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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

Filtered research findings

53 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Safety Steering Amplifies Jailbreaks

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Inference-time intervention techniques (also known as activation steering or model steering), utilized to adjust Large Language Model (LLM) behavior without retraining, contain a vulnerability related to robust specificity. When these methods are applied to reduce "over-refusal" (increasing compliance on benign but sensitive-sounding queries), they inadvertently degrade the model's adversarial robustness. Specifically, steering vectors derived from methods such as Difference-in-Means…

Steering Safely or Off a Cliff? Rethinking Specificity and Robustness in Inference-Time Interventions
Evaluated models: Llama 3.1 8B, Llama 3.2 3B, Qwen 2.5 7B+1 more
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Llama 3.2 3B
  • Qwen 2.5 7B
  • Gemma 2 2B

AI Persuasion Trust Attack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Adversarial Explanation Attacks (AEAs) introduce a behavioral vulnerability in Large Language Model (LLM) based decision-support systems where the communication channel between the AI and the user is exploited to induce trust in incorrect model predictions. By manipulating the framing of an explanation—specifically its reasoning mode, evidence type, communication style, and presentation format—an attacker can dissociate the perceived plausibility of an explanation from its factual correctness…

When AI Persuades: Adversarial Explanation Attacks on Human Trust in AI-Assisted Decision Making
Evaluated models: Llama 3.3 70B

CoT Causal Bypass

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large language models (LLMs) exhibit a "Causal Bypass" vulnerability during Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting, where the generated reasoning text does not causally determine the model's final output. Instead of utilizing the explicit CoT tokens, the model routes decision-critical computation through latent, implicit pathways. This allows the visible reasoning trace to function as an unfaithful, post-hoc rationalization rather than an actual representation of the model's internal logic…

Bypassing the Rationale: Causal Auditing of Implicit Reasoning in Language Models
Evaluated models: Phi-4 Mini Reasoning, Qwen 3 1.7B, Phi-3.5 Mini Instruct+7 more
  • Phi-4 Mini Reasoning
  • Qwen 3 1.7B
  • Phi-3.5 Mini Instruct
  • Phi-2
  • Qwen 3 0.6B
  • DialoGPT Large
  • Phi-1.5
  • Phi-4
  • Qwen 3 8B
  • Qwen 3 4B

Learned Reward Model Hacking

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) aligned via Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) are vulnerable to reward hacking (reward misgeneralization). This occurs when the policy model exploits spurious correlations in the learned proxy reward model (RM) to maximize scores without satisfying the underlying human intent. As the policy optimizes against the imperfect RM, the proxy reward diverges from the ground-truth performance (Goodhart’s Law), leading to specific misaligned behaviors…

Adversarial Reward Auditing for Active Detection and Mitigation of Reward Hacking
Evaluated models: GPT-4, Llama 2 7B

Semantic Hierarchical VLM Transfer

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Vision-Language Models (VLMs) are vulnerable to a transferable targeted adversarial attack known as SGHA-Attack (Semantic-Guided Hierarchical Alignment). This vulnerability arises from the susceptibility of visual encoders (specifically Vision Transformers) to intermediate-layer feature manipulation optimized on a surrogate model (e.g., CLIP). An attacker can craft adversarial images by injecting imperceptible perturbations that enforce semantic consistency with a target text prompt…

SGHA-Attack: Semantic-Guided Hierarchical Alignment for Transferable Targeted Attacks on Vision-Language Models
Evaluated models: UniDiffuser, BLIP-2 ViT-g/14, InstructBLIP Vicuna 13B+4 more
  • UniDiffuser
  • BLIP-2 ViT-g/14
  • InstructBLIP Vicuna 13B
  • MiniGPT-4 Vicuna 13B
  • LLaVA 1.5 13B
  • LLaVA NeXT Qwen 1.5 72B Chat
  • GPT-4o

Adversarial Claim Search Deception

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Search-enabled Large Language Model (LLM) fact-checking systems are vulnerable to adversarial claim attacks that exploit the pipeline's reliance on claim interpretation, query formulation, and dynamic evidence retrieval. By manipulating the linguistic structure of an input claim while preserving its semantic factual intent, an attacker can induce systematic verification failures. This vulnerability stems from three specific attack surfaces: 1. Search Engine Misguidance: Altering lexical…

DECEIVE-AFC: Adversarial Claim Attacks against Search-Enabled LLM-based Fact-Checking Systems
Evaluated models: GPT-4o

LLM Agent False Negative

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

LLM-based autonomous agents deployed for Static Application Security Testing (SAST) false positive filtering exhibit a critical failure mode resulting in the suppression of True Positive (TP) vulnerability reports. When configured to triage alerts from tools such as CodeQL, Semgrep, and SonarQube, agents including SWE-agent, OpenHands, and Aider incorrectly classify legitimate, exploitable vulnerabilities as false positives. This vulnerability suppression is highly correlated with specific…

Sifting the Noise: A Comparative Study of LLM Agents in Vulnerability False Positive Filtering
Evaluated models: Claude Sonnet 4, DeepSeek Chat, GPT-5

Agent Missing-Tool Hallucination

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Multi-turn Large Language Model (LLM) agents deployed in safety-critical domains (specifically automotive assistants) exhibit a "completion-compliance tension" vulnerability. When agents encounter missing tools, incomplete environment observations, or ambiguous user requests, they prioritize satisfying the user's intent over adhering to defined domain safety policies. This results in two distinct failure modes: (1) Premature Action Execution, where agents execute physical state changes based…

CAR-bench: Evaluating the Consistency and Limit-Awareness of LLM Agents under Real-World Uncertainty
Evaluated models: GPT-5, GPT-5.2, Claude Opus 4.5+7 more
  • GPT-5
  • GPT-5.2
  • Claude Opus 4.5
  • Claude Sonnet 4
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash
  • Gemini 2.5 Pro
  • GPT-4.1
  • Qwen 3 32B
  • GPT-oss 120B
  • xLAM 2 32B

RL Adversarial Function Call

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) enabled with Function Calling (FC) capabilities are vulnerable to adversarial query rewriting and semantic manipulation. Standard FC models, typically trained via Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) on static datasets, fail to generalize against adversarial inputs that deviate from fixed distribution patterns. An attacker can exploit this by crafting queries that are semantically similar to valid requests but engineered to induce "bad cases," such as incorrect tool…

Exploring Weaknesses in Function Call Models via Reinforcement Learning: An Adversarial Data Augmentation Approach
Evaluated models: Qwen 2.5 7B Instruct, Qwen 3 0.6B, Qwen 3 4B+1 more
  • Qwen 2.5 7B Instruct
  • Qwen 3 0.6B
  • Qwen 3 4B
  • Qwen 3 8B

VLM Text Overrides Image

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in multiple state-of-the-art Vision-Language Models (VLMs), including GPT-4o, Gemini-2.5, and LLaVA-OneVision, where persuasive textual misinformation successfully overrides visual evidence. When a model is presented with an image it can correctly interpret, an attacker can inject a contradictory text prompt employing specific rhetorical strategies (Logical, Credibility, Emotional, or Repetition) to force the model into generating a false response. This "obedience bias"…

Do Images Speak Louder than Words? Investigating the Effect of Textual Misinformation in VLMs
Evaluated models: Qwen 2.5 VL 3B Instruct, Qwen 2.5 VL 7B Instruct, InternVL3 1B+8 more
  • Qwen 2.5 VL 3B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 VL 7B Instruct
  • InternVL3 1B
  • InternVL3 2B
  • InternVL3 8B
  • LLaVA-OneVision 0.5B
  • LLaVA-OneVision 7B
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash
  • Gemini 2.5 Pro
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • GPT-4o

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.