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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

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556 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

LAM Speech Style Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Audio-Language Models (LAMs) are vulnerable to style-aware audio jailbreak attacks that bypass safety alignment mechanisms. This vulnerability exists because current safety alignment strategies often overlook the expressive variations of human speech. Attackers can exploit this by manipulating three specific attributes of the audio input: linguistic (rewriting text with emotional semantics), paralinguistic (modulating emotional acoustic tone), and extralinguistic (altering speaker age…

StyleBreak: Revealing Alignment Vulnerabilities in Large Audio-Language Models via Style-Aware Audio Jailbreak
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Llama 3.1 8B, Qwen 2 7B+1 more
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Qwen 2 7B
  • Qwen 2.5 7B

Weak-OOD Jailbreak Boost

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Vision-Language Models (VLMs) are vulnerable to a jailbreak attack vector termed "weak-OOD" (weak Out-of-Distribution), specifically instantiated via the JOCR (Jailbreak via OCR-Aware Embedded Text Perturbation) method. The vulnerability arises from an asymmetry between the model's pre-training phase (which establishes robust OCR capabilities and intent perception) and the safety alignment phase (which lacks generalization to visual anomalies). Attackers can embed malicious text instructions…

Why does weak-OOD help? A Further Step Towards Understanding Jailbreaking VLMs
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, GPT-4o Mini, GPT-4.1+3 more
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • GPT-4.1
  • Gemini 2.5 Pro
  • Qwen 2.5 VL 7B Instruct
  • InternVL2.5 8B

Multi-Agent Multimodal Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

The JPRO (Automated Multimodal Jailbreaking via Multi-Agent Collaboration) framework exploits a vulnerability in Large Vision-Language Models (VLMs) related to insufficient cross-modal safety alignment and lack of maliciousness sustainability in multi-turn dialogues. The attack leverages a multi-agent system (Planner, Attacker, Modifier, Verifier) to automate the generation of adversarial image-text pairs. By employing hybrid tactics—such as combining role-playing with malicious content…

JPRO: Automated Multimodal Jailbreaking via Multi-Agent Collaboration Framework
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, GPT-4o Mini, GPT-4.1+3 more
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • GPT-4.1
  • Gemini 2.5 Pro
  • Qwen 2.5 VL 7B Instruct
  • InternVL2.5 8B

Semantic Intention Obfuscation

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

The KG-DF (Knowledge Graph Defense Framework) contains a logic vulnerability in its Semantic Parsing Module, specifically within the keyword extraction phase defined as $K_{core} = \text{LLM}(P_{prompt})$. The framework relies on a Large Language Model (e.g., GPT-3.5-turbo) to distill user input into keywords ($K_{core}$), which are then embedded to retrieve security warning triples ($T_{match}$) from a Knowledge Graph.

KG-DF: A Black-box Defense Framework against Jailbreak Attacks Based on Knowledge Graphs
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5, GPT-4, Llama 2 7B+1 more
  • GPT-3.5
  • GPT-4
  • Llama 2 7B
  • Vicuna 7B

Bee Path Planning Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a multi-turn jailbreak attack orchestrated by an enhanced Artificial Bee Colony (ABC) algorithm. This vulnerability exists because current safety alignment mechanisms (such as RLHF and DPO) can be bypassed by treating the attack process as a path planning problem on a dynamically weighted graph topology. The ABC algorithm automates the search for adversarial dialogue trajectories by maintaining a population of "bees" (candidate attack paths) that…

Let the Bees Find the Weak Spots: A Path Planning Perspective on Multi-Turn Jailbreak Attacks against LLMs
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5, GPT-4, Llama 2 7B+1 more
  • GPT-3.5
  • GPT-4
  • Llama 2 7B
  • Llama 3.1 8B

Needle-in-Haystack Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A safety bypass vulnerability, dubbed "Ninja" (Needle-in-a-haystack jailbreak), exists in long-context Large Language Models (LLMs). The vulnerability exploits a degradation in safety alignment that occurs when a harmful goal is embedded within a massive, benign context window. Unlike traditional adversarial attacks that use unintelligible strings or "many-shot" attacks that use harmful examples, this method utilizes thematically relevant but innocuous text (the "haystack"). The attack…

Jailbreaking in the Haystack
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Llama 3.1 8B Instruct, Gemini 2.0 Flash+2 more
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 3.1 8B Instruct
  • Gemini 2.0 Flash
  • Mistral 7B v0.3
  • Qwen 2.5 7B Instruct

Pervasive Multi-turn Jailbreaks

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Multiple open-weight Large Language Models (LLMs)—specifically those prioritizing capability over safety alignment—exhibit a critical vulnerability to adaptive multi-turn prompt injection and jailbreak attacks. While these models effectively reject isolated, single-turn adversarial inputs (averaging ~13.11% Attack Success Rate), they fail to maintain safety guardrails and policy enforcement across extended conversational contexts. By leveraging iterative strategies such as "Crescendo" (gradual…

Death by a Thousand Prompts: Open Model Vulnerability Analysis
Evaluated models: GPT-oss 20B, Llama 3.3 70B Instruct, Mistral Large 2+5 more
  • GPT-oss 20B
  • Llama 3.3 70B Instruct
  • Mistral Large 2
  • DeepSeek V3.1
  • Qwen 3 32B
  • Gemma 3 1B
  • Phi-4
  • GLM 4.5 Air

Autonomous Jailbreak Evolution

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to an automated, self-evolving jailbreak attack framework known as ASTRA (Automated Strategy Discovery, Retrieval, and Evolution). This vulnerability exists because current safety alignment mechanisms (such as RLHF) fail to generalize defenses against dynamically distilled and retrieved attack strategies. ASTRA operates on a closed-loop "attack-evaluate-distill-reuse" mechanism. An attacker LLM generates prompts; a separate strategy extractor…

ASTRA: An Automated Framework for Strategy Discovery, Retrieval, and Evolution for Jailbreaking LLMs
Evaluated models: Llama 3 8B Instruct, Llama 3 70B Instruct, DeepSeek R1 0528+5 more
  • Llama 3 8B Instruct
  • Llama 3 70B Instruct
  • DeepSeek R1 0528
  • GPT-4o 2024-08-06
  • GPT-4.1 2025-04-14
  • Gemini 2.0 Flash 001
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash Preview 04-17
  • Claude 3.7 Sonnet 20250219

Meta-Optimized LLM Judge Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in Large Language Models (LLMs) allows for systematic jailbreaking through a meta-optimization framework called AMIS (Align to MISalign). The attack uses a bi-level optimization process to co-evolve both the jailbreak prompts and the scoring templates used to evaluate them.

Align to Misalign: Automatic LLM Jailbreak with Meta-Optimized LLM Judges
Evaluated models: Claude 3.5 Haiku, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Claude Sonnet 4+3 more
  • Claude 3.5 Haiku
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • Claude Sonnet 4
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Llama 3.1 8B Instruct

Latent Space Discontinuity Exploitation

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in certain Large Language Models and diffusion models due to discontinuities in their latent space, which arise from data sparsity during training. An attacker can craft inputs containing lexically rare or semantically ambiguous constructs to guide the model's inference process toward these unstable, poorly-conditioned regions. This technique, termed "Alignment Degradation Induction," can degrade or bypass safety alignment mechanisms. Through iterative, multi-turn…

Exploiting Latent Space Discontinuities for Building Universal LLM Jailbreaks and Data Extraction Attacks
Evaluated models: Not reported

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.