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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

Filtered research findings

610 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Hard-Negative Prompt Evasion

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Embedding-based LLM prompt injection detectors, specifically those based on the DeBERTa-v3 architecture, are vulnerable to adversarial evasion attacks utilizing "hard-negative" mining and fuzzing techniques. Attackers can circumvent detection mechanisms by iteratively generating adversarial prompts that are semantically malicious but structurally mutated to evade the classifier's decision boundary. Specific evasion vectors identified include semantic fuzzing (paraphrasing), syntactic fuzzing…

Proactive Hardening of LLM Defenses with HASTE
Evaluated models: GPT-4o

VLM Text Overrides Image

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in multiple state-of-the-art Vision-Language Models (VLMs), including GPT-4o, Gemini-2.5, and LLaVA-OneVision, where persuasive textual misinformation successfully overrides visual evidence. When a model is presented with an image it can correctly interpret, an attacker can inject a contradictory text prompt employing specific rhetorical strategies (Logical, Credibility, Emotional, or Repetition) to force the model into generating a false response. This "obedience bias"…

Do Images Speak Louder than Words? Investigating the Effect of Textual Misinformation in VLMs
Evaluated models: Qwen 2.5 VL 3B Instruct, Qwen 2.5 VL 7B Instruct, InternVL3 1B+8 more
  • Qwen 2.5 VL 3B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 VL 7B Instruct
  • InternVL3 1B
  • InternVL3 2B
  • InternVL3 8B
  • LLaVA-OneVision 0.5B
  • LLaVA-OneVision 7B
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash
  • Gemini 2.5 Pro
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • GPT-4o

LLM Agent Disguised URL Bypass

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) acting as web agents exhibit a vulnerability in their decision-making process when validating external URLs. The models fail to correctly identify malicious domains when the Uniform Resource Locator (URL) structure—specifically the subdomain, directory path, or query parameters—is manipulated to include semantically "safe" keywords or mimic benign websites (URL disguising). Attackers can induce the agent to accept and visit a malicious link by embedding natural…

MalURLBench: A Benchmark Evaluating Agents' Vulnerabilities When Processing Web URLs
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5, GPT-4o, Llama 2 7B+4 more
  • GPT-3.5
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 2 7B
  • Llama 3 8B
  • Mistral 7B
  • DeepSeek V3
  • Mixtral 8x7B

Personalization Intent Legitimation

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Personalized LLM agents utilizing long-term memory systems are vulnerable to a safety bypass known as intent legitimation. Benign, organically accumulated user memories can bias the model's intent inference, causing it to misinterpret inherently harmful queries as contextually justified. When a malicious request semantically aligns with a user's established persona (e.g., hobbies, mental health history, routine), the model normalizes the request and complies, effectively bypassing standard…

When Personalization Legitimizes Risks: Uncovering Safety Vulnerabilities in Personalized Dialogue Agents
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, GPT-4o Mini, DeepSeek V3.2+2 more
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • DeepSeek V3.2
  • Qwen 3 235B-A22B
  • Qwen 3 8B

MCP Server-Side Injection

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) specification v1.0 contains fundamental architectural vulnerabilities enabling server-side prompt injection and privilege escalation. The protocol relies on bidirectional sampling (sampling/createMessage) without cryptographic origin authentication or UI distinction, allowing connected servers to inject content that the LLM backend interprets as legitimate user input. Additionally, the protocol lacks isolation boundaries between concurrent server connections…

Breaking the Protocol: Security Analysis of the Model Context Protocol Specification and Prompt Injection Vulnerabilities in Tool-Integrated LLM Agents
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Llama 3.1 70B

Visual Object Injection

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) are vulnerable to Physical Prompt Injection Attacks (PPIA), a query-agnostic injection technique delivered via the visual modality. The vulnerability stems from the model's "Vision-Enabled Text Recognition" capabilities and "Identity Sensitivity," where the model interprets text embedded in the physical environment (e.g., printed on signs, posters, or objects) as high-priority instructions rather than passive visual data. An attacker can embed adversarial…

Physical Prompt Injection Attacks on Large Vision-Language Models
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, GPT-4o Mini, GPT-4 Turbo+7 more
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • GPT-4 Turbo
  • Gemini 1.5 Pro Latest
  • Gemini 1.5 Pro 002
  • Gemini 1.5 Flash Latest
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet Latest
  • Claude 3.5 Haiku 20241022
  • Llama 3.2 11B Vision
  • Llama 3.2 90B Vision Instruct

VLM Moral Persuasion

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Vision-Language Models (VLMs) exhibit a vulnerability to moral judgment flipping, where the model's safety alignment can be bypassed through lightweight, model-agnostic multimodal perturbations. By introducing conflicting textual or visual cues that do not alter the underlying moral context of a scenario, an attacker can coerce the model into reversing its ethical stance (e.g., reclassifying a harmful action from "morally wrong" to "not morally wrong"). This vulnerability exploits the model's…

Do VLMs Have a Moral Backbone? A Study on the Fragile Morality of Vision-Language Models
Evaluated models: Qwen 2.5 VL 3B Instruct, Qwen 2.5 VL 7B Instruct, Qwen 2.5 VL 32B Instruct+20 more
  • Qwen 2.5 VL 3B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 VL 7B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 VL 32B Instruct
  • Qwen3-VL 2B Instruct
  • Qwen3-VL 4B Instruct
  • Qwen3-VL 8B Instruct
  • Qwen3-VL 30B-A3B Instruct
  • InternVL3 2B Instruct
  • InternVL3 8B Instruct
  • InternVL3 14B Instruct
  • InternVL3 38B Instruct
  • InternVL3.5 4B Instruct
  • InternVL3.5 8B Instruct
  • InternVL3.5 14B Instruct
  • InternVL3.5 38B Instruct
  • LLaVA 1.5 7B
  • LLaVA 1.5 13B
  • LLaVA v1.6 Vicuna 7B
  • LLaVA v1.6 Vicuna 13B
  • LLaVA v1.6 34B
  • Gemma 3 4B IT
  • Gemma 3 12B IT
  • Gemma 3 27B IT

Activation-Level Privacy Leak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Conversational Large Language Model (LLM) agents integrated with privileged data sources (e.g., medical records, organizational emails) are vulnerable to contextually inappropriate information disclosure due to failures in enforcing Contextual Integrity (CI) norms. Standard semantic input/output filters and generic safety guardrails (e.g., Llama Guard) fail to detect "mosaic attacks" and multi-turn conversational manipulation. In these attacks, adversaries decompose a malicious query into a…

NeuroFilter: Privacy Guardrails for Conversational LLM Agents
Evaluated models: GPT-oss 20B, Llama 3.3 70B Instruct, Qwen 2.5 7B+3 more
  • GPT-oss 20B
  • Llama 3.3 70B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 7B
  • Qwen 2.5 14B
  • Qwen 2.5 32B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 72B

Confident Misinformation Hallucination

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in large language models (LLMs) allows attackers to induce factually incorrect outputs by injecting misinformation into prompts framed with strong confidence. By using authoritative phrasing (e.g., "As we know..."), attackers exploit model sycophancy, causing the LLM to accept the false premise and generate hallucinated content aligned with the injected misinformation. The models fail to detect and correct the embedded falsehoods, generating fabricated but plausible responses.

AdversaRiskQA: An Adversarial Factuality Benchmark for High-Risk Domains
Evaluated models: GPT-oss 20B, GPT-oss 120B, GPT-5+3 more
  • GPT-oss 20B
  • GPT-oss 120B
  • GPT-5
  • Qwen 3 4B Instruct
  • Qwen 3 30B-A3B Instruct
  • Qwen 3 Next 80B-A3B Instruct

LLM Judge Framing Bias

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

LLM-based evaluation systems ("LLM-as-a-Judge") exhibit a structural vulnerability termed "Framing Bias," wherein the model produces logically contradictory judgments depending on the syntactic framing of the evaluation prompt. Specifically, when assessing the same content using predicate-positive (P) framing (e.g., "Is this toxic?") versus predicate-negative (¬P) framing (e.g., "Is this non-toxic?"), models frequently fail to invert their binary decisions, leading to inconsistency rates…

When Wording Steers the Evaluation: Framing Bias in LLM judges
Evaluated models: Llama 3.2 1B Instruct, Llama 3.1 8B Instruct, Llama 3.1 70B Instruct+11 more
  • Llama 3.2 1B Instruct
  • Llama 3.1 8B Instruct
  • Llama 3.1 70B Instruct
  • Llama 3.3 70B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 1.5B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 3B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 7B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 14B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 32B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 72B Instruct
  • o4-mini
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-5 Mini
  • GPT-5

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.