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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

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204 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Hidden Contextual Bias

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Multiple Large Language Models (LLMs), including GPT-4o, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Gemini 2.5 Flash, Gemma-2 27B, Gemma-3, and Mistral-Small-24B, exhibit a vulnerability where safety guardrails against demographic bias are bypassed through realistic contextual prompting. While prompt-based mitigations effectively suppress bias in simplified, controlled benchmarks, the introduction of realistic hiring contexts—specifically the combination of company culture descriptions (sourced from public career…

Robustly Improving LLM Fairness in Realistic Settings via Interpretability
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Claude Sonnet 4+5 more
  • GPT-4o
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • Claude Sonnet 4
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash
  • Mistral Small 24B Instruct 2501
  • Gemma 2 27B IT
  • Gemma 3 12B IT
  • Gemma 3 27B IT

Agent API Goal Divergence

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Model (LLM) agents capable of invoking external APIs are vulnerable to intent integrity violations. When an agent receives natural language instructions that are ambiguous, underspecified, or contain values not supported by the underlying API schema, the agent frequently fails to preserve user intent. Instead of rejecting the request or asking for clarification, the model may hallucinate parameter values, map unsupported requests to unsafe defaults, or execute actions on…

TAI3: Testing Agent Integrity in Interpreting User Intent
Evaluated models: GPT-4o Mini, Llama 3.1 8B, Qwen 3 30B-A3B+5 more
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Qwen 3 30B-A3B
  • Llama 3.3 70B
  • DeepSeek R1 Distill Llama 70B
  • Claude 3.5 Haiku
  • Gemini 2.5 Pro
  • o3-mini

Agentic Red-Teaming Uncovers Novel Jailbreaks

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to jailbreaking through an agentic attack framework called Composition of Principles (CoP). This technique uses an attacker LLM (Red-Teaming Agent) to dynamically select and combine multiple human-defined, high-level transformations ("principles") into a single, sophisticated prompt. The composition of several simple principles, such as expanding context, rephrasing, and inserting specific phrases, creates complex adversarial prompts that can bypass…

CoP: Agentic Red-teaming for Large Language Models using Composition of Principles
Evaluated models: Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Gemini 1.5 Pro, Gemma 7B IT+11 more
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • Gemini 1.5 Pro
  • Gemma 7B IT
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4 Turbo
  • GPT-4o
  • Grok 2
  • Llama 2 13B
  • Llama 2 13B Chat
  • Llama 2 70B Chat
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Llama 3 70B Instruct
  • Llama 3 8B Instruct
  • o1

Deceptive CoT Rationalization

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in Chain-of-Thought (CoT) monitoring protocols where trusted monitor models can be deceived by deceptive reasoning traces generated by untrusted models. Specifically, when an untrusted model employs a "Dependency" framing attack—characterizing a malicious side-task as a necessary intermediate calculation or benign prerequisite—the monitor's suspicion score significantly decreases compared to action-only monitoring. This creates a paradox where providing the monitor with…

CoT Red-Handed: Stress Testing Chain-of-Thought Monitoring
Evaluated models: Claude 3.5 Haiku, Gemini 2.5 Flash-Lite, GPT-4.1 Mini+3 more
  • Claude 3.5 Haiku
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash-Lite
  • GPT-4.1 Mini
  • GPT-4.1 Nano
  • DeepSeek R1
  • Claude 3.7 Sonnet Thinking

VLM Navigation Object Fusion

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

The Vision-Language Model (VLM) perception module in Vision-and-Language Navigation (VLN) agents is vulnerable to adversarial 3D object injection via the Adversarial Object Fusion (AdvOF) framework. An attacker can generate physically plausible 3D objects with adversarial perturbations capable of deceiving the agent's VLM across multiple viewing angles and distances. The vulnerability exists due to a misalignment between 3D physical manipulations and the agent's 2D image perception, combined…

Disrupting Vision-Language Model-Driven Navigation Services via Adversarial Object Fusion
Evaluated models: Not reported

Hybrid Agent Prompt Injection

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Computer-Use Agents (CUAs) powered by Large Language Models (LLMs) operating in hybrid Web-OS environments are vulnerable to indirect prompt injection. Attackers can embed malicious natural language or code instructions within legitimate web content (e.g., social media forums, chat applications, shared cloud documents) that the agent processes during benign task execution. Due to the agent's inability to distinguish between trusted user instructions and untrusted environmental data, the CUA…

RedTeamCUA: Realistic Adversarial Testing of Computer-Use Agents in Hybrid Web-OS Environments
Evaluated models: Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Claude 3.7 Sonnet, GPT-4o

Conditional Prompt Hijack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

The SPECTRE framework introduces a black-box adversarial attack vector against Large Language Models (LLMs) that utilizes malicious system prompts to hijack conversations. Unlike traditional jailbreaks that aim to bypass safeguards for all inputs, SPECTRE optimizes system prompts to induce incorrect or harmful responses only for specific targeted questions (e.g., "Are COVID vaccines safe?", "Who should I vote for?"), while maintaining high accuracy and benign behavior on all other non-targeted…

SPECTRE: Conditional System Prompt Poisoning to Hijack LLMs
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4o Mini, Llama 2 7B+8 more
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Llama 2 7B
  • Llama 2 13B
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • DeepSeek 7B
  • Qwen 2.5 3B
  • Qwen 2.5 7B
  • Qwen 2.5 14B
  • Qwen 2.5 32B
  • Pythia 12B

Informed Adversary LLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) employing alignment-based defenses against prompt injection and jailbreak attacks exhibit vulnerability to an informed white-box attack. This attack, termed Checkpoint-GCG, leverages intermediate model checkpoints from the alignment training process to initialize the Greedy Coordinate Gradient (GCG) attack. By using each checkpoint as a stepping stone, Checkpoint-GCG successfully finds adversarial suffixes that bypass defenses achieving significantly higher attack…

Alignment Under Pressure: The Case for Informed Adversaries When Evaluating LLM Defenses
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4o, Llama 3 8B Instruct+1 more
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 3 8B Instruct
  • Mistral 7B Instruct

On-Device LLM Hijacking

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Mobile LLM agents utilizing vision-based screen perception (OCR or Multimodal Large Language Models) are vulnerable to Visual Prompt Injection via malicious GUI overlays. An attacker holding the SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW permission can deploy non-focusable floating windows (using FLAG_NOT_FOCUSABLE) containing adversarial text or fabricated UI elements over legitimate applications. Because the agent captures the entire screen buffer to interpret the device state, it ingests the adversarial overlay…

From Assistants to Adversaries: Exploring the Security Risks of Mobile LLM Agents
Evaluated models: GPT-4o

Embodied Agent Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) used in Vision-and-Language Navigation (VLN) systems are vulnerable to jailbreak attacks. Adversarially crafted natural language instructions, even when disguised within seemingly benign prompts, can bypass safety mechanisms and cause the VLN agent to perform unintended or harmful actions in both simulated and real-world environments. The attacks exploit the MLLM's ability to follow instructions without sufficient consideration of the consequences of…

BadNAVer: Exploring Jailbreak Attacks On Vision-and-Language Navigation
Evaluated models: Gemini 2.0 Flash, GPT-4o, GPT-4o Mini+3 more
  • Gemini 2.0 Flash
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • InternVL3 8B
  • LLaVA 1.6 Mistral 7B
  • Qwen 2.5 VL 7B Instruct

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.