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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

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736 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

LLM Grading Compliance Paradox

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) employed as automated code evaluators ("Universal Graders") are vulnerable to Semantic-Instruction Decoupling, a form of adversarial prompt injection that exploits the "Syntax-Semantics Gap." Attackers can embed adversarial directives into syntactically inert regions of the Abstract Syntax Tree (AST)—specifically comments, docstrings, variable names, and whitespace. While these regions are discarded by compilers (trivia nodes) or treated as arbitrary symbols…

The Compliance Paradox: Semantic-Instruction Decoupling in Automated Academic Code Evaluation
Evaluated models: GPT-5, Llama 3.1 8B, DeepSeek V3

LLM Router Rerouting

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

LLM routing systems are vulnerable to adversarial rerouting attacks where malicious triggers prepended to user queries manipulate the router's model-selection mechanism. Because LLM routers function as classifiers evaluating query complexity to balance computational cost and response quality, an attacker can craft adversarial prefixes that distort the query's latent semantic representation. This exploits the router's decision boundaries, forcing the system to misclassify the input and redirect…

RerouteGuard: Understanding and Mitigating Adversarial Risks for LLM Routing
Evaluated models: GPT-4, GPT-4o, GPT-5+2 more
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-5
  • Llama 3 8B
  • Mixtral 8x7B

Pathological Reasoning DoS

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) allows attackers to perform Prompt-Induced Inference-Time Denial-of-Service (PI-DoS) attacks by submitting short, semantically coherent adversarial prompts. These prompts, which often take the form of complex logic puzzles with nested dependencies or contradictory constraints, exploit the adaptive computation mechanism of LRMs to force the model into pathologically long, nearly non-terminating intermediate reasoning traces (e.g., generating…

ReasoningBomb: A Stealthy Denial-of-Service Attack by Inducing Pathologically Long Reasoning in Large Reasoning Models
Evaluated models: DeepSeek V3, Kimi K2 Instruct, DeepSeek R1+8 more
  • DeepSeek V3
  • Kimi K2 Instruct
  • DeepSeek R1
  • DeepSeek R1 Distill Qwen 32B
  • MiniMax M2
  • Nemotron 3 Nano 30B-A3B
  • Qwen 3 30B-A3B Thinking
  • Qwen 3 32B
  • Claude Sonnet 4.5
  • GPT-5
  • Gemini 3 Pro Preview

Persona Adherence Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) deployed as Role-Playing Agents (RPAs) are vulnerable to Persona-Targeted Jailbreaks. When an LLM is prompted to adopt a persona—particularly characters with negative, risky, or villainous traits—the model's optimization for role fidelity frequently overrides its foundational safety alignment. Attackers can exploit this vulnerability by synthesizing queries that leverage the specific narrative background, ideology, or psychological vulnerabilities of the assigned…

Stay in Character, Stay Safe: Dual-Cycle Adversarial Self-Evolution for Safety Role-Playing Agents
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Llama 3 8B, Qwen 2.5 7B+1 more
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 3 8B
  • Qwen 2.5 7B
  • Gemma 2 9B

Agent Over-Trigger Containment

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Autonomous Incident Response (IR) and Security Operations Center (SOC) agents utilizing frontier LLMs are vulnerable to adversarial over-triggering via contextualized prompt injections. When processing untrusted artifacts (such as SQLite logs, alerts, or phishing emails) in a dual-control environment, these agents exhibit a severe calibration failure: they lack action restraint and execute disruptive containment tools prematurely. Attackers can exploit this by embedding T2 (contextualized…

OpenSec: Measuring Incident Response Agent Calibration Under Adversarial Evidence
Evaluated models: GPT-5.2, Claude Sonnet 4.5, DeepSeek V3.2+1 more
  • GPT-5.2
  • Claude Sonnet 4.5
  • DeepSeek V3.2
  • Qwen 3 4B Instruct

Intent-Context Coupling Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs), including GPT-4o, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, and Llama 3, are vulnerable to an "Intent-Context Coupling" multi-turn jailbreak attack (automated by the ICON framework). The vulnerability arises from an alignment failure where safety constraints are relaxed when a malicious intent is paired with a semantically congruent "authoritative-style" context pattern. By routing specific prohibited intents (e.g., Hacking) to pre-optimized context patterns (e.g., Scientific Research…

ICON: Intent-Context Coupling for Efficient Multi-Turn Jailbreak Attack
Evaluated models: Llama 4 Maverick Instruct, Llama 3.1 405B Instruct, Qwen-Max 2025-01-25+8 more
  • Llama 4 Maverick Instruct
  • Llama 3.1 405B Instruct
  • Qwen-Max 2025-01-25
  • DeepSeek V3.2
  • GPT-5.1 2025-11-13
  • GPT-4o 2024-11-20
  • Claude Sonnet 4.5 20250929
  • Gemini 3 Pro Preview
  • Llama Guard 3 8B
  • Llama Guard 4 12B
  • WildGuard

LLM Soft Hate Policy Bypass

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) and dedicated content moderation systems (including safety guards and encoder-based classifiers) are vulnerable to "Soft Hate" evasion attacks. This vulnerability arises when hostile standpoints are encoded through defeasible reasoning structures—specifically formalized by the Argumentum Model of Topics (AMT)—rather than explicit lexical toxicity. Attackers can bypass safety filters by framing discriminatory conclusions as logical inferences derived from widely…

SoftHateBench: Evaluating Moderation Models Against Reasoning-Driven, Policy-Compliant Hostility
Evaluated models: HateBERT, HateRoBERTa, Llama Guard 3 1B+7 more
  • HateBERT
  • HateRoBERTa
  • Llama Guard 3 1B
  • Qwen 3 Guard 4B
  • ShieldGemma 2B
  • DeepSeek V3.1
  • GPT-5 Mini
  • Llama 3.2 3B
  • Gemma 3 4B
  • Qwen 3 4B

Hard-Negative Prompt Evasion

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Embedding-based LLM prompt injection detectors, specifically those based on the DeBERTa-v3 architecture, are vulnerable to adversarial evasion attacks utilizing "hard-negative" mining and fuzzing techniques. Attackers can circumvent detection mechanisms by iteratively generating adversarial prompts that are semantically malicious but structurally mutated to evade the classifier's decision boundary. Specific evasion vectors identified include semantic fuzzing (paraphrasing), syntactic fuzzing…

Proactive Hardening of LLM Defenses with HASTE
Evaluated models: GPT-4o

VLM Text Overrides Image

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in multiple state-of-the-art Vision-Language Models (VLMs), including GPT-4o, Gemini-2.5, and LLaVA-OneVision, where persuasive textual misinformation successfully overrides visual evidence. When a model is presented with an image it can correctly interpret, an attacker can inject a contradictory text prompt employing specific rhetorical strategies (Logical, Credibility, Emotional, or Repetition) to force the model into generating a false response. This "obedience bias"…

Do Images Speak Louder than Words? Investigating the Effect of Textual Misinformation in VLMs
Evaluated models: Qwen 2.5 VL 3B Instruct, Qwen 2.5 VL 7B Instruct, InternVL3 1B+8 more
  • Qwen 2.5 VL 3B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 VL 7B Instruct
  • InternVL3 1B
  • InternVL3 2B
  • InternVL3 8B
  • LLaVA-OneVision 0.5B
  • LLaVA-OneVision 7B
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash
  • Gemini 2.5 Pro
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • GPT-4o

LLM Agent Disguised URL Bypass

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) acting as web agents exhibit a vulnerability in their decision-making process when validating external URLs. The models fail to correctly identify malicious domains when the Uniform Resource Locator (URL) structure—specifically the subdomain, directory path, or query parameters—is manipulated to include semantically "safe" keywords or mimic benign websites (URL disguising). Attackers can induce the agent to accept and visit a malicious link by embedding natural…

MalURLBench: A Benchmark Evaluating Agents' Vulnerabilities When Processing Web URLs
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5, GPT-4o, Llama 2 7B+4 more
  • GPT-3.5
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 2 7B
  • Llama 3 8B
  • Mistral 7B
  • DeepSeek V3
  • Mixtral 8x7B

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.