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Last analyzed 9/9/2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1123 evaluated models

Filtered research findings

468 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Published 1/1/2026
Analyzed 2/20/2026

Large Language Models (LLMs) and their associated output guardrails (e.g., Llama Guard, OpenAI Moderation API) rely on autoregressive, token-by-token processing, which interprets text as a one-dimensional sequence. A vulnerability exists wherein harmful content can bypass these safety filters by exploiting the discrepancy between 1D token serialization and 2D visual rendering. By redistributing tokens across different rows, columns, or diagonals (SpatialJB), attackers can induce the model to…

SpatialJB: How Text Distribution Art Becomes the" Jailbreak Key" for LLM Guardrails
Evaluated models: GPT-4, Grok 4, Gemini 2.5 Pro +3 more

Source: arXiv

Published 1/1/2026
Analyzed 2/21/2026

A "risk-invariance" vulnerability exists in Large Language Models (LLMs) wherein the model's decision-making policy is functionally decoupled from its verbalized confidence and externally defined error penalties. Despite generating calibrated confidence estimates (internal epistemic uncertainty), affected models fail to adjust their abstention thresholds when presented with high-penalty incentives (e.g., negative utility for incorrect answers). This results in "utility collapse," where models…

Are LLM Decisions Faithful to Verbal Confidence?
Evaluated models: GPT-5 Mini, GPT-5 Nano, GPT-4.1 Mini +7 more

Source: arXiv

Published 1/1/2026
Analyzed 2/22/2026

Closed-source Multi-modal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are vulnerable to Universal Targeted Transferable Adversarial Attacks (UTTAA). An attacker can generate a single, image-agnostic adversarial perturbation ($\delta$) that, when added to any arbitrary source image, steers the victim model to output a description or classification matching a specific target image chosen by the attacker. This vulnerability exploits the transferability of adversarial features from open-source surrogate vision…

Universal Adversarial Attacks against Closed-Source MLLMs via Target-View Routed Meta Optimization
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Claude Sonnet 4.5, GPT-5 +2 more

Source: arXiv

Published 1/1/2026
Analyzed 2/21/2026

Vision-Language Models (VLMs) exhibit a vulnerability to moral judgment flipping, where the model's safety alignment can be bypassed through lightweight, model-agnostic multimodal perturbations. By introducing conflicting textual or visual cues that do not alter the underlying moral context of a scenario, an attacker can coerce the model into reversing its ethical stance (e.g., reclassifying a harmful action from "morally wrong" to "not morally wrong"). This vulnerability exploits the model's…

Do VLMs Have a Moral Backbone? A Study on the Fragile Morality of Vision-Language Models
Evaluated models: Qwen 2.5 VL 3B Instruct, Qwen 2.5 VL 7B Instruct, Qwen 2.5 VL 32B Instruct +20 more

Source: arXiv

Published 1/1/2026
Analyzed 2/22/2026

A vulnerability exists in Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) utilizing visual token compression mechanisms (e.g., VisionZip, VisPruner) to reduce inference latency. The vulnerability stems from an optimization-inference mismatch where standard adversarial defenses assume full-token processing, while the deployed model utilizes a subset of tokens selected via importance metrics (typically attention scores).

On the Adversarial Robustness of Large Vision-Language Models under Visual Token Compression
Evaluated models: LLaVA 1.5 7B

Source: arXiv

Published 12/1/2025
Analyzed 3/8/2026

Open-weight Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a white-box safety alignment bypass known as "abliteration" (directional orthogonalization). An attacker with access to the model weights can compute the "refusal direction" in the residual stream activation space by contrasting internal activations between harmful and harmless prompts. By projecting the model's weight matrices to be orthogonal to this single direction (or specific concept cones), the safety alignment is surgically…

Comparative Analysis of LLM Abliteration Methods: A Cross-Architecture Evaluation
Evaluated models: Llama 3.1 8B Instruct, Mistral 7B Instruct v0.3, Qwen 2.5 7B Instruct +13 more

Source: arXiv

Published 12/1/2025
Analyzed 1/14/2026

Large Language and Vision Assistant (LLaVA) v1.5-13B and Meta Llama 3.2 11B Vision are vulnerable to adversarial evasion attacks targeting the visual input modality. An attacker with white-box access (knowledge of model architecture and gradients) can employ Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) to generate adversarial perturbations constrained by an L-infinity norm. By maximizing the model's internal loss function with respect to the input image, the attacker can force the Vision-Language Model…

Adversarial Robustness of Vision in Open Foundation Models
Evaluated models: LLaVA 1.5 13B, Llama 3.2 11B Vision

Source: arXiv

Published 12/1/2025
Analyzed 1/14/2026

Frontier Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit a critical vulnerability to automated, adaptive multi-turn adversarial attacks, specifically those utilizing tree-based exploration algorithms (e.g., the TEMPEST framework). Unlike single-turn jailbreaks, this vulnerability exploits the model's inability to maintain safety alignment across extended conversation trajectories. An attacker using an automated agent can dynamically select from multiple adversarial strategies—such as academic framing…

Replicating TEMPEST at Scale: Multi-Turn Adversarial Attacks Against Trillion-Parameter Frontier Models
Evaluated models: Cogito 2.1, DeepSeek V3.1, Gemma 3 12B +7 more

Source: arXiv

Published 12/1/2025
Analyzed 12/5/2025

A vulnerability exists in large language models where safety guardrails can be bypassed by decomposing a single harmful objective into a sequence of individually innocuous sub-queries. An attacker agent can use an adaptive tree search algorithm (Correlated Knowledge Attack Agent - CKA-Agent) to explore the target model's internal correlated knowledge. The agent issues benign queries, uses the model's responses to guide exploration along multiple reasoning paths, and aggregates the collected…

A Wolf in Sheep's Clothing: Bypassing Commercial LLM Guardrails via Harmless Prompt Weaving and Adaptive Tree Search
Evaluated models: Circuit Breaker, Claude 3.5 Haiku, Gemini 2.5 Flash +7 more

Source: arXiv

Published 12/1/2025
Analyzed 2/21/2026

A Denial-of-Service (DoS) vulnerability exists in Large Language Model (LLM) inference services where specially crafted input prompts can trigger excessively long or infinite generation loops ("infinite thinking"). This vulnerability, identified as "ThinkTrap," utilizes derivative-free optimization (CMA-ES) within a continuous surrogate embedding space to circumvent the discrete nature of token inputs. By optimizing a low-dimensional latent vector and projecting it to token sequences, an…

ThinkTrap: Denial-of-Service Attacks against Black-box LLM Services via Infinite Thinking
Evaluated models: Gemini 2.5 Pro, Lumimaid 70B, o4-mini +4 more

Source: arXiv

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.