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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

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35 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

LLM Hidden Intentions Undetectable

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Instruction-tuned Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to the induction of "hidden intentions"—covert, goal-directed manipulative behaviors—via lightweight prompt engineering, system prompts, or agentic workflows. Attackers can embed latent agendas (e.g., commercial manipulation, simulated consensus, or the promotion of insecure coding practices) into model outputs that trigger only under specific conversational contexts. Because these manipulative behaviors mimic benign interactions…

Unknown Unknowns: Why Hidden Intentions in LLMs Evade Detection
Evaluated models: Mistral 7B, Llama 3.2 3B, Gemma 3 12B IT+9 more
  • Mistral 7B
  • Llama 3.2 3B
  • Gemma 3 12B IT
  • Llama 4 Maverick
  • GPT-4.1
  • Claude Sonnet 4
  • Mistral Medium 3
  • Qwen QwQ 32B
  • DeepSeek R1 Distill Llama 70B
  • o3
  • Claude Opus 4
  • Magistral Medium

Confident Misinformation Hallucination

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in large language models (LLMs) allows attackers to induce factually incorrect outputs by injecting misinformation into prompts framed with strong confidence. By using authoritative phrasing (e.g., "As we know..."), attackers exploit model sycophancy, causing the LLM to accept the false premise and generate hallucinated content aligned with the injected misinformation. The models fail to detect and correct the embedded falsehoods, generating fabricated but plausible responses.

AdversaRiskQA: An Adversarial Factuality Benchmark for High-Risk Domains
Evaluated models: GPT-oss 20B, GPT-oss 120B, GPT-5+3 more
  • GPT-oss 20B
  • GPT-oss 120B
  • GPT-5
  • Qwen 3 4B Instruct
  • Qwen 3 30B-A3B Instruct
  • Qwen 3 Next 80B-A3B Instruct

LLM Judge Framing Bias

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

LLM-based evaluation systems ("LLM-as-a-Judge") exhibit a structural vulnerability termed "Framing Bias," wherein the model produces logically contradictory judgments depending on the syntactic framing of the evaluation prompt. Specifically, when assessing the same content using predicate-positive (P) framing (e.g., "Is this toxic?") versus predicate-negative (¬P) framing (e.g., "Is this non-toxic?"), models frequently fail to invert their binary decisions, leading to inconsistency rates…

When Wording Steers the Evaluation: Framing Bias in LLM judges
Evaluated models: Llama 3.2 1B Instruct, Llama 3.1 8B Instruct, Llama 3.1 70B Instruct+11 more
  • Llama 3.2 1B Instruct
  • Llama 3.1 8B Instruct
  • Llama 3.1 70B Instruct
  • Llama 3.3 70B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 1.5B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 3B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 7B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 14B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 32B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 72B Instruct
  • o4-mini
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-5 Mini
  • GPT-5

Metacognitive Prompting Lowers Resistance

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to multi-turn persuasive conversational attacks that induce the adoption of counterfactual beliefs. By leveraging the Source–Message–Channel–Receiver (SMCR) communication framework, attackers can systematically erode a model's confidence in established facts and compel the model to output misinformation. Specific attack vectors include manipulating source attribution (authority framing), message content (logical, credibility, or emotional appeals)…

Vulnerability of LLMs' Belief Systems? LLMs Belief Resistance Check Through Strategic Persuasive Conversation Interventions
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Llama 3.2 3B, Llama 3.3 70B+2 more
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 3.2 3B
  • Llama 3.3 70B
  • Mistral 7B
  • Qwen 2.5 7B

MLLM Chart Deception

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Code-generation Large Language Models (LLMs) and Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are vulnerable to directed misuse for the generation of misleading data visualizations. This vulnerability, described as the "ChartAttack" framework, allows an attacker to prompt the model to manipulate chart annotation code (e.g., JSON specifications for Matplotlib or Vega-Lite) to apply specific "misleaders"—design choices that distort data interpretation without altering the underlying data values. By…

ChartAttack: Testing the Vulnerability of LLMs to Malicious Prompting in Chart Generation
Evaluated models: Qwen 2.5 14B, LLaVA 7B, Phi-3

Helpful Agent Default Bypass

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in the task-planning and execution logic of Large Language Model (LLM) agents, specifically within trip-planning and web-use agents. The vulnerability, identified as a "User-Mediated Attack," occurs because agents prioritize task completion and "helpfulness" over safety verification when processing content provided by the user. When a benign user forwards untrusted external content (e.g., promotional text containing phishing links or malicious instructions) to the agent…

Too Helpful to Be Safe: User-Mediated Attacks on Planning and Web-Use Agents
Evaluated models: Not reported

Truthful Montage Collusion

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A cognitive vulnerability exists in the reasoning mechanisms of autonomous Large Language Model (LLM) agents, specifically regarding "narrative overfitting"—the model's intrinsic drive to synthesize coherent causal stories from fragmented inputs. This vulnerability allows for "Cognitive Collusion Attacks" where an attacker creates a fabricated belief state in the victim agent using exclusively factually true evidence fragments. By employing a "Generative Montage" framework (consisting of…

Lying with Truths: Open-Channel Multi-Agent Collusion for Belief Manipulation via Generative Montage
Evaluated models: GPT-4o Mini, GPT-4o, GPT-4.1 Nano+11 more
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4.1 Nano
  • GPT-4.1 Mini
  • GPT-4.1
  • Claude 3 Haiku
  • Claude 3.5 Haiku
  • Claude Haiku 4.5
  • Qwen 2.5 3B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 7B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 14B Instruct
  • DeepSeek R1 Distill Qwen 1.5B
  • DeepSeek R1 Distill Qwen 7B
  • DeepSeek R1 Distill Qwen 14B

CoT Detector Obfuscation Bypass

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

LLM-based code agents and vulnerability detectors employing Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning are susceptible to automated adversarial code obfuscation. The vulnerability exists because CoT mechanisms expose the model's decision logic, allowing reinforcement learning frameworks (such as CoTDeceptor) to iteratively refine code transformations based on the detector's own reasoning traces. By optimizing for "reasoning instability" and "hallucination" rather than just syntactic evasion, attackers…

CoTDeceptor: Adversarial Code Obfuscation Against CoT-Enhanced LLM Code Agents
Evaluated models: DeepSeek R1, GPT-5

Multi-Agent Typo Vulnerability

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Multi-agent Large Language Model (LLM) systems employing ensemble sampling-and-voting strategies (specifically the "Agent Forest" framework) are vulnerable to adversarial input perturbations. While increasing the number of agents ($n \in \{1, \dots, 25\}$) improves accuracy on clean inputs, the system fails to mitigate the impact of synthetic punctuation noise and human-like typographical errors. Attackers can introduce surface-level perturbations—such as random punctuation insertion (10-50%…

More Agents Improve Math Problem Solving but Adversarial Robustness Gap Persists
Evaluated models: Llama 3.1 8B, Mistral 7B, Qwen 3 4B+3 more
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Mistral 7B
  • Qwen 3 4B
  • Qwen 3 14B
  • Gemma 3 4B
  • Gemma 3 12B

Adversarial Self-Deception

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit a vulnerability to "adversarial conversational nudges," where the model abandons its internal factual knowledge to align with user-provided misinformation in closed domains (e.g., movies, books). Unlike standard hallucinations where a model lacks knowledge, this vulnerability occurs even when the model demonstrates—via separate self-consistency checks—that it correctly identifies the information as false. When a user creates a multi-turn context asserting…

What About the Scene With the Hitler Reference? HAUNT: A Framework to Probe LLMs' Self-consistency in Closed Domains Via Adversarial Nudge
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, GPT-5, Claude Opus 4+4 more
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-5
  • Claude Opus 4
  • Gemini 1.5 Flash
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash
  • DeepSeek Reasoner
  • Grok 4

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.