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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

Filtered research findings

410 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Deceptive CoT Rationalization

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in Chain-of-Thought (CoT) monitoring protocols where trusted monitor models can be deceived by deceptive reasoning traces generated by untrusted models. Specifically, when an untrusted model employs a "Dependency" framing attack—characterizing a malicious side-task as a necessary intermediate calculation or benign prerequisite—the monitor's suspicion score significantly decreases compared to action-only monitoring. This creates a paradox where providing the monitor with…

CoT Red-Handed: Stress Testing Chain-of-Thought Monitoring
Evaluated models: Claude 3.5 Haiku, Gemini 2.5 Flash-Lite, GPT-4.1 Mini+3 more
  • Claude 3.5 Haiku
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash-Lite
  • GPT-4.1 Mini
  • GPT-4.1 Nano
  • DeepSeek R1
  • Claude 3.7 Sonnet Thinking

VLM Navigation Object Fusion

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

The Vision-Language Model (VLM) perception module in Vision-and-Language Navigation (VLN) agents is vulnerable to adversarial 3D object injection via the Adversarial Object Fusion (AdvOF) framework. An attacker can generate physically plausible 3D objects with adversarial perturbations capable of deceiving the agent's VLM across multiple viewing angles and distances. The vulnerability exists due to a misalignment between 3D physical manipulations and the agent's 2D image perception, combined…

Disrupting Vision-Language Model-Driven Navigation Services via Adversarial Object Fusion
Evaluated models: Not reported

Hybrid Agent Prompt Injection

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Computer-Use Agents (CUAs) powered by Large Language Models (LLMs) operating in hybrid Web-OS environments are vulnerable to indirect prompt injection. Attackers can embed malicious natural language or code instructions within legitimate web content (e.g., social media forums, chat applications, shared cloud documents) that the agent processes during benign task execution. Due to the agent's inability to distinguish between trusted user instructions and untrusted environmental data, the CUA…

RedTeamCUA: Realistic Adversarial Testing of Computer-Use Agents in Hybrid Web-OS Environments
Evaluated models: Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Claude 3.7 Sonnet, GPT-4o

Expanded Strategy Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to jailbreak attacks that exploit the model's inherent persuasive nature. A novel attack framework, CL-GSO, decomposes jailbreak strategies into four components (Role, Content Support, Context, Communication Skills), creating a significantly expanded strategy space compared to prior methods. This expanded space allows for the generation of prompts that bypass safety protocols with a success rate exceeding 90% on models previously considered…

Breaking the Ceiling: Exploring the Potential of Jailbreak Attacks through Expanding Strategy Space
Evaluated models: Claude 3.5 Sonnet, GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4o+2 more
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 3 8B
  • Qwen 2.5 7B

Distilled Jailbreak Attacks

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in Large Language Models (LLMs) allows adversarial prompt distillation from a large language model (LLM) to a smaller language model (SLM), enabling efficient and stealthy jailbreak attacks. The attack leverages knowledge distillation techniques, reinforcement learning, and dynamic temperature control to transfer the LLM's ability to bypass safety mechanisms to a smaller, more easily deployable SLM. This allows for lower computational cost attacks with a potentially high…

Efficient and Stealthy Jailbreak Attacks via Adversarial Prompt Distillation from LLMs to SLMs
Evaluated models: BERT Base, Gemma 2 27B, Gemma 2 2B+8 more
  • BERT Base
  • Gemma 2 27B
  • Gemma 2 2B
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 2 13B
  • Llama 2 7B
  • Llama 3.2 1B
  • Vicuna 13B
  • Vicuna 7B

Dynamic Prompt Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

GhostPrompt demonstrates a vulnerability in multimodal safety filters used with text-to-image generative models. The vulnerability allows attackers to bypass these filters by using a dynamic prompt optimization framework that iteratively generates adversarial prompts designed to evade both text-based and image-based safety checks while preserving the original, harmful intent of the prompt. This bypass is achieved through a combination of semantically aligned prompt rewriting and the injection…

GhostPrompt: Jailbreaking Text-to-image Generative Models based on Dynamic Optimization
Evaluated models: DALL-E 3, DeepSeek V3, Flux Schnell+5 more
  • DALL-E 3
  • DeepSeek V3
  • Flux Schnell
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4.1
  • InternVL 2 2B
  • Qwen 2.5 7B Instruct
  • ShieldLM 7B

CoT Jailbreak Mitigation Failure

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning, while intended to improve safety, can paradoxically increase the harmfulness of successful jailbreak attacks by enabling the generation of highly detailed and actionable instructions. Existing jailbreaking methods, when applied to LLMs employing CoT, can elicit more precise and dangerous outputs than those from LLMs without CoT.

Does Chain-of-Thought Reasoning Really Reduce Harmfulness from Jailbreaking?
Evaluated models: Claude 3.5 Sonnet, DeepSeek Chat, DeepSeek R1+9 more
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • DeepSeek Chat
  • DeepSeek R1
  • GLM
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 3.1 8B Instruct
  • o1
  • o3-mini
  • Qwen 32B
  • Qwen 72B
  • Qwen 7B
  • QwQ 32B

Universal Jailbreak Prompt Generator

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to robust jailbreak prompts generated by the ArrAttack framework. ArrAttack uses a two-stage process: a robustness judgment model trained to identify prompts that bypass existing LLM safety mechanisms, and a robust jailbreak prompt generation model that leverages this information to create highly effective attacks. This allows attackers to bypass multiple defense mechanisms, including perplexity-based detection, input preprocessing, and…

One Model Transfer to All: On Robust Jailbreak Prompts Generation against LLMs
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4, Guanaco 7B+3 more
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • Guanaco 7B
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Vicuna 13B
  • Vicuna 7B

Conditional Prompt Hijack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

The SPECTRE framework introduces a black-box adversarial attack vector against Large Language Models (LLMs) that utilizes malicious system prompts to hijack conversations. Unlike traditional jailbreaks that aim to bypass safeguards for all inputs, SPECTRE optimizes system prompts to induce incorrect or harmful responses only for specific targeted questions (e.g., "Are COVID vaccines safe?", "Who should I vote for?"), while maintaining high accuracy and benign behavior on all other non-targeted…

SPECTRE: Conditional System Prompt Poisoning to Hijack LLMs
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4o Mini, Llama 2 7B+8 more
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Llama 2 7B
  • Llama 2 13B
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • DeepSeek 7B
  • Qwen 2.5 3B
  • Qwen 2.5 7B
  • Qwen 2.5 14B
  • Qwen 2.5 32B
  • Pythia 12B

Hidden Image Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) are vulnerable to implicit jailbreak attacks that leverage least significant bit (LSB) steganography to conceal malicious instructions within images. These instructions are coupled with seemingly benign image-related text prompts, causing the MLLM to execute the hidden malicious instructions. The attack bypasses existing safety mechanisms by exploiting cross-modal reasoning capabilities.

Implicit Jailbreak Attacks via Cross-Modal Information Concealment on Vision-Language Models
Evaluated models: Gemini 1.5 Pro, Gemini 2.5 Pro, GPT-4.5+3 more
  • Gemini 1.5 Pro
  • Gemini 2.5 Pro
  • GPT-4.5
  • GPT-4o
  • InternVL 2 8B
  • Qwen 2.5 VL 72B Instruct

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.