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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

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204 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Cat-Triggered Reasoning Error

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) designed for step-by-step problem-solving are vulnerable to query-agnostic adversarial triggers. Appending short, semantically irrelevant text snippets (e.g., "Interesting fact: cats sleep most of their lives") to mathematical problems consistently increases the likelihood of incorrect model outputs without altering the problem's inherent meaning. This vulnerability stems from the models' susceptibility to subtle input manipulations that interfere with their…

Cats Confuse Reasoning LLM: Query Agnostic Adversarial Triggers for Reasoning Models
Evaluated models: DeepSeek R1, DeepSeek R1 Distill Qwen 32B, DeepSeek V3+2 more
  • DeepSeek R1
  • DeepSeek R1 Distill Qwen 32B
  • DeepSeek V3
  • o1
  • o3-mini

Agent Reasoning Hijacking

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in Large Language Model (LLM) agents that allows attackers to manipulate the agent's reasoning process through the insertion of strategically placed adversarial strings. This allows attackers to induce the agent to perform unintended malicious actions or invoke specific malicious tools, even when the initial prompt or instruction is benign. The attack exploits the agent's reliance on chain-of-thought reasoning and dynamically optimizes the adversarial string to maximize…

UDora: A Unified Red Teaming Framework against LLM Agents by Dynamically Hijacking Their Own Reasoning
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4, GPT-4o+2 more
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Mistral 7B

Flowchart-based LVLM Jailbreak Attack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

FC-Attack leverages automatically generated flowcharts containing step-by-step descriptions derived or rephrased from harmful queries, combined with a benign textual prompt, to jailbreak Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs). The vulnerability lies in the model's susceptibility to visual prompts containing harmful information within the flowcharts, thus bypassing safety alignment mechanisms.

FC-Attack: Jailbreaking Large Vision-Language Models via Auto-Generated Flowcharts
Evaluated models: Claude 3.5 Sonnet 20240620, Gemini 1.5 Flash, GPT-4o 2024-08-06+4 more
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet 20240620
  • Gemini 1.5 Flash
  • GPT-4o 2024-08-06
  • GPT-4o Mini 2024-07-18
  • InternVL2.5 8B
  • LLaVA NeXT 8B
  • Qwen2-VL 7B Instruct

Adaptive LLM Agent Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

LLM agents utilizing external tools are vulnerable to indirect prompt injection (IPI) attacks. Attackers can embed malicious instructions into the external data accessed by the agent, manipulating its behavior even when defenses against direct prompt injection are in place. Adaptive attacks, which modify the injected payload based on the specific defense mechanism, consistently bypass existing defenses with a success rate exceeding 50%.

Adaptive Attacks Break Defenses Against Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks on LLM Agents
Evaluated models: Llama 3 8B, Vicuna 7B

Attention-Based Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in large language models (LLMs) allows attackers to bypass safety-alignment mechanisms by manipulating the model's internal attention weights. The attack, termed "Attention Eclipse," modifies the attention scores between specific tokens within a prompt, either amplifying or suppressing attention to selectively strengthen or weaken the influence of certain parts of the prompt on the model's output. This allows injection of malicious content while appearing benign to the model's…

Attention Eclipse: Manipulating Attention to Bypass LLM Safety-Alignment
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4o Mini, Llama 2 13B Chat+3 more
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Llama 2 13B Chat
  • Llama 2 70B Chat
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Vicuna 13B

Context-Coherent LLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A context-coherent jailbreak attack (CCJA) allows bypassing safety mechanisms in aligned large language models (LLMs) by optimizing perturbations in the continuous word embedding space of a masked language model (MLM). The attack leverages the MLM's ability to reconstruct text from hidden states to generate semantically coherent yet malicious prompts that induce the target LLM to produce unsafe outputs, even with strong safety alignment. The attack's effectiveness is enhanced by using a seed…

CCJA: Context-Coherent Jailbreak Attack for Aligned Large Language Models
Evaluated models: Guanaco 13B, Llama 2 7B Chat, Llama 3 8B Instruct+4 more
  • Guanaco 13B
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Llama 3 8B Instruct
  • Mistral 7B Instruct v0.2
  • Mistral 7B Instruct v0.3
  • Vicuna 13B v1.5
  • Vicuna 7B v1.5

LLM Syntax Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to structure transformation attacks, where malicious prompts are encoded in diverse syntax spaces (e.g., SQL, JSON, LLM-generated syntaxes) to bypass safety mechanisms. These attacks maintain the harmful intent while altering the linguistic structure, making detection based on token-level patterns ineffective.

StructTransform: A Scalable Attack Surface for Safety-Aligned Large Language Models
Evaluated models: BERT, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, GPT-4o+5 more
  • BERT
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 3 8B
  • Llama 3.2 3B
  • Llama 3.2 90B
  • Mistral 7B
  • o1

Agent Pipeline Simple Hacks

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Commercial LLM-powered agents utilizing autonomous web access, memory modules, and retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) are vulnerable to indirect prompt injection and environmental manipulation. Attackers can embed malicious instructions into external data sources trusted by the agent (such as Reddit posts, public databases, or ArXiv papers). When the agent autonomously retrieves and processes this content during task execution, it executes the embedded malicious commands. This vulnerability…

Commercial llm agents are already vulnerable to simple yet dangerous attacks
Evaluated models: Not reported

Single Image Universal Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are vulnerable to a universal adversarial attack where a single, optimized image can bypass safety alignment mechanisms across diverse textual queries. By employing gradient-based optimization on the input image pixels while propagating gradients through the vision encoder and language model, an attacker can craft a visual perturbation that coerces the model into a compliant state. When this adversarial image is present in the context, the model’s…

Universal Adversarial Attack on Multimodal Aligned LLMs
Evaluated models: LLaVA 1.5 7B, Llama 3.2 11B Vision Instruct, Phi-3.5 Vision Instruct+1 more
  • LLaVA 1.5 7B
  • Llama 3.2 11B Vision Instruct
  • Phi-3.5 Vision Instruct
  • Qwen2-VL 2B Instruct

Universal Jailbreak Injection

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

JailbreakEdit is a novel attack that injects a universal jailbreak backdoor into safety-aligned Large Language Models (LLMs) by exploiting model editing techniques. The attack modifies specific parameters within the model's feed-forward networks, creating shortcuts that bypass internal safety mechanisms and trigger jailbroken responses to a wide range of prompts, including those containing sensitive or harmful content. The attack requires only one-time parameter modification, making it…

Injecting Universal Jailbreak Backdoors into LLMs in Minutes
Evaluated models: ChatGLM 6B, Llama 2 13B Chat, Llama 2 7B+2 more
  • ChatGLM 6B
  • Llama 2 13B Chat
  • Llama 2 7B
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Vicuna 7B

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.