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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

Filtered research findings

610 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Emergent Character Misalignment

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs), specifically Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct and Qwen2.5-14B-Instruct, are vulnerable to emergent misalignment caused by "character-conditioned" fine-tuning. This vulnerability arises when models are fine-tuned on small datasets (e.g., 500 examples) that exhibit consistent behavioral dispositions (e.g., "Evil," "Sycophantic," or "Hallucinatory") rather than just incorrect facts. This process creates a latent control variable—defined as "character"—that governs model…

Character as a Latent Variable in Large Language Models: A Mechanistic Account of Emergent Misalignment and Conditional Safety Failures
Evaluated models: GPT-5, Llama 3.1 8B, Qwen 2.5 14B

Payment Protocol Whisper Attack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

The Google Agent Payments Protocol (AP2), specifically within the reference implementation built using the Google Agent Development Kit (ADK) and Gemini models, contains vulnerabilities allowing for both indirect and direct prompt injection. The architecture fails to sufficiently isolate the Large Language Model (LLM) context from untrusted external data sources and user inputs.

Whispers of Wealth: Red-Teaming Google's Agent Payments Protocol via Prompt Injection
Evaluated models: Gemini 2.5 Flash

Semantics-Preserving Detector Evasion

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

LLM-based vulnerability detection systems (used in static application security testing and code review pipelines) are susceptible to semantics-preserving adversarial evasion attacks. Attackers can bypass detection mechanisms by injecting gradient-optimized "universal adversarial strings" into specific code regions—defined as "carriers"—that do not alter the program's compilation or execution logic. These carriers include non-executable regions (code comments, inactive preprocessor directives)…

Syntax- and Compilation-Preserving Evasion of LLM Vulnerability Detectors
Evaluated models: Qwen 2.5 Coder 14B, Qwen 2.5 Coder 32B, Llama 3.1 8B+4 more
  • Qwen 2.5 Coder 14B
  • Qwen 2.5 Coder 32B
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • CodeAstra
  • StarCoder2 15B
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-5 Mini

Autonomous Agent Prompt Reveal

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in Large Language Model (LLM) deployments and multi-agent systems where an autonomous attacker agent can systematically extract hidden system prompts through self-evolving interaction strategies. The vulnerability leverages a "JustAsk" framework which utilizes Upper Confidence Bound (UCB) exploration to dynamically select and refine attack vectors from a hierarchical taxonomy of 14 atomic skills (e.g., structural formatting, authority appeals) and 14 multi-turn…

Just Ask: Curious Code Agents Reveal System Prompts in Frontier LLMs
Evaluated models: o1, Llama 3.1 70B Hanami X1, Phi-4+38 more
  • o1
  • Llama 3.1 70B Hanami X1
  • Phi-4
  • Aion 1.0
  • Sonar Pro
  • Command A
  • Llama 4 Maverick
  • Llama 3.1 Nemotron Ultra 253B v1
  • Qwen 3 235B-A22B
  • Mercury
  • Hunyuan A13B Instruct
  • UI-TARS 1.5 7B
  • GPT-oss 120B
  • Jamba Mini 1.7
  • Hermes 4 70B
  • Step 3
  • LongCat Flash Chat
  • Tongyi DeepResearch 30B-A3B
  • Cydonia 24B v4.1
  • ERNIE 4.5 21B-A3B Thinking
  • Granite 4.0 H Micro
  • LFM2 8B-A1B
  • Nova Premier v1
  • Kimi K2 Thinking
  • KAT Coder Pro
  • Cogito v2.1 671B
  • Gemini 3 Pro Preview
  • Grok 4.1 Fast
  • Claude Opus 4.5
  • TNG R1T Chimera
  • Intellect 3
  • DeepSeek V3.2 Speciale
  • Trinity Mini
  • Mistral Large 2512
  • DeepSeek V3.1 Nex N1
  • MiMo V2 Flash
  • GLM-4.7
  • MiniMax M2.1
  • Seed 1.6
  • Molmo 2 8B
  • GPT-5.2 Codex

LLM Grading Compliance Paradox

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) employed as automated code evaluators ("Universal Graders") are vulnerable to Semantic-Instruction Decoupling, a form of adversarial prompt injection that exploits the "Syntax-Semantics Gap." Attackers can embed adversarial directives into syntactically inert regions of the Abstract Syntax Tree (AST)—specifically comments, docstrings, variable names, and whitespace. While these regions are discarded by compilers (trivia nodes) or treated as arbitrary symbols…

The Compliance Paradox: Semantic-Instruction Decoupling in Automated Academic Code Evaluation
Evaluated models: GPT-5, Llama 3.1 8B, DeepSeek V3

LLM Router Rerouting

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

LLM routing systems are vulnerable to adversarial rerouting attacks where malicious triggers prepended to user queries manipulate the router's model-selection mechanism. Because LLM routers function as classifiers evaluating query complexity to balance computational cost and response quality, an attacker can craft adversarial prefixes that distort the query's latent semantic representation. This exploits the router's decision boundaries, forcing the system to misclassify the input and redirect…

RerouteGuard: Understanding and Mitigating Adversarial Risks for LLM Routing
Evaluated models: GPT-4, GPT-4o, GPT-5+2 more
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-5
  • Llama 3 8B
  • Mixtral 8x7B

Pathological Reasoning DoS

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) allows attackers to perform Prompt-Induced Inference-Time Denial-of-Service (PI-DoS) attacks by submitting short, semantically coherent adversarial prompts. These prompts, which often take the form of complex logic puzzles with nested dependencies or contradictory constraints, exploit the adaptive computation mechanism of LRMs to force the model into pathologically long, nearly non-terminating intermediate reasoning traces (e.g., generating…

ReasoningBomb: A Stealthy Denial-of-Service Attack by Inducing Pathologically Long Reasoning in Large Reasoning Models
Evaluated models: DeepSeek V3, Kimi K2 Instruct, DeepSeek R1+8 more
  • DeepSeek V3
  • Kimi K2 Instruct
  • DeepSeek R1
  • DeepSeek R1 Distill Qwen 32B
  • MiniMax M2
  • Nemotron 3 Nano 30B-A3B
  • Qwen 3 30B-A3B Thinking
  • Qwen 3 32B
  • Claude Sonnet 4.5
  • GPT-5
  • Gemini 3 Pro Preview

Persona Adherence Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) deployed as Role-Playing Agents (RPAs) are vulnerable to Persona-Targeted Jailbreaks. When an LLM is prompted to adopt a persona—particularly characters with negative, risky, or villainous traits—the model's optimization for role fidelity frequently overrides its foundational safety alignment. Attackers can exploit this vulnerability by synthesizing queries that leverage the specific narrative background, ideology, or psychological vulnerabilities of the assigned…

Stay in Character, Stay Safe: Dual-Cycle Adversarial Self-Evolution for Safety Role-Playing Agents
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Llama 3 8B, Qwen 2.5 7B+1 more
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 3 8B
  • Qwen 2.5 7B
  • Gemma 2 9B

Intent-Context Coupling Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs), including GPT-4o, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, and Llama 3, are vulnerable to an "Intent-Context Coupling" multi-turn jailbreak attack (automated by the ICON framework). The vulnerability arises from an alignment failure where safety constraints are relaxed when a malicious intent is paired with a semantically congruent "authoritative-style" context pattern. By routing specific prohibited intents (e.g., Hacking) to pre-optimized context patterns (e.g., Scientific Research…

ICON: Intent-Context Coupling for Efficient Multi-Turn Jailbreak Attack
Evaluated models: Llama 4 Maverick Instruct, Llama 3.1 405B Instruct, Qwen-Max 2025-01-25+8 more
  • Llama 4 Maverick Instruct
  • Llama 3.1 405B Instruct
  • Qwen-Max 2025-01-25
  • DeepSeek V3.2
  • GPT-5.1 2025-11-13
  • GPT-4o 2024-11-20
  • Claude Sonnet 4.5 20250929
  • Gemini 3 Pro Preview
  • Llama Guard 3 8B
  • Llama Guard 4 12B
  • WildGuard

LLM Soft Hate Policy Bypass

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) and dedicated content moderation systems (including safety guards and encoder-based classifiers) are vulnerable to "Soft Hate" evasion attacks. This vulnerability arises when hostile standpoints are encoded through defeasible reasoning structures—specifically formalized by the Argumentum Model of Topics (AMT)—rather than explicit lexical toxicity. Attackers can bypass safety filters by framing discriminatory conclusions as logical inferences derived from widely…

SoftHateBench: Evaluating Moderation Models Against Reasoning-Driven, Policy-Compliant Hostility
Evaluated models: HateBERT, HateRoBERTa, Llama Guard 3 1B+7 more
  • HateBERT
  • HateRoBERTa
  • Llama Guard 3 1B
  • Qwen 3 Guard 4B
  • ShieldGemma 2B
  • DeepSeek V3.1
  • GPT-5 Mini
  • Llama 3.2 3B
  • Gemma 3 4B
  • Qwen 3 4B

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.