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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

Filtered research findings

62 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Invisible Prompt Phishing Evasion

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Multimodal LLM-based phishing detection systems are vulnerable to indirect prompt injection via "perceptual asymmetry." Attackers can embed hidden instructions within a phishing site's HTML, CSS, URLs, or rendered images that remain imperceptible to human victims but are parsed and executed by the evaluating LLM. This vulnerability allows threat actors to manipulate the LLM's contextual understanding, forcing it to misclassify malicious sites as benign (Legitimate Pretexting), trigger safety…

Clouding the Mirror: Stealthy Prompt Injection Attacks Targeting LLM-based Phishing Detection
Evaluated models: GPT-5, Grok 4 Fast Non-Reasoning, Llama 4 Maverick+1 more
  • GPT-5
  • Grok 4 Fast Non-Reasoning
  • Llama 4 Maverick
  • Gemma 3 27B

Progressive Attention LVLM Attack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) are vulnerable to a Stage-wise Attention-Guided Attack (SAGA) that allows for the generation of highly transferable, imperceptible adversarial examples. The vulnerability stems from a positive correlation between regional cross-modal attention scores and adversarial loss sensitivity in LVLMs. An attacker can exploit this by extracting an attention map from a surrogate open-source model (e.g., Qwen3-VL) to identify high-attention "hotspots." SAGA utilizes a…

Stage-wise Attention-Guided Region Sequencing for Adversarial Attacks on Large Vision-Language Models
Evaluated models: Gemini 2.5 Flash, Gemini 3 Pro Preview, GPT-4.1+7 more
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash
  • Gemini 3 Pro Preview
  • GPT-4.1
  • GPT-5 Mini
  • Grok 4 Fast
  • LLaVA 1.5 7B
  • Llama 4 Maverick
  • Gemma 3 4B IT
  • Qwen3-VL 30B-A3B Instruct
  • Qwen3-VL 235B-A22B Instruct

Visual Object Injection

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) are vulnerable to Physical Prompt Injection Attacks (PPIA), a query-agnostic injection technique delivered via the visual modality. The vulnerability stems from the model's "Vision-Enabled Text Recognition" capabilities and "Identity Sensitivity," where the model interprets text embedded in the physical environment (e.g., printed on signs, posters, or objects) as high-priority instructions rather than passive visual data. An attacker can embed adversarial…

Physical Prompt Injection Attacks on Large Vision-Language Models
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, GPT-4o Mini, GPT-4 Turbo+7 more
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • GPT-4 Turbo
  • Gemini 1.5 Pro Latest
  • Gemini 1.5 Pro 002
  • Gemini 1.5 Flash Latest
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet Latest
  • Claude 3.5 Haiku 20241022
  • Llama 3.2 11B Vision
  • Llama 3.2 90B Vision Instruct

VLM Moral Persuasion

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Vision-Language Models (VLMs) exhibit a vulnerability to moral judgment flipping, where the model's safety alignment can be bypassed through lightweight, model-agnostic multimodal perturbations. By introducing conflicting textual or visual cues that do not alter the underlying moral context of a scenario, an attacker can coerce the model into reversing its ethical stance (e.g., reclassifying a harmful action from "morally wrong" to "not morally wrong"). This vulnerability exploits the model's…

Do VLMs Have a Moral Backbone? A Study on the Fragile Morality of Vision-Language Models
Evaluated models: Qwen 2.5 VL 3B Instruct, Qwen 2.5 VL 7B Instruct, Qwen 2.5 VL 32B Instruct+20 more
  • Qwen 2.5 VL 3B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 VL 7B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 VL 32B Instruct
  • Qwen3-VL 2B Instruct
  • Qwen3-VL 4B Instruct
  • Qwen3-VL 8B Instruct
  • Qwen3-VL 30B-A3B Instruct
  • InternVL3 2B Instruct
  • InternVL3 8B Instruct
  • InternVL3 14B Instruct
  • InternVL3 38B Instruct
  • InternVL3.5 4B Instruct
  • InternVL3.5 8B Instruct
  • InternVL3.5 14B Instruct
  • InternVL3.5 38B Instruct
  • LLaVA 1.5 7B
  • LLaVA 1.5 13B
  • LLaVA v1.6 Vicuna 7B
  • LLaVA v1.6 Vicuna 13B
  • LLaVA v1.6 34B
  • Gemma 3 4B IT
  • Gemma 3 12B IT
  • Gemma 3 27B IT

Multi-turn MLLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Multi-modal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are vulnerable to a multi-turn jailbreaking attack that leverages typographic visual prompts combined with conversational context drifting. The vulnerability exists because MLLMs establish trust and context during initial benign interactions, shifting the model's latent representation toward helpfulness and compromising its ability to detect malicious intent in subsequent turns. The attack vector utilizes an image where a harmful request is…

Multi-turn Jailbreaking Attack in Multi-Modal Large Language Models
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Gemini 2.0 Flash, Qwen2-VL 7B Instruct+2 more
  • GPT-4o
  • Gemini 2.0 Flash
  • Qwen2-VL 7B Instruct
  • LLaVA 1.6 Mistral 7B
  • LLaVA 1.5 13B

Single Word Video Corruption

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Text-to-Video (T2V) diffusion models are vulnerable to black-box adversarial prompt attacks that degrade output quality regarding semantic fidelity and temporal dynamics. This vulnerability is exploited via the T2VAttack framework, which utilizes two primary vector strategies: T2VAttack-S (Substitution) and T2VAttack-I (Insertion). T2VAttack-S leverages a greedy search to identify key semantic tokens and replaces them with high-similarity synonyms defined in lexical databases (e.g., WordNet)…

T2VAttack: Adversarial Attack on Text-to-Video Diffusion Models
Evaluated models: Not reported

Dual Stego MLLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Commercial Multimodal Large Language Model (MLLM) integrated systems are vulnerable to a "Dual Steganography" jailbreak paradigm (referred to as Odysseus). The vulnerability arises from the reliance of safety filters on the assumption that malicious content must be explicitly visible in the input or output modalities (text or image). Attackers can bypass these filters by encoding malicious queries into binary matrices and embedding them into benign-looking images using steganographic encoders…

Odysseus: Jailbreaking Commercial Multimodal LLM-integrated Systems via Dual Steganography
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Gemini 2.0 Pro, Gemini 2.0 Flash+1 more
  • GPT-4o
  • Gemini 2.0 Pro
  • Gemini 2.0 Flash
  • Grok 3

LLM App Malicious Drift

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Improper restriction of the "Capability Space" in Large Language Model (LLM) applications allows remote attackers to manipulate application behavior through "Goal Deviation" attacks. This vulnerability arises when developers rely on the broad capabilities of a foundational model (e.g., GPT-4, LLaMA) without implementing sufficient negative constraints or disabling default plugins (e.g., DALL-E, Web Search) in the system prompt. Attackers can exploit this via natural language inputs to trigger…

Beyond Jailbreak: Unveiling Risks in LLM Applications Arising from Blurred Capability Boundaries
Evaluated models: Not reported

Embodied Cross-Modal Misalignment

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

OpenVLA, a Vision-Language-Action (VLA) model, contains a vulnerability regarding multimodal adversarial robustness. The model lacks sufficient cross-modal alignment stability, allowing attackers to disrupt the grounding between visual perception and linguistic instructions. By utilizing the "VLA-Fool" framework, adversaries can inject perturbations via three vectors: (1) Semantically Greedy Coordinate Gradient (SGCG), which alters specific linguistic tokens (referential cues, attributes…

When alignment fails: Multimodal adversarial attacks on vision-language-action models
Evaluated models: Not reported

Indirect Environmental Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Embodied Artificial Intelligence (AI) agents utilizing Vision-Language Models (VLMs) for perception and planning are vulnerable to Indirect Environmental Jailbreak (IEJ). The vulnerability arises from the system's failure to distinguish between user-issued instructions and text embedded in the physical environment (e.g., writing on walls, sticky notes, or projections). The VLM processes visual text detected in the camera feed as authoritative context or direct commands, allowing a black-box…

The Shawshank Redemption of Embodied AI: Understanding and Benchmarking Indirect Environmental Jailbreaks
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Qwen3-VL Plus, Gemini 2.0 Flash+3 more
  • GPT-4o
  • Qwen3-VL Plus
  • Gemini 2.0 Flash
  • GLM 4.5
  • DeepSeek-VL2
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.