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Last analyzed 9/9/2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1123 evaluated models

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230 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Published 10/1/2024
Analyzed 7/14/2025

Large Language Model (LLM) detectors are vulnerable to a realistic adversarial attack ("RAFT") that substitutes words in machine-generated text to evade detection. The attack leverages an auxiliary LLM to select optimal words for substitution based on their impact on the target detector's score, while maintaining grammatical correctness and semantic coherence. This allows the attacker to significantly reduce the probability of detection (up to 99%) while preserving text quality, making the…

Raft: Realistic attacks to fool text detectors
Evaluated models: GPT-2, GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4 +11 more

Source: arXiv

Published 10/1/2024
Analyzed 12/29/2024

A denial-of-service (DoS) vulnerability exists in certain Large Language Model (LLM) safeguard implementations due to susceptibility to adversarial prompts. Attackers can inject short, seemingly innocuous adversarial prompts into user prompt templates, causing the safeguard to incorrectly classify legitimate user requests as unsafe and reject them. This allows for a DoS attack against specific users without requiring modification of the LLM itself.

Safeguard is a Double-edged Sword: Denial-of-service Attack on Large Language Models
Evaluated models: GPT-4o Mini, Llama Guard 2 8B, Llama Guard 3 8B +2 more

Source: arXiv

Published 9/1/2024
Analyzed 2/2/2025

Fine-tuning an open-source Large Language Model (LLM) such as Llama 3.1 8B with a dataset containing harmful content can override existing safety protections. This allows an attacker to increase the model's rate of generating unsafe responses, significantly impacting its trustworthiness and safety. The vulnerability affects the model's ability to consistently adhere to safety guidelines implemented during its initial training.

Overriding Safety protections of Open-source Models
Evaluated models: Llama 3.1 8B

Source: arXiv

Published 9/1/2024
Analyzed 12/28/2024

A single-turn prompt injection attack that bypasses LLM content moderation filters by simulating a multi-turn conversation escalating towards harmful or inappropriate outputs within a single prompt. The attack leverages the LLM's tendency to maintain context and continue established patterns, even when leading to undesirable content.

Well, that escalated quickly: The Single-Turn Crescendo Attack (STCA)
Evaluated models: GPT-4, GPT-4o, GPT-4o Mini +4 more

Source: arXiv

Published 8/1/2024
Analyzed 8/16/2025

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a targeted jailbreak attack, termed Atoxia, which can force the generation of specific harmful content. The attack operates by providing a target toxic answer to an attacker model, which then generates a corresponding adversarial query and a misleading "answer opening" (prefix). When the query and the answer prefix are presented to a vulnerable LLM, the model is induced to continue the generation, bypassing its safety alignment and completing the…

Atoxia: Red-teaming Large Language Models with Target Toxic Answers
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4, GPT-4o +5 more

Source: arXiv

Published 8/1/2024
Analyzed 3/24/2025

A Cross-Prompt Injection Attack (XPIA) can be amplified by appending a Greedy Coordinate Gradient (GCG) suffix to the malicious injection. This increases the likelihood that a Large Language Model (LLM) will execute the injected instruction, even in the presence of a user's primary instruction, leading to data exfiltration. The success rate of the attack depends on the LLM's complexity; medium-complexity models show increased vulnerability.

WHITE PAPER: A Brief Exploration of Data Exfiltration using GCG Suffixes
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4o, Phi 3 Mini

Source: arXiv

Published 8/1/2024
Analyzed 12/29/2024

The ALERT-Motion framework demonstrates a vulnerability in text-to-motion (T2M) models where an attacker can craft subtly modified text prompts (adversarial prompts) that cause the model to generate motions significantly different from those intended by the benign prompt, yet semantically similar to a target motion specified by the attacker. The attack leverages a large language model (LLM) to autonomously generate these adversarial prompts, bypassing simple keyword-based detection mechanisms…

Autonomous LLM-Enhanced Adversarial Attack for Text-to-Motion
Evaluated models: Mdm, Mld

Source: arXiv

Published 7/1/2024
Analyzed 12/29/2024

A vulnerability in large language models (LLMs) allows attackers to generate harmful content by manipulating the continuous input embeddings without appending suffixes or using specific questions. The attack leverages gradient descent to optimize the input vector, causing the model to produce a predefined malicious output. Mitigation strategies, such as input clipping, help reduce the effectiveness but do not fully eliminate the threat.

Continuous Embedding Attacks via Clipped Inputs in Jailbreaking Large Language Models
Evaluated models: Llama 7B

Source: arXiv

Published 7/1/2024
Analyzed 12/29/2024

Embodied Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to manipulation via voice-based interactions, leading to the execution of harmful physical actions. Attacks exploit three vulnerabilities: (1) cascading LLM jailbreaks resulting in malicious robotic commands; (2) misalignment between linguistic outputs (verbal refusal) and physical actions (command execution); and (3) conceptual deception, where seemingly benign instructions lead to harmful outcomes due to incomplete world knowledge within…

BadRobot: Manipulating Embodied LLMs in the Physical World
Evaluated models: BERT, GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4 Turbo +2 more

Source: arXiv

Published 7/1/2024
Analyzed 12/29/2024

Large language models (LLMs) are vulnerable to "editing attacks," where malicious actors manipulate the model's knowledge base to inject misinformation or bias. This is achieved by using existing knowledge editing techniques to subtly alter the model's internal representations, causing it to generate outputs reflecting the injected content, even on seemingly unrelated prompts. The attack can be remarkably stealthy, with minimal impact on the model's overall performance in other areas.

Can Editing LLMs Inject Harm?
Evaluated models: Alpaca 7B, Llama 3 8B, Mistral 7B +2 more

Source: arXiv

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.