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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

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340 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Multi-Agent Jailbreak Strategy

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in multiple LLMs allowing attackers to elicit harmful responses by strategically distributing malicious intent across multiple turns in a conversation. The vulnerability is not detected by single-turn safety measures, as the harmful intent is only revealed through a sequence of seemingly benign prompts. The vulnerability is exacerbated by the use of techniques such as prompt optimization that dynamically adjust prompts based on model responses, maximizing the likelihood…

X-teaming: Multi-turn jailbreaks and defenses with adaptive multi-agents
Evaluated models: Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Claude 3.7 Sonnet, DeepSeek V3+7 more
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • Claude 3.7 Sonnet
  • DeepSeek V3
  • Gemini 2.0 Flash
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 3 70B Instruct
  • Llama 3 8B Instruct
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Qwen 2.5 32B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 7B

Genetic Scenario Shift Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in Large Language Models (LLMs) allows attackers to bypass safety mechanisms and elicit detailed harmful responses by strategically manipulating input prompts. The vulnerability exploits the LLM's sensitivity to "scenario shifts"—contextual changes in the input that influence the model's output, even when the core malicious request remains the same. A genetic algorithm can optimize these scenario shifts, increasing the likelihood of obtaining detailed harmful responses while…

Geneshift: Impact of different scenario shift on Jailbreaking LLM
Evaluated models: GPT-4o Mini

Benign-Prompt Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit Defense Threshold Decay (DTD): generating substantial benign content shifts the model's attention from the input prompt to prior outputs, increasing susceptibility to jailbreak attacks. The "Sugar-Coated Poison" (SCP) attack exploits this by first generating benign content, then transitioning to malicious output.

Sugar-Coated Poison: Benign Generation Unlocks LLM Jailbreaking
Evaluated models: Claude 3.5 Sonnet, DeepSeek R1, GPT-3.5 Turbo+3 more
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • DeepSeek R1
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • Llama 3.1 405B
  • Mixtral 8x22B

Generative Reward Hacking

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

State-of-the-art Reward Models (RMs) utilized in Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) exhibit poor out-of-distribution (OOD) generalization, making them susceptible to adversarial inputs. These models fail to reliably assess prompt-response pairs that diverge from their training distribution, assigning high reward scores to low-quality, nonsensical, or syntactically incorrect responses. This vulnerability allows for "reward hacking," where a policy model optimizes for unintended…

Adversarial training of reward models
Evaluated models: Llama 3.1 8B, Llama 3.3 70B, DeepSeek R1+1 more
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Llama 3.3 70B
  • DeepSeek R1
  • Gemma 2 27B

Multimodal Contextual Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are vulnerable to a jailbreaking attack, dubbed PiCo, that leverages token-level typographic attacks on images embedded within code-style instructions. The attack bypasses multi-tiered defense mechanisms, including input filtering and runtime monitoring, by exploiting weaknesses in the visual modality's integration with programming contexts. Harmful intent is concealed within visually benign image fragments and code instructions, circumventing safety…

PiCo: Jailbreaking Multimodal Large Language Models via Pictorial Code Contextualization
Evaluated models: Gemini 1.0 Pro Vision, GPT-4 Turbo, GPT-4o+2 more
  • Gemini 1.0 Pro Vision
  • GPT-4 Turbo
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4V
  • LLaVA 1.5

Multi-Accent Audio Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Multilingual and multi-accent audio inputs, combined with acoustic adversarial perturbations (reverberation, echo, whisper effects), can bypass safety mechanisms in Large Audio Language Models (LALMs), causing them to generate unsafe or harmful outputs. The vulnerability is amplified by the interaction between acoustic and linguistic variations, particularly in languages with less training data.

Multilingual and Multi-Accent Jailbreaking of Audio LLMs
Evaluated models: DIVA Llama 3 v0 8B, MERaLion AudioLLM, MiniCPM-o 2.6+2 more
  • DIVA Llama 3 v0 8B
  • MERaLion AudioLLM
  • MiniCPM-o 2.6
  • Qwen 2 Audio
  • Ultravox

Schema-Guided LLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) with structured output APIs (e.g., using JSON Schema) are vulnerable to Constrained Decoding Attacks (CDAs). CDAs exploit the control plane of the LLM's decoding process by embedding malicious intent within the schema-level grammar rules, bypassing safety mechanisms that primarily focus on input prompts. The attack manipulates the allowed output space, forcing the LLM to generate harmful content despite a benign input prompt. One instance of a CDA is the Chain Enum…

Output Constraints as Attack Surface: Exploiting Structured Generation to Bypass LLM Safety Mechanisms
Evaluated models: Gemini 2.0 Flash, Gemma 2 9B, GPT-4o+5 more
  • Gemini 2.0 Flash
  • Gemma 2 9B
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Mistral Nemo
  • Phi 3.5 MoE
  • Qwen 2.5 32B

Segmented Prompt Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) incorporating safety filters are vulnerable to a "Prompt, Divide, and Conquer" attack. This attack segments a malicious prompt into smaller, seemingly benign parts, processes these segments in parallel across multiple LLMs, and then reassembles the results to generate malicious code, bypassing the safety filters. The attack's success relies on the iterative refinement of initially abstract function descriptions into concrete implementations. Individual LLM safety…

Prompt, Divide, and Conquer: Bypassing Large Language Model Safety Filters via Segmented and Distributed Prompt Processing
Evaluated models: Claude 3.5 Haiku, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Gemini 1.5 Pro+3 more
  • Claude 3.5 Haiku
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • Gemini 1.5 Pro
  • GPT-4 Turbo
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini

Multimodal Narrative Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are vulnerable to a novel attack vector leveraging narrative-driven visual storytelling and role immersion to circumvent built-in safety mechanisms. The attack, termed MIRAGE, decomposes harmful queries into environment, character, and activity triplets, generating a sequence of images and text prompts that guide the MLLM through a deceptive narrative, ultimately eliciting harmful responses. The attack successfully exploits the MLLM's cross-modal…

MIRAGE: Multimodal Immersive Reasoning and Guided Exploration for Red-Team Jailbreak Attacks
Evaluated models: Gemini 1.5 Pro, GPT-4V, Grok 2 Vision+3 more
  • Gemini 1.5 Pro
  • GPT-4V
  • Grok 2 Vision
  • InternVL
  • LLaVA Mistral
  • Qwen VL

Implicit Prompt Code Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) used for code generation are vulnerable to a jailbreaking attack that leverages implicit malicious prompts. The attack exploits the fact that existing safety mechanisms primarily rely on explicit malicious intent within the prompt instructions. By embedding malicious intent implicitly within a benign-appearing commit message accompanying a code request (e.g., in a simulated software evolution scenario), the attacker can bypass the LLM's safety filters and induce…

Smoke and Mirrors: Jailbreaking LLM-based Code Generation via Implicit Malicious Prompts
Evaluated models: Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Code Llama 13B Instruct, DeepSeek Coder 7B+3 more
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • Code Llama 13B Instruct
  • DeepSeek Coder 7B
  • DeepSeek V3
  • GPT-4
  • Qwen Plus

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.