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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

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736 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Diffusion Context Nesting Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Diffusion Large Language Models (D-LLMs) are vulnerable to a "Context Nesting" attack that bypasses safety alignment mechanisms. While D-LLMs typically utilize a stepwise reduction effect during the iterative denoising process to suppress harmful content, this mechanism fails when harmful requests are embedded within benign, structured contexts. By wrapping a malicious query inside high-level structural templates (such as code completion, table filling, JSON, or YAML formats), an attacker can…

A Fragile Guardrail: Diffusion LLM's Safety Blessing and Its Failure Mode
Evaluated models: GPT-4o

Optimal Transport Bot Cloaking

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Graph Neural Network (GNN)-based social bot detection systems are vulnerable to an Optimal Transport (OT)-guided evasion attack that manipulates local graph structures under realistic domain constraints. By modeling $k$-hop ego-neighborhoods as probability measures over spatio-temporal features, an attacker can compute an optimal transport plan to identify "cloak templates" (existing bots near the decision boundary that are misclassified as humans). The attacker can then decode this plan into…

Optimal Transport-Guided Adversarial Attacks on Graph Neural Network-Based Bot Detection
Evaluated models: Not reported

Payment Protocol Whisper Attack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

The Google Agent Payments Protocol (AP2), specifically within the reference implementation built using the Google Agent Development Kit (ADK) and Gemini models, contains vulnerabilities allowing for both indirect and direct prompt injection. The architecture fails to sufficiently isolate the Large Language Model (LLM) context from untrusted external data sources and user inputs.

Whispers of Wealth: Red-Teaming Google's Agent Payments Protocol via Prompt Injection
Evaluated models: Gemini 2.5 Flash

Query-Agnostic Retrieval Poisoning

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in Large Language Model-based Retrieval (LLMR) systems allows attackers to intentionally hide specific documents from being retrieved (e.g., in RAG pipelines or search engines) by appending a small number of adversarially crafted, query-agnostic tokens. The attack operates in a complete black-box setting: it requires no knowledge of the victim's queries, the target retrieval model's parameters, or the underlying document corpus. By utilizing Document-Query Adversarial (DQ-A)…

" Someone Hid It": Query-Agnostic Black-Box Attacks on LLM-Based Retrieval
Evaluated models: Mistral 7B, Qwen 2.5 7B

Semantic Cache Collision Hijack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Semantic caching mechanisms in LLM applications are vulnerable to cross-tenant cache key collision attacks (CacheAttack) due to the inherent mathematical conflict between locality-preserving fuzzy hashing and cryptographic collision resistance (the avalanche effect). An attacker can leverage gradient-based search algorithms to optimize an adversarial discrete suffix that, when appended to a malicious prompt, forces its output embedding vector to collide with the embedding of a targeted benign…

From Similarity to Vulnerability: Key Collision Attack on LLM Semantic Caching
Evaluated models: Llama 3.1 8B, Mistral 7B, DeepSeek R1

Semantics-Preserving Detector Evasion

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

LLM-based vulnerability detection systems (used in static application security testing and code review pipelines) are susceptible to semantics-preserving adversarial evasion attacks. Attackers can bypass detection mechanisms by injecting gradient-optimized "universal adversarial strings" into specific code regions—defined as "carriers"—that do not alter the program's compilation or execution logic. These carriers include non-executable regions (code comments, inactive preprocessor directives)…

Syntax- and Compilation-Preserving Evasion of LLM Vulnerability Detectors
Evaluated models: Qwen 2.5 Coder 14B, Qwen 2.5 Coder 32B, Llama 3.1 8B+4 more
  • Qwen 2.5 Coder 14B
  • Qwen 2.5 Coder 32B
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • CodeAstra
  • StarCoder2 15B
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-5 Mini

Universal MLLM Target Matching

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Closed-source Multi-modal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are vulnerable to Universal Targeted Transferable Adversarial Attacks (UTTAA). An attacker can generate a single, image-agnostic adversarial perturbation ($\delta$) that, when added to any arbitrary source image, steers the victim model to output a description or classification matching a specific target image chosen by the attacker. This vulnerability exploits the transferability of adversarial features from open-source surrogate vision…

Universal Adversarial Attacks against Closed-Source MLLMs via Target-View Routed Meta Optimization
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Claude Sonnet 4.5, GPT-5+2 more
  • GPT-4o
  • Claude Sonnet 4.5
  • GPT-5
  • GPT-5.2
  • Claude Opus 4.5

Adaptive Multimodal Reasoning Jailbreaks

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

The paper reports a black-box jailbreak evaluation in which a ReAct-style loop adaptively rewrites unsafe text prompts and selectively applies blur, DCT filtering, or recoloring to image regions identified as safety-sensitive. The combined cross-modal strategy is intended to make harmful image-text requests appear less objectionable to a vision-language model while preserving enough semantics to elicit an answer. This is a specific, security-relevant evaluation, although the reported results…

Jailbreaks on Vision Language Model via Multimodal Reasoning
Evaluated models: Gemini 2.0 Flash

Autonomous Agent Prompt Reveal

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in Large Language Model (LLM) deployments and multi-agent systems where an autonomous attacker agent can systematically extract hidden system prompts through self-evolving interaction strategies. The vulnerability leverages a "JustAsk" framework which utilizes Upper Confidence Bound (UCB) exploration to dynamically select and refine attack vectors from a hierarchical taxonomy of 14 atomic skills (e.g., structural formatting, authority appeals) and 14 multi-turn…

Just Ask: Curious Code Agents Reveal System Prompts in Frontier LLMs
Evaluated models: o1, Llama 3.1 70B Hanami X1, Phi-4+38 more
  • o1
  • Llama 3.1 70B Hanami X1
  • Phi-4
  • Aion 1.0
  • Sonar Pro
  • Command A
  • Llama 4 Maverick
  • Llama 3.1 Nemotron Ultra 253B v1
  • Qwen 3 235B-A22B
  • Mercury
  • Hunyuan A13B Instruct
  • UI-TARS 1.5 7B
  • GPT-oss 120B
  • Jamba Mini 1.7
  • Hermes 4 70B
  • Step 3
  • LongCat Flash Chat
  • Tongyi DeepResearch 30B-A3B
  • Cydonia 24B v4.1
  • ERNIE 4.5 21B-A3B Thinking
  • Granite 4.0 H Micro
  • LFM2 8B-A1B
  • Nova Premier v1
  • Kimi K2 Thinking
  • KAT Coder Pro
  • Cogito v2.1 671B
  • Gemini 3 Pro Preview
  • Grok 4.1 Fast
  • Claude Opus 4.5
  • TNG R1T Chimera
  • Intellect 3
  • DeepSeek V3.2 Speciale
  • Trinity Mini
  • Mistral Large 2512
  • DeepSeek V3.1 Nex N1
  • MiMo V2 Flash
  • GLM-4.7
  • MiniMax M2.1
  • Seed 1.6
  • Molmo 2 8B
  • GPT-5.2 Codex

Cross-Image Contagion

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Multi-modal Large Language Models (MLLMs) capable of processing interleaved image-text sequences are vulnerable to a universal adversarial perturbation (UAP) attack known as LAMP. This vulnerability allows an attacker to generate a single, noise-based perturbation pattern using a surrogate model (e.g., Mantis-CLIP) that transfers effectively to black-box target models. The attack leverages two novel loss functions during perturbation learning: a "contagious" objective that manipulates…

LAMP: Learning Universal Adversarial Perturbations for Multi-Image Tasks via Pre-trained Models
Evaluated models: Mantis-CLIP, Mantis-SIGLIP, Mantis-Idefics2+4 more
  • Mantis-CLIP
  • Mantis-SIGLIP
  • Mantis-Idefics2
  • VILA 1.5
  • LLaVA 1.6
  • Qwen VL Chat
  • MiniGPT-4

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.