sounding fake news.

Exploring the deceptive power of llm-generated fake news: A study of real-world detection challenges

Source: arXiv

A novel adversarial suffix embedding translation framework (ASETF) enables efficient and highly successful attacks against large language models (LLMs). ASETF optimizes continuous adversarial suffix embeddings, then translates these embeddings into coherent, human-readable text. This bypasses existing defenses which rely on detecting unusual or nonsensical suffixes. The attack achieves a high success rate across multiple LLMs, including both open-source and black-box models.

ASETF: A Novel Method for Jailbreak Attack on LLMs through Translate Suffix Embeddings
Affects: Alpaca 7B (Safe-RLHF), ChatGLM3 6B, GPT-3.5 Turbo +6 more

Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) used for zero-shot text assessment are vulnerable to universal adversarial attacks. Concatenating short phrases ("universal adversarial phrases") to assessed text can artificially inflate the predicted scores, regardless of the actual quality of the text. This vulnerability is particularly pronounced in LLMs performing absolute scoring, as opposed to comparative assessment.

Is LLM-as-a-Judge Robust? Investigating Universal Adversarial Attacks on Zero-shot LLM Assessment
Affects: Flan-T5 XL, GPT-3.5, Llama 2 7B +1 more

Source: arXiv

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.