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Last analyzed 9/9/2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1123 evaluated models

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22 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Published 12/1/2025
Analyzed 1/14/2026

Text-to-Video (T2V) diffusion models are vulnerable to black-box adversarial prompt attacks that degrade output quality regarding semantic fidelity and temporal dynamics. This vulnerability is exploited via the T2VAttack framework, which utilizes two primary vector strategies: T2VAttack-S (Substitution) and T2VAttack-I (Insertion). T2VAttack-S leverages a greedy search to identify key semantic tokens and replaces them with high-similarity synonyms defined in lexical databases (e.g., WordNet)…

T2VAttack: Adversarial Attack on Text-to-Video Diffusion Models
Evaluated models: Not reported

Source: arXiv

Published 11/1/2025
Analyzed 12/1/2025

A jailbreak vulnerability, termed Embedded Jailbreak Template (EJT), allows for the generation of harmful content by bypassing the safety mechanisms of Large Language Models (LLMs). The attack uses a generator LLM to contextually integrate a harmful query into a pre-existing jailbreak template. Unlike fixed templates which insert a query into a static placeholder, EJT rewrites multiple parts of the template to embed the harmful intent naturally. This process preserves the original template's…

Beyond Fixed and Dynamic Prompts: Embedded Jailbreak Templates for Advancing LLM Security
Evaluated models: BERT, DeBERTa v3 Base, GPT-4o

Source: arXiv

Published 11/1/2025
Analyzed 1/14/2026

OpenVLA, a Vision-Language-Action (VLA) model, contains a vulnerability regarding multimodal adversarial robustness. The model lacks sufficient cross-modal alignment stability, allowing attackers to disrupt the grounding between visual perception and linguistic instructions. By utilizing the "VLA-Fool" framework, adversaries can inject perturbations via three vectors: (1) Semantically Greedy Coordinate Gradient (SGCG), which alters specific linguistic tokens (referential cues, attributes…

When alignment fails: Multimodal adversarial attacks on vision-language-action models
Evaluated models: Not reported

Source: arXiv

Published 11/1/2025
Analyzed 12/5/2025

A vulnerability exists in certain Large Language Models and diffusion models due to discontinuities in their latent space, which arise from data sparsity during training. An attacker can craft inputs containing lexically rare or semantically ambiguous constructs to guide the model's inference process toward these unstable, poorly-conditioned regions. This technique, termed "Alignment Degradation Induction," can degrade or bypass safety alignment mechanisms. Through iterative, multi-turn…

Exploiting Latent Space Discontinuities for Building Universal LLM Jailbreaks and Data Extraction Attacks
Evaluated models: Not reported

Source: arXiv

Published 10/1/2025
Analyzed 10/31/2025

Large Language Models (LLMs) that use special tokens to define conversational structure (e.g., via chat templates) are vulnerable to a jailbreak attack named MetaBreak. An attacker can inject these special tokens, or regular tokens with high semantic similarity in the embedding space, into a user prompt. This manipulation allows the attacker to bypass the model's internal safety alignment and external content moderation systems. The attack leverages four primitives: 1. Response Injection…

MetaBreak: Jailbreaking Online LLM Services via Special Token Manipulation
Evaluated models: Claude Opus 4, Gemma 2 27B IT, GPT-4.1 +9 more

Source: arXiv

Published 8/1/2025
Analyzed 12/9/2025

A vulnerability exists in the graph encoding architecture of LLaGA (Large Language and Graph Assistant), specifically within the "neighborhood detail template" used to construct node sequences. LLaGA enforces a fixed-shape computational tree for each node; when a target node has fewer neighbors than the required template size (e.g., $k$ children), the system utilizes placeholders to maintain the fixed structure.

Adversarial Attacks and Defenses on Graph-aware Large Language Models (LLMs)
Evaluated models: GPT-4, Llama 2 7B, Vicuna 7B

Source: arXiv

Published 7/1/2025
Analyzed 12/30/2025

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems utilizing dense (e.g., BERT-based) or sparse (e.g., BM25) retrievers are vulnerable to black-box adversarial prompt injection attacks. By employing a gradient-free Differential Evolution (DE) optimization algorithm (referred to as DeRAG), an attacker can generate short adversarial suffixes (typically ≤ 5 tokens). When these suffixes are appended to a user query, they manipulate the retriever's ranking mechanism to promote a specific, malicious, or…

DeRAG: Black-box Adversarial Attacks on Multiple Retrieval-Augmented Generation Applications via Prompt Injection
Evaluated models: Not reported

Source: arXiv

Published 4/1/2025
Analyzed 1/14/2026

A vulnerability exists in the tool selection mechanism of Large Language Model (LLM) agents that utilize a retrieval-then-selection pipeline (RAG) for identifying executable tools. The vulnerability, known as "ToolHijacker," allows a remote attacker to manipulate the agent's decision-making process by injecting a malicious tool document into the accessible tool library (e.g., via third-party tool hubs or plugins). The attack employs a two-phase optimization strategy to craft a malicious tool…

Prompt Injection Attack to Tool Selection in LLM Agents
Evaluated models: Llama 2 7B Chat, Llama 3 8B Instruct, Llama 3 70B Instruct +5 more

Source: arXiv

Published 3/1/2025
Analyzed 12/30/2025

A vulnerability exists in Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems that allows for black-box adversarial attacks known as "CtrlRAG." This flaw allows an attacker to manipulate the generation of Large Language Models (LLMs) by injecting maliciously crafted inputs into the system's knowledge base. Unlike traditional injection attacks that rely on direct concatenation, CtrlRAG utilizes a Masked Language Model (MLM) to iteratively replace words in the malicious text. This optimization ensures…

CtrlRAG: Black-box Document Poisoning Attacks for Retrieval-Augmented Generation of Large Language Models
Evaluated models: GPT-4 Turbo, GPT-4o, Claude 3.5 Sonnet +2 more

Source: arXiv

Published 2/1/2025
Analyzed 12/9/2025

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are vulnerable to a universal adversarial attack where a single, optimized image can bypass safety alignment mechanisms across diverse textual queries. By employing gradient-based optimization on the input image pixels while propagating gradients through the vision encoder and language model, an attacker can craft a visual perturbation that coerces the model into a compliant state. When this adversarial image is present in the context, the model’s…

Universal Adversarial Attack on Multimodal Aligned LLMs
Evaluated models: LLaVA 1.5 7B, Llama 3.2 11B Vision Instruct, Phi-3.5 Vision Instruct +1 more

Source: arXiv

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.