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Last analyzed 9/9/2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1123 evaluated models

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204 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Published 9/1/2025
Analyzed 12/9/2025

Large Language Model (LLM)-powered GUI agents exhibit a vulnerability to deceptive interface designs (dark patterns) due to goal-driven optimization and procedural myopia. When executing natural language instructions on web interfaces, these agents consistently prioritize minimizing steps and achieving task completion over user safety or privacy. Agents frequently recognize manipulative elements—such as pre-selected consent checkboxes, hidden costs, or trick questions—in their internal…

Dark Patterns Meet GUI Agents: LLM Agent Susceptibility to Manipulative Interfaces and the Role of Human Oversight
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Claude 3.7 Sonnet, DeepSeek V3 +1 more

Source: arXiv

Published 9/1/2025
Analyzed 12/30/2025

Large Language Models (LLMs), including proprietary and open-weight state-of-the-art systems, are vulnerable to automated, self-evolving adversarial attacks orchestrated by multi-agent frameworks. The vulnerability exists because current safety alignment strategies (RLHF, static safety filters) fail to generalize against the "SafeEvalAgent" attack vector. In this vector, an "Analyst" agent analyzes model refusals to iteratively refine attack strategies, while a "Specialist" agent grounds these…

SafeEvalAgent: Toward Agentic and Self-Evolving Safety Evaluation of LLMs
Evaluated models: GPT-5, GPT-5 Chat Latest, Gemini 2.5 Pro +7 more

Source: arXiv

Published 9/1/2025
Analyzed 12/9/2025

The evaluated MetaGPT multi-agent systems are vulnerable to "Web Fraud Attacks" due to insufficient semantic and structural validation of Uniform Resource Locators (URLs) by agentic models. A low-privilege compromised agent can exploit this vulnerability to induce other agents (including auditors and experts) into accepting, visiting, or processing malicious links. The vulnerability leverages the LLM's inability to distinguish between benign and malicious link structures when obfuscation…

Web fraud attacks against llm-driven multi-agent systems
Evaluated models: GPT-4o Mini, Gemini 2.5 Flash, DeepSeek Reasoner +1 more

Source: arXiv

Published 9/1/2025
Analyzed 1/14/2026

Multi-agent Large Language Model (LLM) systems are vulnerable to compositional privacy leakage, a flaw where sensitive information is exposed through the aggregation of individually benign responses from distinct agents. In distributed architectures where data is siloed (e.g., distinct agents handling HR, Finance, and IT logs), individual agents lack a global view of the user’s accumulated knowledge or the sensitive attributes derivable from cross-agent data combinations. An attacker can…

The Sum Leaks More Than Its Parts: Compositional Privacy Risks and Mitigations in Multi-Agent Collaboration
Evaluated models: Qwen 3 32B, Gemini 2.5 Pro, GPT-5

Source: arXiv

Published 9/1/2025
Analyzed 1/14/2026

AdvEDM reveals a vulnerability in Vision-Language Model (VLM) based Embodied Decision-Making (EDM) systems, such as those used in autonomous driving and robotic manipulation. The vulnerability allows an attacker to launch fine-grained adversarial attacks that selectively modify the perception of specific objects in an input image—either by removing them (Semantic Removal) or adding them (Semantic Addition)—while preserving the semantic integrity of the rest of the scene.

AdvEDM: Fine-grained Adversarial Attack against VLM-based Embodied Agents
Evaluated models: BLIP-2, MiniGPT-4, LLaVA-v2 +5 more

Source: arXiv

Published 9/1/2025
Analyzed 12/8/2025

Large Language Models (LLMs) integrated with external retrieval mechanisms (e.g., Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG), web search, or email processing) are vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection. This vulnerability occurs when an LLM consumes input from untrusted external sources—such as websites, code repositories, or incoming emails—that contain embedded adversarial prompts. Unlike direct injection, where the user attacks the model, here the "poisoned" data is retrieved by the system…

Breaking to Build: A Threat Model of Prompt-Based Attacks for Securing LLMs
Evaluated models: Not reported

Source: arXiv

Published 9/1/2025
Analyzed 2/21/2026

The GPT-OSS-20B large language model contains critical failures in its alignment and Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning mechanisms, specifically in how it prioritizes numerical objectives and validates procedural structure. The model is vulnerable to "Quant Fever," where explicit numerical targets in a prompt (e.g., "delete 90% of files") override contextual safety constraints (e.g., "do not delete important files"). Furthermore, the model exhibits "Reasoning Procedure Mirage," where harmful…

Quant Fever, Reasoning Blackholes, Schrodinger's Compliance, and More: Probing GPT-OSS-20B
Evaluated models: Not reported

Source: arXiv

Published 9/1/2025
Analyzed 10/13/2025

LLM-based search agents are vulnerable to manipulation via unreliable search results. An attacker can craft a website containing malicious content (e.g., misinformation, harmful instructions, or indirect prompt injections) that is indexed by search engines. When an agent retrieves and processes this page in response to a benign user query, it may uncritically accept the malicious content as factual and incorporate it into its final response. This allows the agent to be used as a vector for…

SafeSearch: Automated Red-Teaming for the Safety of LLM-Based Search Agents
Evaluated models: DeepSeek R1, Gemini 2.5 Flash, Gemini 2.5 Pro +11 more

Source: arXiv

Published 8/1/2025
Analyzed 12/8/2025

Large Language Models (LLMs) and Vision-Language Models (VLMs) are vulnerable to an automated, adaptive role-play jailbreak attack known as GUARD (Guideline Upholding Test through Adaptive Role-play and Jailbreak Diagnostics). The vulnerability exists because the models fail to recognize malicious intent when harmful queries are embedded within complex, iteratively optimized "playing scenarios."

GUARD: Guideline Upholding Test through Adaptive Role-play and Jailbreak Diagnostics for LLMs
Evaluated models: Vicuna 13B, LongChat 7B, Llama 2 7B +5 more

Source: arXiv

Published 8/1/2025
Analyzed 2/22/2026

A vulnerability exists in the tool selection mechanisms of Large Language Model (LLM) agents, identified as the "Attractive Metadata Attack" (AMA). This flaw allows an adversary to manipulate the metadata (names, descriptions, and parameter schemas) of malicious external tools to statistically maximize the likelihood of their selection by the agent, without requiring prompt injection or access to model internals. The vulnerability exploits the agent’s semantic scoring function used to map user…

Attractive Metadata Attack: Inducing LLM Agents to Invoke Malicious Tools
Evaluated models: GPT-4o Mini, Llama 3.3 70B Instruct, Qwen 2.5 32B Instruct +2 more

Source: arXiv

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.