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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

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204 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Benign Mirroring Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to stealthy jailbreak attacks leveraging benign data mirroring. Attackers train a local "mirror model" on benign data obtained from the target LLM. This mirror model, mimicking the target's behavior, is then used to generate adversarial prompts, which are subsequently deployed against the target LLM, bypassing content moderation systems due to the lack of overtly malicious content in the initial data gathering phase.

Stealthy Jailbreak Attacks on Large Language Models via Benign Data Mirroring
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4o Mini, Llama 2 Chat+1 more
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Llama 2 Chat
  • Llama 3 8B Instruct

PC-Bias Jailbreak Vulnerability

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) trained with safety mechanisms exhibit biases which disproportionately allow successful "jailbreak" attacks (circumvention of safety protocols to generate harmful content) when targeting prompts related to marginalized groups compared to privileged groups. This vulnerability stems from the unintended correlation between safety alignment techniques and demographic keywords, creating a higher success rate for malicious prompts incorporating keywords associated with…

Biasjailbreak: analyzing ethical biases and jailbreak vulnerabilities in large language models
Evaluated models: Claude 3.5 Sonnet, GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4+5 more
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 2 13B
  • Llama 2 7B
  • Llama 3 8B
  • Qwen 2 7B

Fine-tuning Safety Bypass

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs), even those initially aligned for safety, are vulnerable to having their safety mechanisms compromised through fine-tuning on a small number of adversarially-crafted or even seemingly benign sentences. Fine-tuning with as few as 10 toxic sentences can significantly increase the model's compliance with harmful instructions.

Locking down the finetuned llms safety
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4, Llama 3 70B Chat+4 more
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • Llama 3 70B Chat
  • Llama 3 70B Instruct
  • Llama-3-8B Chat
  • Llama 3 8B Instruct
  • Mistral-large-2 123B

Gradient Image Jailbreaks

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Multimodal fusion models, such as Chameleon models, utilize non-differentiable tokenization functions for image inputs, hindering direct gradient-based attacks. This vulnerability allows attackers with white-box access to bypass safety mechanisms by using a "tokenizer shortcut," a differentiable approximation of the tokenization process, to perform continuous optimization of image inputs. This enables the generation of adversarial images that elicit harmful responses from the model, even for…

Gradient-based jailbreak images for multimodal fusion models
Evaluated models: Chameleon 30B, Chameleon 7B, LLaVA 1.6 Llama 3

RAG Worm Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Jailbreaking vulnerabilities in Large Language Models (LLMs) used in Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems allow escalation of attacks from entity extraction to full document extraction and enable the propagation of self-replicating malicious prompts ("worms") within interconnected RAG applications. Exploitation leverages prompt injection to force the LLM to return retrieved documents or execute malicious actions specified within the prompt.

Unleashing worms and extracting data: Escalating the outcome of attacks against rag-based inference in scale and severity using jailbreaking
Evaluated models: Gemini 1.5 Flash

Single-Turn LLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A single-turn prompt injection attack that bypasses LLM content moderation filters by simulating a multi-turn conversation escalating towards harmful or inappropriate outputs within a single prompt. The attack leverages the LLM's tendency to maintain context and continue established patterns, even when leading to undesirable content.

Well, that escalated quickly: The Single-Turn Crescendo Attack (STCA)
Evaluated models: GPT-4, GPT-4o, GPT-4o Mini+4 more
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Llama 3 8B
  • Llama 3 70B
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Llama 3.1 70B

Attack LLMs with Toxic Answers

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a targeted jailbreak attack, termed Atoxia, which can force the generation of specific harmful content. The attack operates by providing a target toxic answer to an attacker model, which then generates a corresponding adversarial query and a misleading "answer opening" (prefix). When the query and the answer prefix are presented to a vulnerable LLM, the model is induced to continue the generation, bypassing its safety alignment and completing the…

Atoxia: Red-teaming Large Language Models with Target Toxic Answers
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4, GPT-4o+5 more
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Llama 3 8B Instruct
  • Mistral 7B
  • Vicuna 7B v1.5

GCG Suffix Data Exfiltration

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A Cross-Prompt Injection Attack (XPIA) can be amplified by appending a Greedy Coordinate Gradient (GCG) suffix to the malicious injection. This increases the likelihood that a Large Language Model (LLM) will execute the injected instruction, even in the presence of a user's primary instruction, leading to data exfiltration. The success rate of the attack depends on the LLM's complexity; medium-complexity models show increased vulnerability.

WHITE PAPER: A Brief Exploration of Data Exfiltration using GCG Suffixes
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4o, Phi 3 Mini

Hidden-Intent LLM Evasion

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to adversarial attacks that employ conversation strategies to elicit harmful information through seemingly benign dialogues. The attack, termed "Imposter.AI," leverages three key strategies: (1) decomposing malicious questions into innocuous sub-questions; (2) rephrasing overtly malicious questions into benign-sounding alternatives; and (3) enhancing the harmfulness of responses by prompting the LLM for illustrative examples. This allows attackers to…

Imposter. ai: Adversarial attacks with hidden intentions towards aligned large language models
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4, Llama 2 13B+1 more
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • Llama 2 13B
  • WizardLM 13B

Continuous Embedding Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in large language models (LLMs) allows attackers to generate harmful content by manipulating the continuous input embeddings without appending suffixes or using specific questions. The attack leverages gradient descent to optimize the input vector, causing the model to produce a predefined malicious output. Mitigation strategies, such as input clipping, help reduce the effectiveness but do not fully eliminate the threat.

Continuous Embedding Attacks via Clipped Inputs in Jailbreaking Large Language Models
Evaluated models: Llama 7B

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.