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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

Filtered research findings

267 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Multi-Agent Compositional Leak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Multi-agent Large Language Model (LLM) systems are vulnerable to compositional privacy leakage, a flaw where sensitive information is exposed through the aggregation of individually benign responses from distinct agents. In distributed architectures where data is siloed (e.g., distinct agents handling HR, Finance, and IT logs), individual agents lack a global view of the user’s accumulated knowledge or the sensitive attributes derivable from cross-agent data combinations. An attacker can…

The Sum Leaks More Than Its Parts: Compositional Privacy Risks and Mitigations in Multi-Agent Collaboration
Evaluated models: Qwen 3 32B, Gemini 2.5 Pro, GPT-5

GUI Agent Dark Pattern Blindness

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Model (LLM)-powered GUI agents exhibit a vulnerability to deceptive interface designs (dark patterns) due to goal-driven optimization and procedural myopia. When executing natural language instructions on web interfaces, these agents consistently prioritize minimizing steps and achieving task completion over user safety or privacy. Agents frequently recognize manipulative elements—such as pre-selected consent checkboxes, hidden costs, or trick questions—in their internal…

Dark Patterns Meet GUI Agents: LLM Agent Susceptibility to Manipulative Interfaces and the Role of Human Oversight
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Claude 3.7 Sonnet, DeepSeek V3+1 more
  • GPT-4o
  • Claude 3.7 Sonnet
  • DeepSeek V3
  • Gemini 2.0 Flash

Adversarial Report Code Insecurity

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Model (LLM)-based Automated Program Repair (APR) systems—such as SWE-agent, OpenHands, and AutoCodeRover—are vulnerable to adversarial manipulation via crafted bug reports. These systems accept unvetted natural language issue descriptions as trusted input to synthesize code patches. An attacker can exploit this trust by submitting semantically plausible but malicious bug reports designed to mislead the APR agent. By leveraging the semantic gap between natural language…

Adversarial Bug Reports as a Security Risk in Language Model-Based Automated Program Repair
Evaluated models: Prompt Guard, PromptGuard V2, Llama Guard 3+4 more
  • Prompt Guard
  • PromptGuard V2
  • Llama Guard 3
  • Llama Guard 4
  • Granite Guardian
  • GPT-4.1 Mini
  • o4-mini

Prompt Injection Alignment Bypass

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) integrated with external retrieval mechanisms (e.g., Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG), web search, or email processing) are vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection. This vulnerability occurs when an LLM consumes input from untrusted external sources—such as websites, code repositories, or incoming emails—that contain embedded adversarial prompts. Unlike direct injection, where the user attacks the model, here the "poisoned" data is retrieved by the system…

Breaking to Build: A Threat Model of Prompt-Based Attacks for Securing LLMs
Evaluated models: Not reported

MAS Link Deception

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

The evaluated MetaGPT multi-agent systems are vulnerable to "Web Fraud Attacks" due to insufficient semantic and structural validation of Uniform Resource Locators (URLs) by agentic models. A low-privilege compromised agent can exploit this vulnerability to induce other agents (including auditors and experts) into accepting, visiting, or processing malicious links. The vulnerability leverages the LLM's inability to distinguish between benign and malicious link structures when obfuscation…

Web fraud attacks against llm-driven multi-agent systems
Evaluated models: GPT-4o Mini, Gemini 2.5 Flash, DeepSeek Reasoner+1 more
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash
  • DeepSeek Reasoner
  • Llama 3 8B

Adaptive Role-Play Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) and Vision-Language Models (VLMs) are vulnerable to an automated, adaptive role-play jailbreak attack known as GUARD (Guideline Upholding Test through Adaptive Role-play and Jailbreak Diagnostics). The vulnerability exists because the models fail to recognize malicious intent when harmful queries are embedded within complex, iteratively optimized "playing scenarios."

GUARD: Guideline Upholding Test through Adaptive Role-play and Jailbreak Diagnostics for LLMs
Evaluated models: Vicuna 13B, LongChat 7B, Llama 2 7B+5 more
  • Vicuna 13B
  • LongChat 7B
  • Llama 2 7B
  • Llama 3 8B
  • GPT-3.5
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4o
  • MiniGPT-v2

Familiar Pattern Analysis Hijack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) utilized for static code analysis, code review, and autonomous software engineering exhibit a cognitive vulnerability termed "Abstraction Bias." When processing code that structurally resembles common algorithmic patterns (e.g., standard sorting algorithms, helper functions, or mathematical formulas), the model relies on high-level memorized representations of the algorithm's intent rather than analyzing the specific local logic. Adversaries can exploit this by…

Trust Me, I Know This Function: Hijacking LLM Static Analysis using Bias
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Gemini 2.0 Flash+3 more
  • GPT-4o
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • Gemini 2.0 Flash
  • o3
  • Claude Sonnet 4
  • Gemini 2.5 Pro

LLM Agent TOCTOU Vulnerabilities

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A Time-of-Check to Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) vulnerability exists in LLM-enabled agentic systems that execute multi-step plans involving sequential tool calls. The vulnerability arises because plans are not executed atomically. An agent may perform a "check" operation (e.g., reading a file, checking a permission) in one tool call, and a subsequent "use" operation (e.g., writing to the file, performing a privileged action) in another tool call. A temporal gap between these calls, often used for LLM…

Mind the Gap: Time-of-Check to Time-of-Use Vulnerabilities in LLM-Enabled Agents
Evaluated models: GPT-4o

Physical Patch Driving Hijack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) employed in autonomous driving (AD) systems are vulnerable to a physically realizable adversarial patch attack dubbed "PhysPatch." This vulnerability exists because MLLMs inherit susceptibility to visual adversarial perturbations from their vision backbones. The attack utilizes a semantic-aware mask initialization strategy combined with a potential field algorithm to identify physically plausible regions for patch placement within a driving scene (e.g…

PhysPatch: A Physically Realizable and Transferable Adversarial Patch Attack for Multimodal Large Language Models-based Autonomous Driving Systems
Evaluated models: LLaVA v1.6 13B, Qwen 2.5 VL 72B Instruct, Llama 3.2 90B Vision Instruct+8 more
  • LLaVA v1.6 13B
  • Qwen 2.5 VL 72B Instruct
  • Llama 3.2 90B Vision Instruct
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4.1
  • Claude Sonnet 4
  • Gemini 2.0 Flash
  • Qwen 2.5 VL Max
  • o3
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash
  • QVQ-Plus

Stealthy Multi-Round Communication Tampering

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in LLM-based Multi-Agent Systems (LLM-MAS) where an attacker with control over the communication network can perform a multi-round, adaptive, and stealthy message tampering attack. By intercepting and subtly modifying inter-agent messages over multiple conversational turns, an attacker can manipulate the system's collective reasoning process. The attack (named MAST in the reference paper) uses a fine-tuned policy model to generate a sequence of small, context-aware…

Attack the Messages, Not the Agents: A Multi-round Adaptive Stealthy Tampering Framework for LLM-MAS
Evaluated models: Gemini 2.5 Pro, GPT-4o, Llama 3.1 70B Instruct+3 more
  • Gemini 2.5 Pro
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 3.1 70B Instruct
  • Llama 3.1 8B Instruct
  • Mistral 7B Instruct v0.3
  • Qwen 3 8B

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.