Language Model Security Database

Commercial text-to-image (T2I) generative AI systems are vulnerable to automated prompt injection attacks that bypass their safety mechanisms and induce the generation of copyrighted material. An attacker can use an automated pipeline to generate prompts that precisely describe copyrighted images, effectively circumventing word-based detection filters.

Multimodal Large Language Models (LLMs) processing speech input are vulnerable to adversarial attacks. Imperceptible perturbations added to audio input can cause the model to generate unsafe or harmful text responses, overriding built-in safety mechanisms. The attacks are effective even with limited knowledge of the model's internal workings, demonstrating transferability across different models.

A vulnerability in large language models (LLMs) allows attackers to elicit unsafe or unethical responses through a chain of semantically relevant multi-turn prompts. The attack, termed "Chain of Attack" (CoA), exploits the model's contextual understanding and adaptive response capabilities to gradually steer the conversation towards the desired harmful output, even if single-turn prompts are rejected due to safety mechanisms. The attack leverages semantic similarity scoring (e.g., using…

A momentum-accelerated gradient-based attack (MAC) against Large Language Models (LLMs) significantly improves the efficiency and success rate of jailbreak attacks. MAC leverages a momentum term within the gradient descent optimization process to enhance the stability and speed of generating adversarial prompts that bypass LLM safety measures. This allows adversaries to elicit harmful or undesirable outputs from the model more quickly than previous methods.

A novel adversarial suffix embedding translation framework (ASETF) enables efficient and highly successful attacks against large language models (LLMs). ASETF optimizes continuous adversarial suffix embeddings, then translates these embeddings into coherent, human-readable text. This bypasses existing defenses which rely on detecting unusual or nonsensical suffixes. The attack achieves a high success rate across multiple LLMs, including both open-source and black-box models.

Large Language Models (LLMs) with advanced reasoning capabilities are vulnerable to jailbreaking attacks using novel, complex, and layered custom encryption schemes. LLMs' ability to decipher these ciphers, exceeding the capabilities of less sophisticated models, enables attackers to bypass existing safety mechanisms by encoding malicious prompts.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to efficient adversarial attacks using Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) on a continuously relaxed input prompt. This attack bypasses existing alignment methods by crafting adversarial prompts that induce the model to produce undesired or harmful outputs, significantly faster than previous state-of-the-art discrete optimization methods. The effectiveness stems from carefully controlling the error introduced by the continuous relaxation of the discrete…

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are vulnerable to a jailbreaking attack using crafted images (image Jailbreaking Prompts or imgJPs). These imgJPs, when presented as input alongside malicious prompts, cause the MLLM to bypass safety mechanisms and generate objectionable content, including instructions for harmful activities like identity theft or creation of violent video games. The attack demonstrates both prompt-universality (a single imgJP works across multiple prompts) and, to a…

Newly added APIs to large language models (LLMs), such as fine-tuning, function calling, and knowledge retrieval, introduce novel attack vectors that bypass existing safety mechanisms and enable various malicious activities. Specifically, fine-tuning with even a small number of carefully crafted examples can remove or weaken built-in safety guardrails, resulting in the generation of misinformation, disclosure of private information (PII), and the creation of malicious code. Function calling…

Large Language Models (LLMs) such as Llama 2 and Vicuna exhibit a vulnerability where specific layers (e.g., layer 3 in Llama2-13B, layer 1 in Llama2-7B and Vicuna-13B) overfit to harmful prompts, resulting in a disproportionate influence on the model's output for such prompts. This overfitting creates a narrow "safety" mechanism easily bypassed by adversarial prompts designed to avoid triggering these specific layers. Additionally, a single neuron (e.g., neuron 2100 in Llama2 and Vicuna)…