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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

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230 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Adaptive LLM Agent Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

LLM agents utilizing external tools are vulnerable to indirect prompt injection (IPI) attacks. Attackers can embed malicious instructions into the external data accessed by the agent, manipulating its behavior even when defenses against direct prompt injection are in place. Adaptive attacks, which modify the injected payload based on the specific defense mechanism, consistently bypass existing defenses with a success rate exceeding 50%.

Adaptive Attacks Break Defenses Against Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks on LLM Agents
Evaluated models: Llama 3 8B, Vicuna 7B

Attention-Based Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in large language models (LLMs) allows attackers to bypass safety-alignment mechanisms by manipulating the model's internal attention weights. The attack, termed "Attention Eclipse," modifies the attention scores between specific tokens within a prompt, either amplifying or suppressing attention to selectively strengthen or weaken the influence of certain parts of the prompt on the model's output. This allows injection of malicious content while appearing benign to the model's…

Attention Eclipse: Manipulating Attention to Bypass LLM Safety-Alignment
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4o Mini, Llama 2 13B Chat+3 more
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Llama 2 13B Chat
  • Llama 2 70B Chat
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Vicuna 13B

Agent-in-the-Middle Attack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in the communication mechanisms of Large Language Model (LLM)-based Multi-Agent Systems (LLM-MAS) enabling an Agent-in-the-Middle (AiTM) attack. An attacker can intercept and manipulate messages between agents, causing the victim agent to produce malicious outputs. The attack does not require compromising individual agents directly; instead, it leverages contextual manipulation of inter-agent communications.

Red-Teaming LLM Multi-Agent Systems via Communication Attacks
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4o

Context-Coherent LLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A context-coherent jailbreak attack (CCJA) allows bypassing safety mechanisms in aligned large language models (LLMs) by optimizing perturbations in the continuous word embedding space of a masked language model (MLM). The attack leverages the MLM's ability to reconstruct text from hidden states to generate semantically coherent yet malicious prompts that induce the target LLM to produce unsafe outputs, even with strong safety alignment. The attack's effectiveness is enhanced by using a seed…

CCJA: Context-Coherent Jailbreak Attack for Aligned Large Language Models
Evaluated models: Guanaco 13B, Llama 2 7B Chat, Llama 3 8B Instruct+4 more
  • Guanaco 13B
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Llama 3 8B Instruct
  • Mistral 7B Instruct v0.2
  • Mistral 7B Instruct v0.3
  • Vicuna 13B v1.5
  • Vicuna 7B v1.5

LLM Syntax Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to structure transformation attacks, where malicious prompts are encoded in diverse syntax spaces (e.g., SQL, JSON, LLM-generated syntaxes) to bypass safety mechanisms. These attacks maintain the harmful intent while altering the linguistic structure, making detection based on token-level patterns ineffective.

StructTransform: A Scalable Attack Surface for Safety-Aligned Large Language Models
Evaluated models: BERT, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, GPT-4o+5 more
  • BERT
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 3 8B
  • Llama 3.2 3B
  • Llama 3.2 90B
  • Mistral 7B
  • o1

Single Image Universal Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are vulnerable to a universal adversarial attack where a single, optimized image can bypass safety alignment mechanisms across diverse textual queries. By employing gradient-based optimization on the input image pixels while propagating gradients through the vision encoder and language model, an attacker can craft a visual perturbation that coerces the model into a compliant state. When this adversarial image is present in the context, the model’s…

Universal Adversarial Attack on Multimodal Aligned LLMs
Evaluated models: LLaVA 1.5 7B, Llama 3.2 11B Vision Instruct, Phi-3.5 Vision Instruct+1 more
  • LLaVA 1.5 7B
  • Llama 3.2 11B Vision Instruct
  • Phi-3.5 Vision Instruct
  • Qwen2-VL 2B Instruct

Universal Jailbreak Injection

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

JailbreakEdit is a novel attack that injects a universal jailbreak backdoor into safety-aligned Large Language Models (LLMs) by exploiting model editing techniques. The attack modifies specific parameters within the model's feed-forward networks, creating shortcuts that bypass internal safety mechanisms and trigger jailbroken responses to a wide range of prompts, including those containing sensitive or harmful content. The attack requires only one-time parameter modification, making it…

Injecting Universal Jailbreak Backdoors into LLMs in Minutes
Evaluated models: ChatGLM 6B, Llama 2 13B Chat, Llama 2 7B+2 more
  • ChatGLM 6B
  • Llama 2 13B Chat
  • Llama 2 7B
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Vicuna 7B

Guardrail Bypass Harmful Fine-tuning

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

The Virus attack method enables attackers to bypass guardrail moderation on fine-tuning data, leading to a significant degradation of safety alignment in large language models (LLMs). This is achieved through a dual-objective data optimization strategy that crafts harmful data undetectable by the guardrail while maximizing their effectiveness in compromising the victim model's safety.

Virus: Harmful Fine-tuning Attack for Large Language Models Bypassing Guardrail Moderation
Evaluated models: Llama 3 8B, Llama Guard 2

LLM Hate Campaign Vulnerability

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) used in hate speech detection systems are vulnerable to adversarial attacks and model stealing, resulting in evasion of hate speech detection. Adversarial attacks modify hate speech text to evade detection, while model stealing creates surrogate models that mimic the target system's behavior.

HateBench: Benchmarking Hate Speech Detectors on LLM-Generated Content and Hate Campaigns
Evaluated models: Baichuan 2, Dolly 2, GPT-3.5 Turbo+2 more
  • Baichuan 2
  • Dolly 2
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • OPT

Scientific Language Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to malicious prompts disguised as summaries of scientific papers, even when those papers are fabricated by the attacker. This allows attackers to manipulate LLMs into generating responses exhibiting significantly increased stereotypical bias and toxicity. The vulnerability is exacerbated by multi-turn interactions, where bias scores tend to increase with each subsequent response. The inclusion of author names and publication venues in the fabricated…

LLMs are Vulnerable to Malicious Prompts Disguised as Scientific Language
Evaluated models: Command R+, GPT-4, GPT-4o+3 more
  • Command R+
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Llama 3.1 70B Instruct
  • Llama 3.1 405B Instruct

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.