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Last analyzed 9/9/2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1123 evaluated models

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230 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Published 6/1/2025
Analyzed 1/14/2026

Large Language Models (LLMs) that utilize byte-stream parsing or structural extraction to process PDF files—specifically the OpenAI GPT and Anthropic Claude families—are vulnerable to adversarial text injection via imperceptible "phantom tokens." This vulnerability exploits the disconnect between how PDF viewers render documents for humans (visual layer) and how LLMs extract text from the PDF operator stream (data layer). Attackers can manipulate standard PDF text-showing operators (TJ and Tj)…

TRAPDOC: Deceiving LLM Users by Injecting Imperceptible Phantom Tokens into Documents
Evaluated models: GPT-4, o4-mini

Source: arXiv

Published 6/1/2025
Analyzed 7/14/2025

Large language models (LLMs) protected by multi-stage safeguard pipelines (input and output classifiers) are vulnerable to staged adversarial attacks (STACK). STACK exploits weaknesses in individual components sequentially, combining jailbreaks for each classifier with a jailbreak for the underlying LLM to bypass the entire pipeline. Successful attacks achieve high attack success rates (ASR), even on datasets of particularly harmful queries.

STACK: Adversarial Attacks on LLM Safeguard Pipelines
Evaluated models: Claude Opus 4, Gemma 2 9B, GPT-4 Turbo +4 more

Source: arXiv

Published 6/1/2025
Analyzed 6/30/2025

A vulnerability in fine-tuning-based large language model (LLM) unlearning allows malicious actors to craft manipulated forgetting requests. By subtly increasing the frequency of common benign tokens within the forgetting data, the attacker can cause the unlearned model to exhibit unintended unlearning behaviors when these benign tokens appear in normal user prompts, leading to a degradation of model utility for legitimate users. This occurs because existing unlearning methods fail to…

Keeping an eye on llm unlearning: The hidden risk and remedy
Evaluated models: Llama 3.1 8B, Mistral 7B v0.3

Source: arXiv

Published 5/1/2025
Analyzed 9/7/2025

A vulnerability exists in multiple large language and multimodal models that allows for the bypass of safety filters through the use of code-mixed prompts with phonetic perturbations. An attacker can craft a prompt in a code-mixed language (e.g., Hinglish) and apply phonetic misspellings to sensitive keywords (e.g., spelling "hate" as "haet"). This technique causes the model's tokenizer to parse the sensitive word into benign sub-tokens, preventing safety mechanisms from flagging the harmful…

" Haet Bhasha aur Diskrimineshun": Phonetic Perturbations in Code-Mixed Hinglish to Red-Team LLMs
Evaluated models: Gemma 1.1 7B IT, GPT-4o, GPT-4o Mini +2 more

Source: arXiv

Published 5/1/2025
Analyzed 12/9/2025

Speech-LLMs Qwen2-Audio (7B-Instruct) and Granite-Speech (3.2-8b) are vulnerable to universal acoustic adversarial attacks. An attacker can optimize a fixed, input-agnostic audio segment (approximately 3.2 seconds in length) via gradient-based optimization on the model's frozen weights. When this adversarial segment is prepended to any arbitrary user speech input, it manipulates the model's latent representation, effectively overriding system prompts and generation behavior. This vulnerability…

Universal Acoustic Adversarial Attacks for Flexible Control of Speech-LLMs
Evaluated models: Qwen 2 7B

Source: arXiv

Published 5/1/2025
Analyzed 5/31/2025

Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) are vulnerable to implicit jailbreak attacks that leverage least significant bit (LSB) steganography to conceal malicious instructions within images. These instructions are coupled with seemingly benign image-related text prompts, causing the MLLM to execute the hidden malicious instructions. The attack bypasses existing safety mechanisms by exploiting cross-modal reasoning capabilities.

Implicit Jailbreak Attacks via Cross-Modal Information Concealment on Vision-Language Models
Evaluated models: Gemini 1.5 Pro, Gemini 2.5 Pro, GPT-4.5 +3 more

Source: arXiv

Published 5/1/2025
Analyzed 12/9/2025

Computer-Use Agents (CUAs) powered by Large Language Models (LLMs) operating in hybrid Web-OS environments are vulnerable to indirect prompt injection. Attackers can embed malicious natural language or code instructions within legitimate web content (e.g., social media forums, chat applications, shared cloud documents) that the agent processes during benign task execution. Due to the agent's inability to distinguish between trusted user instructions and untrusted environmental data, the CUA…

RedTeamCUA: Realistic Adversarial Testing of Computer-Use Agents in Hybrid Web-OS Environments
Evaluated models: Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Claude 3.7 Sonnet, GPT-4o

Source: arXiv

Published 5/1/2025
Analyzed 5/31/2025

Large Language Models (LLMs) used for evaluating text quality (LLM-as-a-Judge architectures) are vulnerable to prompt-injection attacks. Maliciously crafted suffixes appended to input text can manipulate the LLM's judgment, causing it to incorrectly favor a predetermined response even if another response is objectively superior. Two attack vectors are identified: Comparative Undermining Attack (CUA), directly targeting the final decision, and Justification Manipulation Attack (JMA), altering…

Investigating the Vulnerability of LLM-as-a-Judge Architectures to Prompt-Injection Attacks
Evaluated models: Falcon 3 3B Instruct, Qwen 2.5 3B Instruct

Source: arXiv

Published 5/1/2025
Analyzed 12/9/2025

Mobile LLM agents utilizing vision-based screen perception (OCR or Multimodal Large Language Models) are vulnerable to Visual Prompt Injection via malicious GUI overlays. An attacker holding the SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW permission can deploy non-focusable floating windows (using FLAG_NOT_FOCUSABLE) containing adversarial text or fabricated UI elements over legitimate applications. Because the agent captures the entire screen buffer to interpret the device state, it ingests the adversarial overlay…

From Assistants to Adversaries: Exploring the Security Risks of Mobile LLM Agents
Evaluated models: GPT-4o

Source: arXiv

Published 5/1/2025
Analyzed 5/31/2025

A steganographic jailbreak attack, termed StegoAttack, allows bypassing safety mechanisms in Large Language Models (LLMs) by embedding malicious queries within benign-appearing text. The attack hides the malicious query in the first word of each sentence of a seemingly innocuous paragraph, leveraging the LLM's autoregressive generation to process and respond to the hidden query, even when employing encryption in the response.

Hiding in Plain Sight: A Steganographic Approach to Stealthy LLM Jailbreaks
Evaluated models: GPT-5, DeepSeek V3.2 Thinking, Qwen 3 Max Thinking

Source: arXiv

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.